

ملحق

قائمة المقابلات

التاريخ	المنصب الأخير	الشركة	الاسم
3 آب 2000	غير متوفر	إي-باي	توم آدمز *
13 كانون الأول 2000	رئيس	فرونثير للطيران	سام آدمس
18 تموز 2000	نائب الرئيس للشؤون الحكومية	ريل للشبكات	ألكس ألبين
18 أيار 2000	نائب الرئيس ورئيس قسم التسويق	إي-تويز	تيد أوغستين
24 آب 2000	الرئيس التنفيذي	مايكروسوفت	ستيف بالمر
12 كانون الثاني 2000	رئيس قسم الإستراتيجية	سي-نيت للشبكات	ماتيو بارزون
14 أيلول 2000	المدير العام لخدمات الإنترنت	مايكروسوفت	أنطوني باي*
18 تموز 2000	نائب الرئيس لشؤون المالية والعمليات، المدير المالي	ريل للشبكات	بول بيالك
18 تشرين الأول 1999	نائب الرئيس ورئيسة قسم التسويق	إي-تويز	جانين بوسكيت
14 آب 2000	عضو مجلس الإدارة	ريل للشبكات	جيم برير
11 كانون الأول 2000	الرئيس التنفيذي	كلونز	جون كاسيدي
20 تموز 1999	نائب الرئيس لشؤون التطوير والتسويق	هاندسبرنغ	إد كوليغان
10 أيار 2000	الرئيس والمدير التنفيذي	آي-دي-جي	كيلي كولن
10 تموز 2000	رئيس اللجنة التنفيذية	إنيتوت	سكوت كوك
20 تموز 1999؛ 11 كانون الثاني 2000؛ 19 تموز 2000	الرئيس والمدير التنفيذي	هاندسبرنغ	دونا دونبسكي

11 أيار 2000	نائب الرئيس، المنتشر وأمين السر العام	إنتل	توم دنلاب
5 أيار 2000	شريك	بومان للاستثمار	كريس دويري
26 كانون الأول 2000	كبير المديرين، حامل حزام دان 5	نادي توهوكو للجودو	كلارك إدسون
18 تموز 2000	مدير العمليات	ريل للشبكات	توم فرانك*
20 تموز 1999	نائب الرئيس لشؤون التصنيع والسوقيات	هاندسبرنغ	مايك غالوتشي
10 تموز 2000	عضو مجلس الإدارة	إنكتومي	فرانك جيل
2 أيار 2000؛ 21 تموز 2000	الرئيس والمدير التنفيذي	ريل للشبكات	روب غلاسر
16 أيار 2000	رئيس مجلس الإدارة	إنتل	أندي غروف
18 تموز 2000	نائب الرئيس لشؤون الإعلام	ريل للشبكات	مارك هول
18 أيار 2000	نائب الرئيس لتطوير المنتجات	إي-تويز	فرانك هان
11 كانون الثاني 2000	رئيس مجلس الإدارة ورئيس قسم المنتجات	هاندسبرنغ	جيفري هوكنز
18 تموز 2000	نائب الرئيس لشؤون الأدوات الاستهلاكية	ريل للشبكات	لين جوردان
25 نيسان 2000	ريكيثي سابقاً	غير متوفر	جورج كاليما
5 أيار 2000	عضو مجلس الإدارة	ريل للشبكات	ميتشل كابور
25 نيسان 2000	ريكيثي سابقاً	غير متوفر	بيرسي كيبابا
9 أيار 2000	الرئيس التنفيذي	جونيبير للشبكات	سكوت كرينز
4 كانون الأول 2000	نائب الرئيس ورئيس قسم الإستراتيجية	تشارلز شواب	دان ليمون
9 أيار 2000	الرئيس، المدير التنفيذي ورئيس مجلس الإدارة	إي-تويز	توبي لينك
14 أيار 2000	نائب الرئيس لشؤون التطوير الإستراتيجي	أربيا	بوبي لينت
21 تموز 2000	المنتشر العام وأمين السر	ريل للشبكات	كيلي جو مكارثر
12 كانون الثاني 2000	الرئيس ورئيس قسم العمليات	سي-نيت للشبكات	ريتشارد مارينو*

