SOME COMMENTS ON CITIZENSHIP ROLES

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The idea of citizenship or membership in a political community has had many different meanings and emphases. Aristotle, for example, describes the citizen as «a man who shares in the administration of justice and the holding of office», or as one who enjoys the right of such sharing.[1] It is quite clear that the most important attribute of citizenship to Aristotle is the honor and privilege of participation in the state. In fact, he notes that citizen excellence can only be attained by those who have sufficient leisure from menial occupations to participate in public affairs.[2]

Thomas Hobbes regards the key feature of membership in the commonwealth as subjugation, service, and loyalty to the sovereign. In order to escape the anarchy of the «State of Nature» men make a contract to establish an all-powerful leviathan,... and therein... submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgements to his judgement.»[3] Government requires complete obedience and submission to a coercive power. By the very fact that man have contracted out of the state of nature, they have authorized their own necessary subjugation.

Acquinas, although very conscious of the necessity of political life to man, even to the extent of claiming that goodness is achieved in political community and that this communal good may be superior to the individual good,[4] is at pains to note that an important part of man's existence is separate from political membership. «Not all that a man has or is, is subject to political obligation: hence it is not necessary that all of his actions be considered worthy of praise or blame with respect to the political community.»[5] Man has, in modern terms, non-citizenship roles. Acquinas emphasizes personal, Christian ones.

At this point it appears that at least three distinct concepts

have received the consideration of great minds at word on problems of citizenship or political membership: participation in communal affairs, subjugation or service to the communal entity, and participation in extra-political situations. These three elements are particularly interesting for they are not peculiar to the three men just mentioned; they can be seen in the works of many thinkers of different times and places. Insofar as citizens both contribute to the making of the «general will» and are subject to it, Rousseau's thought envisions both participation and obedience.[6]   Thomas Paine, though very concerned with political problems, felt that government was a necessary evil which should impose as few restraints upon citizens' other roles as possible. «Government is nothing more than a national association... Everyone wishes to pursue his occupation, and to enjoy the fruits of his labors and the produce of his property in peace and safety, and with the least possible expense.   When these things are accomplished, all the things for which government ought to be established are answered.[7] T.H. Green's political thought was greatly concerned with the individual and his ability to «realize his reason» and achieve self-perfection. As a central concept in this achievement, he envisioned citizen obedience and duty to the state. «It is thus the social duty of the individual to conform, and he can have no right... that is against his social duty; no right to anything or to do anything that is not involved in the ability to do his duty.»[8]

Nor is concern with these three elements of citizenship confined to past times. Recent more or less scholarly literature seems to follow similar lines. Ogg has written of problems of citizen participation,[9] Grodzins has discussed the question of continuing loyalty and obedience,[10] and T.I. Cook has emphasized the need for attention to non-citizenship roles.[11] Roelofs has explicitly stated that the idea of citizenship contains the three «ingredients» of participation, loyalty, and privacy from political demands.[12] He extracts each of these from established traditions of thought.

It seems fairly well established that these three elements of citizenship or political membership have occured severally or collectively to many great thinkers. However, none of those mentioned are political theorists in the systematic, empirical sense of the term. For our purposes it must be asked if their

tools and concepts can be adapted in such manner as to provide a framework for generating testable hypotheses and suggesting meaningful research. A realistic answer to such a question seems to be this; these thinkers did not dream their ideas up out of whole cloth; they are probably based to some extent on insightful if not systematically empirical observation of actual roles of citizens. As it takes insight to get any meaning out of empirical observation, these ideas are far from irrelevant. They certainly seem worthy of use as a starting point in attempting a rigorous, systematic analysis.

Exactly what are these three ingredients or components of citizenship with which we have chosen to work ? They are categories of individual behaviour. And it is exactly these that we wish to better understand.   They are the matter about which we wish to theorize. They are the very subject of this work.

In examining this behaviour, what actors must be considered ? First, it is obvious that individuals themselves must be looked at, for they are the key elements, the citizens. It is also clear that political authorities must be considered, for it is impossible to think of citizens without such. Citizenship behaviour is directed toward or occurs in response to political authorities.

