
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

6.1. Conclusion

With the fast grow in communication systems and computer networks to include all fields of daily life and used to transfer various types of data with different security levels; The researchers always develop the cryptographic systems to find more secure and confidential methods to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of transmitted data and withstand the attacks developed methods .

As discussed the cryptographic systems saw more developments and more modified algorithms, to improve cost, bandwidth or security attributes and among them the Signcryption algorithm which came to combine between the public cryptography algorithm and the signature algorithms in one step instead of the traditional approach, signature – then– encryption, with saving in communication overhead reach 40% and saving in computational cost 58%, in addition to achieve unforgeability, confidentiality, integrity and non – repudiation but lacks to achieve forward security and public variability. So, many modified signcryption algorithms came to get over the lacks of Zheng’s scheme .

Then introducing a new modified scheme “*Modified Elliptic Curve Signcryption*” this scheme based on ECDLP , in addition to achieve the functionality of the Signcryption schemes, unforgeability, confidentiality and non – repudiation it achieves forward security and encrypted message authentication or public verifiability, while others signcryption schemes lack in achieving forward security and public verifiability together in one scheme. But, reference [28] introduced modified scheme achieved the forward security and public verifiability of message but worsen the saving in communication overhead where the correct value of bandwidth saving is 20%, and increase the computational cost.

Also, the modified signcryption scheme uses a strong session key encryption depends on random choose value and the sender’s private key, plus, using the session key encryption to encrypt the message twice to increase the confidentiality and integrity of the message. The modified signcryption scheme enables the forward security so, if the adversary have the sender’s private key he must have the corresponding random chosen value to decrypt the message, and enables public variability or authenticate the encrypted message and also, check the recovered message. Although, the proposed signcryption scheme is slower than the Zheng’s signcryption scheme, it achieves saving in communication overhead reach 50% with respect to the traditional approach signature – then – encryption. And when applying the modified scheme on multiply recipients and compare it with Zheng’s signcryption for multi – recipients the new scheme achieves saving in communication overhead and computational cost higher than Zheng’s signcryption scheme.

6.2. Future work

As mentioned, IPSec mechanism is an open source mechanism can contain various of cryptographic algorithms, authentication protocols, and key management protocols to secure the sensitive transmitted data between two locations.

When applying the modified signcryption scheme on the IPSec mechanism (as mentioned in chapter 5), the transmitted data can be authenticated and encrypted in one step with less computational cost and saving in bandwidth reach 50% with respect to the traditional approach encryption – then – signature with keeping the public variability or authenticated encrypted message and in addition to increase the security of transmitted data. Also, the modified signcryption scheme is not restricted by a certain encryption algorithm while enable to use any symmetric key encryption and by this way can solve the problem of exchange the share secret key of symmetric algorithm between two peers and keep the easiness of hardware implementation of the encryption algorithms.

For the future work, if using the proposed application of applying the modified signcryption scheme on IPSec mechanism in its all cases; for authentication only, for encryption only, and for both encryption and authentication, can improve the security of computer networks and benefit with cost and bandwidth saving.

Also, I will work on enhancing the processing overhead and the computational cost of the new proposed modified signcryption scheme “*Modified Elliptic Curve Signcryption*”.

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APPENDIX A

ENCODING AND DECODING A MESSAGE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ELLIPTIC CURVE

ECC Encryption and Decryption methods can only encrypt and decrypt a point on the curve not messages. Unfortunately, there are no known polynomial time algorithms for finding a large number of points on an arbitrary curve. But not simply looking for random points on E , here. So, want a systematic way of finding points on $E_p(a, b)$ relating somehow to the plaintext message. Therefore, forcing to use probabilistic algorithms to do this, where the chance of failure is acceptably small. Thus Encoding(message to a point) and Decoding (point to a message) methods are important while Encryption and Decryption [29,30].

A.1. Message Encoding and Decoding

Suppose that, a text file has to be encrypted, a user can encrypt the ASCII code of each and every printable character on the keyboard, let us say he has to encrypt an 8-bit number, can represent 128 characters on the keyboard. All the points on the elliptic curve can be directly mapped to an ASCII value, select a curve on which will get a minimum of 128 points, so that fix each point on the curve to an ASCII value. For example, 'ENCRYPT' can be written as sequence of ASCII characters that is '69' '78' '67' '82' '89' '80' '84' can be mapped these values to fixed points on the curve. This is easiest method for embedding a message but less efficient in terms of security.