ديفيد ماتسوموتو	جودو الولايات المتحدة	مدير برنامج التطوير، حزام دان5	12 تموز 1999
كيفين مكنزي	سي-نيت للشبكات	نائب الرئيس لشؤون تطوير أسواق جديدة	29 آذار 2000
هاريسون ميلر	أمازون.كوم	المدير العام، أمازون تويز	21 أيلول 2000
هالسي ماينور	سي-نيت للشبكات	رئيس مجلس الإدارة الفخري	11 كانون الثاني 2000
شيلي موريسون	ريل للشبكات	نائب الرئيس لشؤون الإعلام ومبيعات التوزيع	21 تموز 2000
ناوكي مورانا	متحف كودوكان للجودو	أمين المتحف وأستاذ، حزام دان7	24 نيسان 2000
بول أوتليني	إنتل	نائب الرئيس والمدير العام، مجموعة إنتل للهندسة المعمارية	13 كانون الثاني 2000
جيمي بيدرو	غير متوفر	بطل العالم عام 1999 بالجودو، وزن 73 كغ	28 حزيران 1999
ديفيد بيتز شميدت	إنكومي	الرئيس التنفيذي	8 أيلول 2000
ديك بيرس	إنكومي	رئيس قسم العمليات	20 تموز 2000؛ 11 آب 2000
ويل بول	مايكروسوفت	نائب الرئيس، قسم الوسائل الرقمية في ويندوز	19 أيار 2000
ديف ريتشاردز	ريل للشبكات	نائب الرئيس لشؤون المستهلكين	21 تموز 2000
دان روزنفيغ	سي-نيت للشبكات	الرئيس	24 أيار 2000
بين روت هولز	ريل للشبكات	المدير العام، المنتجات والأنظمة	18 تموز 2000؛ 19 تموز 2000
جين سالنزمان	إي-تويز	نائبة الرئيس لشؤون المشتريات	18 تشرين الأول 1999؛ 18 أيار 2000
ستيف سوش	إي-تويز	نائب الرئيس ونائب المدير المالي	18 تشرين الأول 1999
ديفيد شابيرو	إنسايد سومو	رئيس التحرير	24 نيسان 2000
جاي سنغ	سي-نيت للشبكات	محرر، سي-نيت نيوز.كوم	30 آذار 2000
بيري تورن دايك	برود-فيجن	نائب الرئيس لشؤون تطوير العمل	19 تموز 2000
جوريت فان دير مولين	أمازون.كوم	مديرة قسم المشتريات، أمازون تويز	20 تموز 2000

20 تموز 2000	الرئيس والمدير التنفيذي	إي-باي	مينغ وايتمان
13 كانون الثاني 2000	نائب الرئيس ومدير عام مجموعة المنتجات المجهرية	إنتل	ألبرت يو
18 تشرين الأول 1999	نائب الرئيس لشؤون العمليات	إي-تويز	لوزامبيلو *

ملاحظة: إضافة إلى هؤلاء، قابلنا مديرين في كابيتال وان وفيدلتي للاستثمار طلبوا عدم ذكر أسمائهم.

* لم يعد مع الشركة.

مراجع

المقدمة

1. Scott McNealy, "It's Like . . ." *Forbes* 486P, 3 October 2000.
2. Michael A. Cusumano and David B. Yoffie, *Competing on Internet Time: Lessons from Netscape and Its Battle with Microsoft* (New York: Free Press, 1998).
3. Gary Hamel and C. K. Prahalad, "Strategic Intent," *Harvard Business Review* 67, no. 3 (May/June 1989): 63–76.

الفصل الأول

1. Jud'it B. Gelman and Steven C. Salup, "Judo Economics: Capacity Limitation and Group Competition," *Rand Journal of Economics* 14, no. 2 (1983): 315–325.
2. Peter F. Drucker, *Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Practice and Principles* (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 230.
3. Iwane Matsu, "The Invention of the Martial Arts: Kano Eigorō and Kodōshin Judo," in *Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan*, ed. Stephen Vlastos (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 163–173.
4. Jigorō Kano, *Kodōshin Judo* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1956), 16.
5. Robert W. Smith, "The Development of Judo in America." In *A Complete Guide to Judo: Its Story and Practice*, ed. Robert W. Smith (Batland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1959), 13.
6. Jigorō Kano, *Judo Gijyūshū* (Tokyo: Maruzen Co. Ltd., 1957), 11.
7. Sano, *Kodōshin Judo*, 16–17.
8. Charles Yerkow, *Modern Judo. The Complete Ju Jutsu Library* (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1942), 41; original emphasis removed.