The question of the nature of the political authorities presents some difficulty.   Easton analyzes supportive behaviour of citizens, that is, behaviour indicative of loyalty to the «political system», into three elements; support for the community, regime, and government.[13] Support for the community consists in feelings and actions expressing the desirability of association of particular peoples, while support for the regime deals with concessus on the extent rules of the political game, and support for the government is self explanatory.   Doubtless there are three distinct types of political authority involved here. but in any given situation, there are not three separate authorities, one corresponding to each level of support. Rather there is only one set of authorities. This set of authorities, the current office holders, not only carries out individual government policy, but also defends against attacks upon the regime or community by exercising the appropriate sanctions. Hence, it would seem that to speak of «the political authorities» as one of the ele-

ments of this scheme is acceptable if we remember that the au·
thorities may play several roles.

In addition to individuals and authorities, our scheme must
contain another element, that of groups. The importance of in-
cluding groups in a political analysis can now hardly be doubt-
ed. Truman notes that it is impossible to consider politics with-
out observing the common habits of response which grouped
individuals exhibit. Individuals behave only in groups. They are
real only through groups.[14] The concept of public opinion in a
democracy as a resultant of competition among interested
groups[15] is probably widespread enough to make further com-
mentary on the importance of groups in democratic politics un-
necessary.

However, since Michels wrote his *Political Parties* it has
been difficult to speak of groups without mentioning the small,
oligarchical leadership cliques which come to dominate most
organizations.[16] There is much evidence to support the existence
of such obligarchical tendencies. To use Almond's terms,
there are always «interest elites» which occupy a dominant
position with respect to individuals who comprise the mass
«publics».[17] That is to say, elites often determine the entire
character of a group's action. In such cases the elite practically
becomes synonymous with the group as an actor. This cannot
be neglected, and in our interpretation the idea of group will
strongly incorporate the idea of leading interest elites.

In attempting to create a picture of the three dimensional
roles of citizens, we find that there are three distinct actors. It
now remains to inquire into the relationships that exist between
these elements.   In this way it may be possible to see more
clearly some of the determinants of the behaviour which goes
into the making of the three ingredients or components of
citizenship.   Development of a scheme depicting how these ac-
tors might behave toward one another should provide some
useful hypotheses about that which we are investigating, citizen-
ship roles.

The first relationship to be considered is that between in-
dividuals as individuals and the political authorities. Obviously,

an important part of the «loyalty» dimension of citizenship has to do with this relationship. We are here primarily concerned with loyalty as represented by Easton's supports for the regime and community rather than supports of an individual government. At this point it would be possible to discuss the *purpose* of the individual-authority relationship. One could argue whether the relationship had to do with the skilled application of manipulative technique by superiors rightfully in authority or whether the relationship represented a popular delegation to authorities in order to satisfy needs.[18] But arguing over purpose doesn't lead very far. Certainly both manipulation and serving of needs occur. It is more important to inquire into why individuals are loyal to political authorities in terms of what observably happens between individuals and authorities. It is possible to examine four such occurrences in these terms.

First, it is obvious that authorities engage in extensive indoctrination programs to build loyalties to the extent system. «... every modern state develops a far reaching program designed to maintain the morale of its constituent members to a point where their activities will fit in with and perform the functional activities necessary for group survival.»[19] This sort of training or politicization, which is for the most part unconsciously accepted, is an extremely important method of generating support.[20] The techniques of such indoctrination programs are extremely familiar. Through compulsory childhood education, vast amounts of patriotic propaganda are disseminated. Men's attitudes are shaped by symbols transmitted through a common language, press, and literature. Personification of the state and other manipulation of symbols conspire to create a strong body of sentiment.[21]

Through official and unofficial means, this important part of citizenship roles is defined. Society simultaneously builds a system of rewards and punishments for conforming to these roles or failing to do so. Failure to conform leads to rejection by the society through the application of official punishment such as jail or through a usually less severe unofficial sanction. Individuals soon learn that to conform is to follow the line of least resistence.[22]