الفصل الثاني

1. Jimmy Pedro, telephone interview with author, 28 June 1999.
2. Network effects exist when the value of a product (such as the telephone) increases as the number of users grows.
3. Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy and the Lean and Hungry Look," *American Economic Review* 74, no. 2 (1984): 361-366.
4. George Anders, "Psst: Wanna See a Great Business Plan?" *Fast Company*, July 2000.
5. Paul Orellini, e-mail to author, 17 December 2000.
6. Mickey Meere, "Products Secret; Edge Is No Mystery," *Australian Business*, 25 September 1996.
7. Of all the examples we describe, this one is probably closest in spirit to *judo economics*, as distinct from *judo strategy*.
8. Jeffrey Leib, "New Airline's Rumpy Takout," *Dallas Post*, 30 November 1984.
9. Scott McCartney, "Upstart's Tactics Allow It to Fly in Friendly Skies of a Big Rival," *Wall Street Journal*, 23 June 1999.
10. Richard Williamson, "The Competitor: After Five Years in Frontier's Cockpit, Achilles Likes What He Sees on the Horizon," *Dallas Rocky Mountain News*, 7 February 1979.
11. McCartney, "Upstart's Tactics Allow It To Fly in Friendly Skies Of a Big Rival."
12. Lucien Rhodes, "That Daring Young Man and His Flying Machines," *Inc.*, January 1984.
13. Donald Barr, "Bitter Victories," interview by George Gendron, *Inc.*, August 1985.
14. Michael A. Cusumano and David B. Yoffie, *Competing on Internet Time: Lessons from Netscape and Its Battle with Microsoft* (New York: Free Press, 1998), 316.
15. Bob Metcalfe, "Without Case of Vapors, Netscape's Tools Will Give Blackbird Reason to Squawk," *InfoWorld*, 16 September 1995.
16. Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry J. Nalebuff, *Co-opetition* (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 69.
17. Eric Lundquist, "Netscape's Battle on the Corporate Tarmac," *PC Week*, 2 June 1997.
18. Clayton M. Christensen analyzes this strategy from the incumbent's perspective in *The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Judo strategy flips it around to take the challenger's point of view. By

- capitalizing on what Christensen terms “disruptive technologies,” a judo strategist can define the competitive space in ways that make it more difficult for the reigning champion to compete. In some cases, this approach may even provide leverage as well—if, for example, your opponent’s customers feel threatened by the new technology.
19. Dan Moreau, “Hey, Cisco Systems: Your Stock Rose 10,000%. Now What?” *Kiplinger’s Personal Finance Magazine*, November 1996.
 20. Scott Moritz, “Juniper Snatching Router Share from Cisco,” *TheStreet.com*, 22 November 2000, <<http://www.thestreet.com/tech/networking/1154179.html>> (accessed 16 December 2000); John Shinn, “The Upstart That’s Eating Cisco’s Lunch,” *Business Week*, 11 September 2000.
 21. Jason Krause, “Upstart Comes out of the Shadows,” *The Industry Standard*, 17 April 2000.
 22. Inkdom executive, e-mail to author, 20 October 2000.
 23. Cusumano and Yoffie, *Competing on Internet Time*, 93.
 24. Robert H. Reil, *Architects of the Web: 1,000 Days that Built the Firm of Business* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 36.
 25. Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are computer manufacturers, such as Compaq and Dell, that distribute software by preloading it onto the machines they sell.
 26. Cusumano and Yoffie, *Competing on Internet Time*, 102.
 27. *Ibid.*, 186.

الفصل الثالث

1. Kenji Tomiki, *Judo* (Tokyo: Japan Travel Bureau, 1959), 28.
2. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this example.
3. We are grateful to Barry Nalebuff for suggesting this example.
4. Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry J. Nalebuff, *Co-opetition* (New York: Doubleday, 1996).
5. Tim Albright and Bruce van Raalte, “Amazon.com,” Salomon Smith Barney report, 17 August 2000.
6. Stephen P. Bradley and Kelley Porter, “eBay, Inc.,” Case 9-700-1007 (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1999).
7. *Ibid.*
8. Game strategists often take a more positive view of tit-for-tat strategies on the grounds that they can deliver benefits by promoting cooperation. The intuition behind this idea is simple: If you can credibly commit to “punish” the other player whenever he makes a hostile move, such as cutting prices, he is less likely to indulge in such behavior. The problem with this argument is that many judo strategists

cannot credibly make commitments of this nature, precisely because they are relatively small and weak. As a result, in the language of game theory, tit-for-tat does not support a subgame-perfect equilibrium (even in a repeated game).