Closely related to indoctrination in individual-authority re-
lationships is the phenomenon of habit. That is to say, people
are loyal to a system because they perform the necessary
supportative behaviour out of habit. Mosca observed that «pub-
lic morality» was nothing more than this. He saw an innate
altruism in man which was necessary for social living. This
altruism becomes a society's «juridicial defense» when obedience
to laws is habitually secured.[23] Although fear of sanction is
deemed to help produce conforming behaviour, sheer custom
and tradition of obedience is seen as more important in es-
tablishing social consensus.[24] «Habit keeps society together
in every stage of history.»[25]

A third element in the loyalty component of individual-
authority relationships might be called psychological identifica-
tion with the state. For the mass of mankind, who live a mean,
insignificant, routine life, identification with the nation, seen
as great and impressive, is very pleasing. One can feel that he
is participating in the momentous acts of the official authori-
ties. Obviously this is very closely related to indoctrination as
discussed above, as such feelings are emotionalized by the
ritual and myth of patriotism. Feelings of commonness, of
national distinctiveness, of homogeneity are important here.
In sum, as is the case with habitual loyalty, psychological
identification is in part the indiviual response to the stimulus
of indoctrination.

The fourth and perhaps basic element in the establishment
of loyalty may be termed demand satisfaction. That is to say,
policy outputs must give people something of at least basic
demands to insure inputs in terms of supportative behav-
iour.[26] Tradition and custom may insure loyalty for a short
time, it is said, but ultimately the system must prove useful to
its constituents.[28] Of course satisfaction needn't be constant,
for «reserves of support» are built up from past satisfactions,
but it cannot be neglected entirely.[29]

The idea of demand satisfactions, however, has another
important side. Most interests that political authorities must
serve are group interests. It is important to serve values of
an economic, religious, professional, or other nature. It is obvious

that we must return to the position of demand satisfaction in loyalty when groups are brought into the analysis.

Thus, insofar as the relationship between individuals and political authorities has to do with loyalty, it may be analysed into four elements. The idea of loyalty implies that individuals regard political authorities as legitimate, that is, as authoritative in the strict sense of the term. If we accept Easton's definition of authority as a relationship in which[30] a subject does someone's bidding without contemplating his action, we can easily see that the four elements tend to establish an authority relation. We can thus posit that as the four elements vary, so will the authority of the political authorities, and that a breakdown of any of the four will impair legitimacy and authority. This seems to follow rather obviously.

There is another completely different aspect of the relationship between individuals and political authorities. It is so obvious as almost to be unworthy of mention. People invest particular sets of office holders through voting behaviour. This is clearly an important part of the participation dimension of citizenship. It is included here for the sake of completeness.

We now turn to the second relationship between the actors of the citizenship picture; that between groups or interest elites and the political authorities. It immediately appears that groups play an important role in the citizenship component of participation. Even superficially, they would appear to be vehicles for participation. At one time, citizen participation was thought to contribute to the forming of some sort of «general interest», with any sort of group interest regarded as an evil perversion. But this picture could not stand in the face of reality. Earlier works like Herring's *Group Representation Before Congress* helped to build images of «the farmer» or «the worker» as participants in the political process instead of «the common man» participating in forming the national interest.[32] That is to say, it was realized that «public opinion» which affects policy was not a product of everyone's opinion, but rather only of those or persons who organized for expression. Policies tend to become compromises over the lines of least resistance between the wills of special group.[33]

As Bently observes, «public opinion» is a group phenomenon. «It arises out of certain definately felt evils among groups of the population.»[34] Parties and interest groups are organized manifestations of public opinion which affect policy. The various kinds of contacts which occur between group elites and political authorities and the ways in which group pressures become the building blocks of policy are perhaps best documented in Truman's *Governmental Process.*

We might ask how to characterize this policy making relationship. Although the sum total of group pressures might be said to authoritatively determine policy, it is certain that most individual relationship are persuasive only. The power of a group is rarely authoritative for an official. Presumably he weighs the significance of each bid rather carefully, rather than meekly submitting. The effectiveness of a group's policy overtured independent upon consistent member voting behaviour, and this is rarely absolutely reliable.

There is another aspect of group-political authority relationships which deal with the loyalty component of citizenship. This is closely related to demand satisfaction as discussed under individual-authority relations. We are told that political authority is in definite danger if those are strong «unassimilated» groups in the society.[35] That is to say, groups tend to support political society when they derive visible benefits from it. If group leaders are provided with effective access to legitimate political institutions, the group becomes assimilated and remains loyal.[36]

An example of this phenomenon is visible in the emergence of organized labor to political power in various political systems. Where labor leaders were not able to participate in the political decisions, they tended to be very critical of the whole system. But with the increasing political strength of labor, due to suffrage extensions and other factors, political access and effectiveness of the leaders also increased, and their antagonism to the system decreased.[37] They gained power, were assimilated, and became apologists for the system.

The danger of a dissatisfied elite to a nation is not something that has only recently been realized. Hamilton's scheme for consciously building loyalties to the new American nation included providing services to prominent elites, in this case primarily economic and commercial, so that these elites might identify their interests with that of the nation. The powerful had to have access.[38]

Loyalty, then, is in part contingent upon group elites' feelings of assimilation and access. It might be speculated that the loyalty of the group elites increases as do their feelings of such access and assimilation to the political system.

The final relationship with which we must deal is that between individuals and their groups on the elites of such groups. This relationship will receive more attention than the others herein considered. This is so because contemplation of it seems to lead to concepts which unify the entire citizenship picture with which we are trying to deal and because it appears more interesting to the writer. Since most groups are primarily non-political, considerations of this relationship is bound to involve non-citizenship roles. Also, since «Mass democracy means the struggle of powerful and large scale interest groups and associations which stand between the big decisions that are made by the state... and the will of the individual citizen as a member of the public,»[89] it would seem that some reference to the participation dimension of citizenship must be made at this point.

First of all, it is necessary to discuss the most obvious factor of individual-group relationships: the iron law of oligarchy. Most associations, although they may be extremely democratic in formal organization, come to be run by a small, «one party» oligarchy. Many studies have confirmed Michels' assertion that organization is oligarchy. Moreover, conscious attempts to destroy organizational oligarchy, to actualize formal democratic devices, have largely failed. The iron law is so prevalent that oligarchical tendencies have become entrenched even in clandestine groups dedicated to revolutionary anarchy.[40]

To some extent, oligarchy is a necessary consequence of administration. Especially in large groups the problem of articulating organizational needs and purposes requires increased power from the top.[41] For example, union conventions are usually mere rubber stamp validators of policies determined in advance by the executive committees.[42] Were it otherwise, it would be difficult to envision that union conventions would accomplish anything at all.

There are several reasons why oligarchy prevails. First, relatively few people have the necessary skills for group leadership. This is essentially true of organizations like labor unions where most members are not equipped with skills beyond those of menial occupations; but skill monopoly is to be observed in more sophisticated groups as well.[43] In some organizations, notably the NAM, the moral force of money accounts in part for the dominance of a few. Those who make the largest contributions tend to occupy the powerful positions.[44] Also, in many organizations participation at critical areas is low either because of a lack of interest in essentially boring administrative details and technicalities or because time is simply not available to all.[45] Moreover, persons who become leaders are not above manipulating prerequisites of office to remain leaders. A leader tends to think of himself as an elite rather than an ordinary member and this is an enjoyable role.[46] Important techniques in this include dispensation of available patronage and monopoly of organizational communications. Such communications can become very authoritative, especially where the recipients are very busy people who have little time to become exposed to other communications. This is supposedly characteristic of professional associations like the AMA. Finally, group oligarchy is perpetuated by custom. The roles which a person is initially assigned within a group tend to determine much of a person's subsequent behaviour.[43] The roles of leaders include the exercise of function, and if this is successful, continuing authority results.[49]

Of course all of this points to an extremely powerful, policy determining, almost irresponsible leadership. It certainly seems to contradict an earlier idea of leaders as more reflectors of underlying group interests.[50] But on the other hand, mem-

bers do have expectations about what group membership should do for them. Leaders must recognize these, it would seem, or they will have no group at all. Leaders must solicit empowering responses. That is to say, although issues may be debated and resolved among the elites, the decisions have to be sold to the members. It has been said that there are two types of group goals: those centering around the immediate welfare of members, and «Whatever acts the group deems worthy of undertaking toward the external world».[51]   Elite power probably comes primarily from discretion with the latter.