9. Bradley and Porter, "eBay, Inc."
10. Yahoo! ultimately reached the same conclusion, announcing in January 2001 that it planned to begin charging auction-listing fees.
11. Stewart Alsop, "Contemplating eBay's Funeral," *Fortune*, 7 June 1999.
12. Bradley and Porter, "eBay, Inc."
13. Mark J. Bowen and Susan P. Hawkins, "eBay, Inc.," PricewaterhouseCoopers report, 26 January 2000; Eliot Walsh, "eBay: Crushing the Competition," <<http://www.investorlink.com/commentaries/secursearch/00-01/000124-dionline-indus.html>> (accessed 21 January 2001).
14. Bruce Posner, "Targeting the Giant," *Inc.*, October 1993.
15. Wal-Mart continues to use this tactic today, as confirmed in an interview with an executive from H.E. Butt, one of Wal-Mart's biggest competitors in the grocery market in Texas, 28 September 2000.
16. Transcript of Bill Gates's remarks at Microsoft's 7 December 1995 Internet strategy briefing.
17. Microsoft initially invested in a proprietary X.25 network to connect users to MSN. After deciding to embrace the Internet, Microsoft abandoned this network and converted to TCP/IP.
18. Luck also helped Schwab in this process. The head of eSchwab, Beth Nawi, had previously arranged for a two-year sabbatical, and the head of the call center was already planning to retire. As a result, the decision to integrate eSchwab did not entail any demotions or significant reassignments. Information from Dan Leemon, EVP and Chief Strategy Officer, Charles Schwab, telephone interview with author, 4 December 2000.
19. Jan W. Rivkin, "Dogfight over Europe: Ryanair (A)," Case 9-700-115 (Boston: Harvard Business School, 2000); Jan W. Rivkin, "Dogfight over Europe: Ryanair (B)," Case 9-710-116 (Boston: Harvard Business School, 2000).
20. Jan W. Rivkin, "Dogfight over Europe: Ryanair (C)," Case 89-700-117 (Boston: Harvard Business School, 2000).

الفصل الرابع

1. Kenji Tomiki, *Judo* (Tokyo: Japan Travel Bureau, 1959), 28.
2. These curtes blend elements of two different translations: Eijoro Kano, *Judo (jijufuru)* (Tokyo: Maruzen Co. Ltd., 1937), 17-19, and Eijoro Kano, *Kodokan Judo* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1986), 18.

3. Kano, *Judo Jujutsu*, 11.
4. Joan Magretta, "The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer's Michael Dell," *Harvard Business Review* 76, no. 3 (March–April 1998): 72–84.
5. Prahalad Ghemawat, *Continental: The Dynamic of Strategy* (New York: Free Press, 1991).
6. We are grateful to Barry Nalebuff for suggesting this example.
7. "New IRA Accounts Surge at Schwab and Fidelity," *Wall Street Letter*, 13 April 1992.
8. David Pottruck, President and co-CEO, Charles Schwab, interview with author, Boston, MA 19 May 2000.
9. Joseph Pereira, "For Video Games, Now It's a Battle of Bits," *Wall Street Journal*, 9 January 1990.
10. *Ibid.*; Anthony Ramirez, "The Strategy Behind Nintendo's Success," *Dallas Morning News*, 26 December 1989.
11. Nikhil Hutheesing, "Games Companies Play," *Forbes*, 25 October 1993.
12. John Burgess, "Sega's Sonic Boom," *Washington Post*, 15 December 1993.
13. Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry J. Nalebuff, *Co-opetition* (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 237–242.
14. Marc Silver and John Simon, "The Rating Game," *U.S. News & World Report*, 21 November 1994.
15. O. Casey Con, "Nintendo Is Trying to Get Back In the Game," *Seattle Times*, 28 August 1994.
16. Kevin O'Toole, "The King of Low-Cost," *Airline Business*, June 1999.
17. Bertelsmann sold its stake in AOL Europe in 2000 following AOL's decision to merge with Bertelsmann competitor Time Warner.
18. Catherine Yang, Kerry Capell, Jack Ewing, and Marsha Johnston, "'I Claim This Land . . . Whoops!' AOL Is Meeting Stiff—and Free—Resistance As It Heads Abroad," *Business Week*, 14 June 1999.
19. Saul Hansell, "Christmas Is Coming! Time for Another Fight to the Death!" *New York Times*, 25 October 2000.
20. Jonathan Rabinowitz, "Building Stores Online: New 'E-tailers' Learning It Takes More Than Web Site," *Sacramento Bee*, 9 December 1998.
21. Brandenburger and Nalebuff, *Co-opetition*, 11–16.
22. Nintendo press release, 30 October 1995; Laura Evenson, "Sega Gains on Nintendo," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 4 June 1993.
23. Steven V. Bull and Neil Gross, "Sony's New World," *Business Week*, 27 May 1996.
24. Benjamin Fulford, "Leisure Killer Sequel," *Forbes*, 5 April 1999.