Although the above comments on oligarchy were directed toward the group elements in individual's non-citizen roles, it can readily be seen that it is also relevant to the participation in political affairs component as well. Mills observes that individuals really have no access to the political policy making machinery of modern interest groups. The very size and complexity which gives the group political power prevents this.[52] Unorganized individuals have no effect on official policy; individuals organized into large groups belong to a powerful device, but have little effective access.

The importance of elites in the instigation of policies has been observed by many scholars. Almond's comments on this phenomenon seem very well expressed. «In the degree to which issues and decisions are remote, the incapacity of the public to grasp the issues and its consequent indifference accords a special importance to the initiatives and pressures of interested elite groups...»[53]   The oligarchy decides which policies will form the basis of group pressures on decision makers. In Almond's scheme the inattentive public does nothing, the attentive public merely forms an audience for discussions among the elite. It is the elite which has effective access.

The extent of elite dominance of the policy process seems yet to be matter for discussion, however. Almond himself thinks elites «give structure to the public» he does not think the latter totally inert.[54] Brogan reserves that the American citizen has his possibilities for action defined for him by private associations, but action is possible.[55] Lasswell sees the relation of individuals to policy as rather insignificant. «The

findings of personality research show that the individual who chooses a political policy as a symbol of his wants is usually trying to relieve his own disorders by irrelevant pallatives.»[56] Persons may by sold on spurious self-interests. Elites may create demands in people's minds.

But it is agreed that elites are central in determining what policy alternatives shall be advocated in the name of the group, just as they oligarchically conduct the non-political affairs of the group. The elite can assume great power indeed. From the observations above we may derive the by now rather obvious proposition that group elites acquire authority over members in matters of internal affairs and with regard to the assertion of political demands. The authority in this case may elicit rather passive behaviour, merely accepting acts of the elite without revolt, for example. But this is not insignificant, for the legitimacy of national political authorities often requires little more.

As was observed above, an important part of the participation component of citzenship consists in voting, for in this way office holders are invested. Among the important determinants of a person's voting behaviour are group affiliations. The inculcation of political attitudes might be called a type of political socialization performed by groups. Of course it is much more particular than political socialization which results in indoctrination with patriotic attitudes.

Apparently human beings' susceptibility to being socialized to a particular set of attitudes, and particularly to a group position in voting, is a result to need for psychological economy. Decisions on all of the relevant political issues would place an intolerable burden upon the participating citizen. The political responsiblities of mere voting in the United States have already been adjudged greater than at any time or place since ancient Greece.[57] The voter needs a reference group. This reference group is usually th political party. Party identification is more likely to determine a person's vote than any other single factor.[58] The most effective socialization of persons is done with respect to party affiliation.[59] Candidates and issues are always in flux, but parties are relatively permanent. People

need something to love and trust at election time. They have not been prepared to react to every issue, nor could they be. Rather, they have been socialized to a party position, and they react to the party in elections.[60]

Studies of the political socialization process have identified the principal sources of the learning involved as parents and secondary groups. That is to say, the party identification of individuals shows a very high correlation with the party identification of corresponding parents. And as we shall see in greater detail, an individual's party identification is very likely to correspond to the distinctive party position of his functional group. Doubtless, however, the influences issuing from parents and functional groups often coincide so that a high correlation in both areas should not be surprising.

It might be noted in passing that a high correlation between children's and parents' party identification seems to indicate a rather stable hereditary attitude structure for the society as a whole. But it must be remembered that perhaps as many as a quarter of all families communicate no political attitudes, and that the communication of preferences does not mean that these preferences will be acted upon.[61] These observations are probably also applicable to groups. It behooves us to note that there is plenty of room for change in spite of socialization.

Since we are here concerned with relation of individuals to groups, let us proceed to consider group influences on voting behaviour. All studies indicate that group influences on the vote are considerable. Of course some groups are created for the purpose of advancing a particular political or ideological viewpoint. People affiliated with such groups on the basis of already existing sympathies. In such cases it is really impossible to speak of group influences on voting behaviour. But there are many other larger, more significant groups, membership in which is a consequence of other attributes, such as profession, religion, ethnic origin, race, etc. Membership in such groups may be effectively non-voluntary. It is with such groups that we will be primarily concerned.