25. The Delaware Chancery Court, quoted in Richard S. Tedlow, *New and Improved: The Story of Mass Marketing in America* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 75.
26. *Ibid.*, 88–89.
27. Note that Pepsi would not have been able to leverage these assets if it had simply cut its price in half.
28. Michael Dell with Catherine Fredman, *Direct from Dell: Strategies That Revolutionized an Industry* (New York: Harper Business, 1999), 201–202; emphasis added.
29. *Ibid.*, 80.
30. Jan W. Rivkin and Michael E. Porter, “Matching Dell,” Case 9-799-158 (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1999).
31. Dell, *Direct From Dell*, 78.
32. *Ibid.*, 77.
33. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, e-mail from Paul Maritz, 20 June 1996, Government Exhibit 653 in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/653.pdf>> (accessed 2 January 2001).
34. Michael A. Cusumano and David B. Yoffie, *Competing on Internet Time: Lessons from Netscape and Its Battle with Microsoft* (New York: Free Press, 1998), 127.
35. This section is based on David B. Yoffie, “The World VCR Industry,” in *International Trade and Competition: Cases and Notes in Strategy and Management* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990), 68–86.
36. “Fidelity Offers Competitors’ Funds,” *Wall Street Letter*, 17 July 1989.
37. Leslie Helm, “Fidelity Fights Back,” *Business Week*, 17 April 1989.
38. Dean Calbreath, “Schwab, Fidelity Battle Over ‘No Fee’ Market,” *San Francisco Business Times*, 30 July 1993.
39. Leslie Wayne, “The Next Giant in Mutual Funds?” *New York Times*, March 20, 1994; Steven T. Goldberg, “Hello Discount Broker, Goodbye Fund Paperwork,” *Kiplinger’s Personal Finance Magazine*, November 1994.
40. Goldberg, “Hello Discount Broker, Goodbye Fund Paperwork.”
41. Leslie Wayne, “The Next Giant in Mutual Funds?” *New York Times*, 20 March 1994.

الفصل الخامس

1. Data from Dataquest cited in Bradley Johnson, “The Marketing 100: U.S. Robotics Pilot: Ed Colligan,” *Advertising Age*, 30 June 1997; and Roger C. Lancot, “Palm-to-Palm Combat Begins—Microsoft Takes on 3Com,” *Computer Retail Week*, 19 January 1998; data from International

- Data Corp., cited in Deborah Claymon. "Knocking Off PDA Leader," *Sacramento Bee*, 26 May 1999.
2. Anita McGahan, Leslie Vasciasz, and David B. Yoffie, "Creating Value and Setting Standards: The Lessons of Consumer Electronics for Personal Digital Assistants," in *Competing in the Age of Digital Convergence*, ed. David B. Yoffie (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 232.
 3. Charles McCoy, "Gadfly or Guru? Andy Seybold—Newsletter Writer, Consultant, Evangelist—Is Helping to Shape the Wireless Industry: Who Is This Guy, Anyway?" *Wall Street Journal*, 11 February 1994.
 4. Rob Haitani, "The Zen of Palm," PowerPoint presentation, undated.
 5. David Einstein, "Shirt-Pocket Computing Revival," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 17 June 1997.
 6. Dubinsky and Hawkins maintain that Palm was actually more profitable than the numbers from Palm's S-1 suggested, arguing that 3Com's corporate allocations and tax allocations depressed Palm's net income in the early years.
 7. by 2000, Palm would claim 100,000 developers were writing applications that ran on the Palm operating system.
 8. Lancelot, "Palm-to-Palm Combat: Microsoft Takes on 3Com."
 9. After Palm sued Microsoft for trademark violation in Europe, Microsoft agreed to stop using the Palm PC name.
 10. Claymon, "Knocking Off PDA Leader."
 11. Stephanie Miles, "Handspring Beats Palm During First Week in Stores," *CNET News.com*, 1 May 2000, <<http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1006-2001-1795508.html>> (accessed 17 January 2001).

الفصل السادس

1. Robert H. Reid, *Architects of the Web: 1,000 Days That Built the Future of Business* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 76.
2. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the company as RealNetworks or Real throughout this chapter.
3. Lee Gomes, "Sound Off on the World Wide Web," *Newsday*, 1 October 1995.
4. In 1998, Netscape began to bundle RealPlayer with free downloads of Navigator.
5. While Microsoft had made significant investments in developing streaming media technology by this time, the company's focus was on broadband networks, making projects such as the "Tiger" streaming media server ill-suited to the low-bandwidth conditions of the Internet.

6. Robert Hertzberg, "RealVideo Streams In, and So Do the Doubts," *Internet World*, 17 February 1997.
7. Brett Atwood, "RealVideo Rounds Up Majors' Support," *Billboard*, 22 February 1997.
8. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, "Agenda: Opportunities, Threats, Product 'Holes' Today, 5 Options, Recommendations," Government Exhibit 946 in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/946.pdf>> (accessed 21 January 2001).
9. In conjunction with its initial investment, Microsoft also received warrants for an additional 10 percent of the company.
10. E-mail message to author from a former RealNetworks product manager, 17 November 2000.
11. "Our evidence indicates that the Windows Media Player tries not to disable any RealPlayer client later than 4.x—and that, were RealNetworks simply to make minor changes to the RealSystem G2 installation process, the problem would largely go away. On the other hand . . . [i]f you are running the RealAudio Player 3.0 or earlier, or RealPlayer 4.0.x (including the "Plus" versions that are registered for a fee), installing Media Player will take over the playback of any Real content—without bothering to ask if this is acceptable." "RealNetworks vs. Microsoft," *PC Magazine Online*, 27 July 1998, <<http://www.zdnet.com/pcmag/plcabs/inside/in980727a.htm>> (accessed 1 December 2000).
12. Walter S. Mossberg, "The Best 'Jukebox' for Playing MP3 Tunes May Surprise You," *Wall Street Journal*, 19 August 1999.

الفصل السابع

1. Andrew Serwer, "CNET: Revenge of the Preppies," *Forums*, 31 June 1999.
2. Initially named CNET, the company was renamed CNET Networks after its acquisition of MySimon in early 2000.
3. Linda Himmelstein, "Halvey Minor's Major Plans," *Business Week*, 26 July 1999.
4. Serwer, "CNET: Revenge of the Preppies."
5. *Ibid.*
6. The company later dropped the slash in C|NET from everything but its logo.
7. "C|NET Business Plan," mimeo, November 1993.
8. Richard Rapaport, "C|NET's Paper Chase," *Forbes ASAP*, 3 June 1996.
9. Keith J. Kelly, "Internet Ignites New Magazines," *Business Marketing*, 1 May 1996.