Generally speaking, people tend to vote as they perceive the political preferences of their organizations. These influences seem to work in two ways. Organizational associations increase the likelihood that a person will vote according to his «latent disposition» as defined by socio-economic status. For example, it was found in 1954 that for every occupational category, for every socio-economic category, and in fact for every other demographic variable held constant, non-union members and their families voted Republican about half again as frequently as union members and their families.[62] Similar results were found in a 1941 study, but there it was also observed that group affiliations can operate in the opposite direction from socio-economic determinants. Lower class people who become members of upper class «prestige organization» are much more likely to vote Republican than are their class equals.[63]

Moreover, group members — at least this was shown to be the case for labor union members — tend to become strongly group-issue oriented in their voting behaviour.[64] For example, a study of the 1954 election revealed that CIO members claimed that labor problems and employment considerations influenced their Presidential vote choice more than any other issue. This was the case even though such problems were not generally regarded as an important issue of the campaign.[65]

The picture of group influences on voting behaviour becomes somewhat more interesting when one examines some of the factors which affect its potency. First of all, certain types of group action or group elite action affect member voting tendencies. Very important is the «clarity of political standard transmission,» such transmission being a communication which alerts members to a pactisan group (or elite) standard. If such standards are transmitted weakly, or if conflicting standards are transmitted, perhaps as a result of decentralized leadership, influence may be impaired. A recent study shows that membership following varies directly with such clarity, even among members whose other attributes are held constant.[66]

If a group can become politically salient, it is likely to increase its membership following in voting behaviour. That is to say, if individuals become conscious of their membership

with respect to a political issue, the group has political salience. Salience is likely to occur when a member of the group is a candidate or likely appointee of a candidate (this has often received the attention of election strategists) or when group goals coincide with major political issues.[67]

Secondly, there are certain types of people who are especially receptive of group influence. Persons who interact with the group and its members, those who participate more in group affairs, are found to vote in the group-distinctive manner more consistently than those who do not interact and participate.[68] This seems very obvious; if nothing else, such persons are likely to be exposed to more group transmitted political standards.

There is also some evidence that individuals' voting behaviour vis-a-vis groups depends upon perception of the group's right to exert political individual act, which goes into making up some sort of general will, are likely to resist pressures to vote in a group-distinctive fashion. But this phenomenon is seen to vary closely with non-identification with the group,[69] which will be discussed immediately below.

Persons who identify with secondary groups are much more likely to vote in the group-distinctive way than those who do not so identify.[70] The actions of groups or group elites which are designed to affect member voting behaviour (see above) are most effective on these identifying people. Clearly the degree of psychological identification with the group on the part of the members is basic to the degree of cohesion which a group attains. And cohesion is the most fundamental factor in a group's ability to assert its claims on the political scene.[71] It is the very factor which makes group-distinctive behaviour possible.

Psychological identification with groups is thus a most worthy subject for study. It is important to inquire into some of the determinants of an individual's identification with his secondary groups. The factor which correlates most strongly with increasing group identification is increasing length of group membership. Apparently there is a sort of an accultura-

tion process to be seen. The longer one belongs, the more contact and familiarity with the group and the greater adoption of its goals.[72] But this observation does not aid in making comparison among groups, except perhaps with respect to older groups as opposed to newer ones. It is necessary to inquire more specifically as to the types of groups which manifest high membership identification and cohesion. Much is revealed by observing the extent to which members feel set apart from other people.[73] Again the «unassimilated group» seems to be a relevant concept. Social assimilation of groups, one would infer, would reduce feelings of distinctiveness on the part of the members, and as a result their group identification and cohesion in voting would be expected to decline. There is considerable evidence to indicate that this in fact happens. As an example, Catholics in the United States no longer normally exhibit extremely distinctive voting behaviour. Simultaneously with the erosion of the «Catholic vote» has occurred the gradual acceptance of that group into the society.[74] Indeed, the simple phenomenon of social acceptance or rejection may explain some good part of the rise and fall of given groups' influence in politics.

As these observations indicate, the potential for group influence on voting behaviour are great indeed. Generally speaking, however, these influences are probably of a persuasive nature only. There are usually no sanctions a group can impose for deviant behaviour on a secret ballot. Other factors, including multiple sets of group influences are likely to be present in a member's voting decision. One is not likely to obey specific group influences without reflection. Group influences do not bear authority. However, as these influences of group membership on voting behaviour increase in intensity, it might be said that the influences move from persuasion toward authority. That is to say, as political standard transmission, salience, and group identification increase, obedience to group cues becomes non-reflective. Cohesion and authority of group influences covary.

The key ideas of group identification and social distinctiveness seem to demand further attention. The greatest factor in keeping most groups from being extremely distinctive, that

provides for «social assimilation», seems to be overlapping memberships and multiple loyalties on the part of individual members. The role of overlapping memberships in group moderation and policy stability is well documented. They impose restrictions and conformities on interest groups at the pain of dissolution. Leaders cannot always act like Michels predicted. Although there is plenty of evidence that power concentrates in a few hands, it is also true that unheavals and rebellions occur within groups. Leaders must be concerned about their relations to the masses, for there is always the disruptive possibility of their following rival leaders.[75] That is to say, a group usually cannot absorb an individual completely. He can turn to another group. If an overlapping membership is not present, a group elite's violation of expectations of members may call forth the forming of a new group with disastrous effects for the degree of cohesion of the old group.[76]

In a democracy, elites offer election propaganda, that is, bid for votes, on a competitive basis. In economic terms, they compete with one another in the opinion markets for the sale of their policies. It seems to be characteristic of democracy that this competition, the possibility of the citizen selecting among alternative elite offerings, is present.[77] It is thus seen that «public» influence exists, although in a crude and passive form. Almond observes, «In most cases the influential policy alternatives placed before the public represent vague impulses and preferences of the masses.»[78] Citizens of a democracy do participate in politics in a meaningful fashion so long as alternative exist for them to select among. Much of the participation component of citizenship may consist in this selection. Moods, interests, and expectations on the part of the masses set limits on elite discretion. The opportunity for choice is conspicuously absent from dictatorships where elites are really dominant.

This emphasizes the usually persuasive nature of group influences on voting behaviour. The citizen has several group influences impinging upon him, and must consciously choose among them, or withdraw from voting altogether in the manner of the classic cross-pressured individual.[79] This is the very antithesis of non-reflective obedience characteristic of the authority relation. But as we saw above, the group influences on

voting behaviour may move toward a condition af authorita-
tiveness. This is the case where group identification is high,
where the members feel distinct, where they have few over-·
lapping memberships.

Since unified voting behaviour is the chief determinant of
a group's ability to assert its claims on the political scene, it
might be expected that group elites would attempt to maximize
their persuasive power on external politics by increasing inter-
nal authority. We can now see that such a process might in-
volve more than tranmission of correct political standards. It
might well include attempts to manipulate identification with
the group. And this would certainly involve attempts to keep
groups distinct, to isolate members from the divisive effects
of overlapping group memberships.

In fact we do find that group elites do regard maintenance
of cohesion through mitigation if not elimination of other
memberships as a task of highest importance. Certain types
of «integrative» political parties perhaps offer the most con-
spicuous example of this. The establishment of party youth
groups, auxiliaries, recreation plans, etc., are designed to sa-
tisfy other member «needs» within the same group. It is not
necessary to go outside. Much more commitment and enthusiasm
for the party cause can be generated in this way.[80] The prac-
tice of setting up subsidiary organizations parallel to those
likely to draw off member loyalty is also seen in such pheno-
mena as company unions, Catholic trade union and veterans'
groups, and similar devices.[81] Elites like to get their groups
into positions where only that group can satisfy certain mem-
ber needs. The infiltration of competing groups is also a techni-
que for mitigating the effects of other possible memberships.
Communist infiltration of labor unions would be an example.
Apparently certain elites have even gone to the extent of join-
ing opposite parties in order to deny persons meaningful voting
alternatives.[82] Closely related elite attempts to eliminate
structures for alternatives of choice are laws designed to dis-
courage splinter parties and non-partisan elections designed to
destroy an organizing principle for voting behaviour.[83]

The importance of choice for avoiding an authority rela-
tionship is also seen by scholars who take a slightly different

tack. Mills, for example, sees a homogeneous national elite mani-
pulating the nation by denial of competing viewpoints to the
public. He compares the situation to economic monopoly.[84]
But whether there is no elite, or as seems more likely, several
competing elites, the question of member alternatives must be
considered. We might hazard the proposition that all group
elites tend to isolate their members from cross-pressures and
overlapping memberships, to create little monopolies for group
identification, thereby denying them policy choices, tending to
confer authority on their own voting suggestions, and, in short,
concentrating the citizenship component of participation and
therewith political power in their own hands.