10. Laurence Zuckerman, "Is Time Right for Purchase of Ziff-Davis?" *New York Times*, 2 October 1995.
11. Jeanne Dugan, "I Live, Breathe, Sleep Computers," *Business Week*, 1 December 1997.
12. Paul C. Judge, "Anc in This Corner, Pat McGovern," *Business Week*, 12 August 1996.
13. Harley Jehens, "Let TV Be Your Guide," *Austin American-Statesman*, 12 October 1995.
14. On the down side, like many other Internet companies, CNET later had to take a substantial write-off after deciding not to use some of the domain names it had bought.
15. Rapaport, "CNET's Paper Chase."
16. Mark Evans, "Web Sites Have Content, Need Investors," *Financial Post*, 25 July 1996.
17. In addition to the public offering of 2 million shares at \$16 per share, CNET sold 600,000 shares to Intel at the same time. CNET's share subsequently split twice, two-for-one each time, in 1999.
18. Walter S. Mossberg, "The Web Produces a Home-Grown Source for Breaking News," *Wall Street Journal*, 26 December 1996.
19. Server, "CNET: Revenge of the Preppies."
20. Eleanor Laise, "One Good Internet Stock," *SmartMoney*, January 2001.
21. CNET press release, 26 February 1998.
22. Shelby Bourne, who came out of the investment world, had little patience for this type of argument. "The real issue is whether or not your editorial is biased," he maintained, addressing the related question of whether or not ads should be placed next to product reviews. "It has nothing to do with placement. Yet a lot of magazines would bring issues like that to bear, which made it hard for them to accept new ways of thinking."
23. Saul Hansell, "Validation: Even if Halsey Minor's NBC Deal Doesn't Insure Success, It Does Give Big-Media Cachet to His New-Media Strategy," *New York Times*, 15 June 1998.
24. Saul Hansell, "NBC Buying a Portal to the Internet," *New York Times*, 10 June 1998.
25. CNET recovered its investment in Snap! in early February 2000, when it sold less than 10 percent of its stock in NBCU for more than \$50 million. However, it had to take a write-off of roughly \$380 million in the fourth quarter of 2000 when NBCU's value collapsed with that of other Internet stocks.
26. The companies involved were Vignette, Mediadrive, and BuyDirect.com. In at least two of these cases, CNET reaped a substantial

- return on its investment, including a gain of nearly \$180 million on its stake in Vignette.
27. CNET did, however, enter into a joint venture to launch CNET Radio, an all-technology format, in January 2000.
 28. Thomas Elsenmann and Pauline Fischer, "CNET 2000," Case 9-800-302 (Boston: Harvard Business School, 2000).
 29. *Ibid.*
 30. CNET reported a profit on its operations in 1998. However, in 1999, marketing expenses drove an operating loss of \$61 million. By 2000, the company was profitable once again, excluding taxes, investment gains, and amortization of goodwill.
 31. Along with ZDNet, CNET also acquired the *Computer Shopper* magazine and Web site and Smart Planet, an online educational service.
 32. ZDNet retained access to the magazines' content through a licensing agreement. Initially, the agreement was for five years, but CNET later renegotiated the terms and shortened the license to two years.

الفصل الثامن

1. David Shapiro, *Suzuki: A Pocket Guide* (Rutland, VT and Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1995), 26; Clyde Newton, *Dynamic Suzuki* (Tokyo: Kōdansha International, 1994), 77.
2. Mark Schilling, *Suzuki: A Firm's Guide* (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 1994), 72.
3. We are grateful to Barry Nalebuff for making this point.
4. Michael Porter, *Competitive Strategy* (New York: Free Press, 1981), 78–79.
5. Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," *American Economic Review* 74, no. 2 (1984), 361–66.
6. Pankaj Ghemawat, "Capacity Expansion in the Titanium Dioxide Industry," *Journal of Industrial Economics* 33, no. 2 (1984), 156.
7. Eric S. Raymond, *The New Hacker's Dictionary*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 208.
8. For an interesting discussion of FUD, see Eric Lee Green, "FUD 101," 15 November 1999, <<http://www.badtux.org/eric/editorial/fud101-1.0.0.html>> (accessed 19 November 2000).
9. IBM's Business Conduct Guidelines, quoted in Richard Thomas DeLamarter, *Big Blue: IBM's Use and Abuse of Power* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1986), 219.
10. Robert Sobel, *IBM: Colossus in Transition* (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), 315; DeLamarter, *Big Blue*, 355–356.

11. Green, "FUD 101."
12. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, e-mail from "Navisoft" at AOL, 21 January 1996, Government Exhibit 38 in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/38.pdf>> (accessed 19 November 2000).
13. Constance L. Hayes, "How Coke Banned Rivals off the Shelf," *New York Times*, 6 August 2000.
14. Cynthia A. Montgomery and Elizabeth J. Gordon, "Newell Company: Corporate Strategy," Case 9 799-139 (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1999).
15. In both cases, subscribers continued to pay toll charges to their telephone company for the time spent online.
16. Michael A. Cusumano and David R. Yoffie, *Competing on Internet Time: Lessons from Netscape and its Battle with Microsoft* (New York: Free Press, 1998).
17. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, "The Internet Tidal Wave," Government Exhibit 20 in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/20.pdf>> (accessed 19 November 2000).
18. Ben Shihata, e-mail to author, 17 August 2000.
19. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, e-mail from Dan Rosen, 14 June 1995, Government Exhibit 530 in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/530.pdf>> (accessed 19 November 2000).
20. *Ibid.*
21. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, e-mail from Bill Gates, 31 May 1995, Government Exhibit 22 in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/22.pdf>> (accessed 19 November 2000).
22. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, e-mail from Bill Gates, 24 June 1995, Government Exhibit 537 in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/537.pdf>> (accessed 22 January 2001).
23. Steve Ballmer, CEO, Microsoft, telephone interview with author, 23 March 1998.
24. Cusumano and Yoffie, *Competing on Internet Time*, 111.
25. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, "How To Get To 10% Share in 12 Months," Government Exhibit 336 in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/334.pdf>> (accessed 19 November 2000).
26. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, quoted from

- Microsoft's Answers to Interrogatories, Civil Investigative Demand No. 18140, Interrogatory 4, in Direct Testimony of Franklin M. Fisher, Witness for the Department of Justice, 54, in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2000/2057.htm>> (accessed 20 January 2001).
27. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, "Internal Browsers," Government Exhibit 503 in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/503.pdf>> (accessed 21 November 2000).
28. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, e-mail from "Navisoft."
29. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, direct testimony of David Colburn, Senior Vice President for Business Affairs, America Online, in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2000/2045.pdf>> (accessed 21 November 2000).
30. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, e-mail from Mark Tyler, Channel Sales Manager, Asia Pacific, Netscape, 19 June 1996, Government Exhibit 78 in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/78.pdf>> (accessed 21 November 2000).
31. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, e-mail from Benjamin Myers, Communications Director, Pyramid Breweries, 21 June 1996, Government Exhibit 79 in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/79.pdf>> (accessed 21 November 2000).
32. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, letter from Peter Miller to David Cabello regarding "Notice of Intent to Terminate License Agreement #1107-3053," 1 October 1992, Government Exhibit 647 in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/647.pdf>> (accessed 21 November 2000).
33. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Brad Chase, memo to FY98 WWSM/M Attendees, 4 April 1997, Government Exhibit 510 in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/510.pdf>> (accessed 21 November 2000).
34. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, e-mail from Jim Allechin, 2 January 1997, Government Exhibit 48 in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/48.pdf>> (accessed 21 January 2001).
35. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, e-mail from Bill Gates, 1 July 1997, Government Exhibit 579 in *United States v. Microsoft*, <<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/579.pdf>> (accessed 21 January 2001).

36. "Microsoft Browser Share at an All-Time High," 26 June 2000, Statmarket.com, <<http://statmarket.com/SM?c=stat062600>> (accessed 21 November 2000).
37. Scott Thurm, "Safe Conduct; Microsoft's Behavior Is Helping Cisco Learn How to Avoid Trouble—Lesson No. 1: Seek to Charm Antitrust Regulators, Don't Try to Bully Them—There Isn't 'a Secret Sauce,'" *Wall Street Journal*, 1 June 2000.
38. Ibid.
39. Tom Dunlap, General Counsel, Intel, telephone interview with author, 11 August 2000.
40. This is a particularly complicated issue for Intel and many other technology companies. While patent laws protect monopolies, antitrust laws are designed to prevent companies from exploiting their monopoly power in ways that injure competition. "If you have an intellectual property right, you are allowed to use that right," Dunlap explained, "but you can't lie your patents or trade secrets to another product."

الفصل التاسع

1. Trevor Leggett, *The Dragon Mask and Other Judo Stories in the Zen Tradition* (London: Ippon Books, no date), 50.

عن المؤلفين

ديفيد ب. يوفي. أستاذ إدارة الأعمال الدولية في كلية إدارة الأعمال في هارفرد، حيث يت رأس أيضاً قسم الإستراتيجية وبرنامج الإدارة المتقدم. يعد الأستاذ يوفي مرجعاً في شؤون الإستراتيجية التنافسية والمنافسة الدولية، وهو عضو في مجلس إدارة شركة إنتل وعدة شركات تقانة عالية أخرى. إنه محرر المنافسة في عصر التقارب الرقمي Competing in The Age of Digital Convergence، وكتب بالتعاون مع مايكل كوزومانو المنافسة في عصر الإنترنت: دروس من نيتسكيب ومعركتها مع مايكروسوفت.

ماري كواك. أستاذ مساعد في مجال البحث في كلية إدارة الأعمال في هارفرد وتنتشر مقالات في سلوان مانجمينت ريفيو:

Sloan Management Review.