Finally, this consideration of the relationship between the
individual and groups or group elites (as actors in our scheme)
must include a section on the citizenship component of loyalty.
The consideration of multiple allegiances and overlapping mem-
berships brings this to mind. As noted above, one of the impor-
tant elements in individual loyalty to political authorities is
satisfactions of individual needs. Loyalty is seen as provisional;
its continuance depends upon the service of interests. These
interests, economic, religious, etc., can cause the citizen to shift
his loyalty as evidenced by revolutions and emigration.[85] As
was noted above, however, these interests are largely group
interests. In any event they are significant only if they become
group interests. If political authorities fail to consider these
interests, in fact if they fail to provide useful benefits to them,
these same non-political groups or other political entities may
become prominent in citizen loyalties.[86]

This places group loyalties in an intermediate position bet-
ween individuals and political authorities. In fact, it is often
asserted that loyalties to functional groups are primary. Men
are most desirous of acceptance by these groups. They are most
sensitive to sanctions imposed by these groups. The internaliza-
tion of group goals is very important to the psychological well
being of individuals. Loyalty to political authorities, then,
becomes a function of groups encouraging their members to be
loyal. «Loyalties are to specific groups, specific goals, specific
programs of action. Populations are loyal to nations as a by-
product of satisfactions achieved within non-national groups,

because the nation is believed to symbolize and sustain these groups.»[37] Although the importance of loyal sub-groups to the strengthening of political system has been recognized by others,[88] this quotation stresses their significance in a very strong manner. If this were always the case, «satisfaction of basic needs,» which are group needs, would be the most important among the four elements of political loyalty discussed above. Indoctrination with patriotism, habit of obedience, and psychologic identification with the state would be clearly secondary. Group elites would have a tremendous influence on members' national loyalties. Their decisions as to whether to encourage or discourage it would be controlling. Encouragement would doubtless vary as would the elites' loyalty, which in turn, recalling statements made earlier in this paper, would vary with their feelings of successful and legitimate access to the political system. Group elites would thus be themselves performing acts necessary to an important part of the citizenship component of loyalty. Again we note that something like this must sometimes occur, for groups do revolt against political authorities and revolutions do occur. We might hypothesize that under certain conditions group elites are able through primary attachment of members to the group, to define the loyalty component of citizenship, that is, to play the role themselves.

It would seem that establishment of group authority of this nature, like that over voting behaviour, is bound up with isolation of the group members. Although loyalty may primarily attach to groups, a specific group definition of political loyalty cannot be authoritative, that is, productive of non-reflective obedience, if several other group definitions exist also. This is merely another way of saying that unassimilated (isolated) groups can become dangerous to political authority.

The observations on modern democratic citizenship in this paper have led to the envisioning of a state of affairs largely dominated by group elites. Such elites seem to have much influence over various organizational non-citizenship roles of individuals. Michels' group oligarchy seems to prevail. Group elites may also gain authority over individuals with respect to the citizenship components of participation and loyalty, es-

pecially if sufficient isolation of the members is achieved. In such situations, only the elites play citizenship roles. The individual is denied even crude and passive instruments.

How useful is the scheme developed herein for gaining a theoretical understanding of citizenship ? First of all, classification of citizenship situations in terms of the degree to which elites play the roles seems to have some promise of facilitating meaningful generalization. The entire development might be said to be a «model» or theory of citizenship roles. As we have progressed, primarily on the basis of the observations of competent scholars, it has been possible to list certain propositions or deductions. Some empirical investigations of these deductions — and they were designed to be testable — would indicate the viability of this device for aiding in understanding of these roles. It is to the contemplation of such empirical research that we now must turn.