A.2. Koblitz's Method for Encoding Plaintext

- Step 1:** Pick an elliptic curve $E_p(a, b)$.
- Step 2:** Assume that E has N points on it.
- Step 3:** Assume that alphabet consists of the digits 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 and the letters A,B,C,.. . . , X,Y,Z coded as 10,11,.. . . , 35.
- Step 4:** This converts our message into a series of numbers between 0 and 35.
- Step 5:** Now choose an auxiliary base parameter, for example $k = 20$. (both parties should agree upon this)
- Step 6:** For each number mk (say), take $x = mk + 1$ and try to solve for y .
- Step 7:** If you can't do it, then try $x = mk + 2$ and then $x = mk + 3$ until you can solve for y .
- Step 8:** In practice, you will find such a y before you hit $x = mk + k - 1$. Then take the point (x, y) . This now converts the number m into a point on the elliptic curve. In this way, the entire message becomes a sequence of points.

Decoding:

Consider each point (x, y) and set m to be the greatest integer less than $(x - 1)/k$. Then the point (x, y) decodes as the symbol m .

APPENDIX B

NIST RECOMMENDED ELLIPTIC CURVES

In the FIPS 186-2 standard, NIST recommended 15 elliptic curves of varying security levels for U.S. federal government use [9]. The curves are of three types:

1. Random Elliptic Curves Over a Prime Field F_p .
2. Random Elliptic Curves Over a Binary Field F_{2^m} .
3. Koblitz Elliptic Curves Over a Binary Field F_{2^m} .

B.1. Random Elliptic Curves Over F_p

Table B.1 lists domain parameters for the five NIST-recommended randomly chosen elliptic curves over prime fields F_p . The primes p were specially chosen to allow for very fast reduction of integers modulo p . The selection $a = -3$ for the coefficient in the elliptic curve equation was made so that elliptic curve points represented in Jacobian projective coordinates could be added using one fewer field multiplication [31,32,33]. The following parameters are given for each curve:

- P The order of the prime field F_p .
- S The seed selected to randomly generate the coefficients of the elliptic Curve
- r The output of SHA-1.
- a, b The coefficients of the elliptic curve $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ satisfying $rb^2 \equiv a^3 \pmod{p}$.
- n The (prime) order of the base point P .
- h the cofactor.
- x, y the x and y coordinates of P .

Table B.1. NIST-Recommended Random Elliptic Curves over Prime Fields [9].

P-192: $p = 2^{192} - 2^{64} - 1$, $a = -3$, $h = 1$									
$S = 0x$	3045AE6F	C8422F64	ED579528	D38120EA	E12196D5				
$r = 0x$	3099D2BB	BFCB2538	542DCD5F	B078B6EF	5F3D6FE2	C745DE65			
$b = 0x$	64210519	E59C80E7	0FA7E9AB	72243049	FEB8DEEC	C146B9B1			
$n = 0x$	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	99DEF836	146BC9B1	B4D22831			
$x = 0x$	188DA80E	B03090F6	7CBF20EB	43A18800	F4FF0AFD	82FF1012			
$y = 0x$	07192B95	FFC8DA78	631011ED	6B24CDD5	73F977A1	1E794811			
P-224: $p = 2^{224} - 2^{96} + 1$, $a = -3$, $h = 1$									
$S = 0x$	BD713447	99D5C7FC	DC45B59F	A3B9AB8F	6A948BC5				
$r = 0x$	5B056C7E	11DD68F4	0469EE7F	3C7A7D74	F7D12111	6506D031	218291FB		
$b = 0x$	B4050A85	0C04B3AB	F5413256	5044B0B7	D7BFD8BA	270B3943	2355FFB4		
$n = 0x$	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFF16A2	E0B8F03E	13DD2945	5C5C2A3D		
$x = 0x$	B70E0CBD	6BB4BF7F	321390B9	4A03C1D3	56C21122	343280D6	115C1D21		
$y = 0x$	BD376388	B5F723FB	4C22DFE6	CD4375A0	5A074764	44D58199	85007E34		
P-256: $p = 2^{256} - 2^{224} + 2^{192} + 2^{96} - 1$, $a = -3$, $h = 1$									
$S = 0x$	C49D3608	86E70493	6A6678E1	139D26B7	819F7E90				
$r = 0x$	7EFBA166	2985BE94	03CB055C	75D4F7E0	CE8D84A9	C5114ABC	AF317768		
	0104FA0D								
$b = 0x$	5AC635D8	AA3A93E7	B3EBBD55	769886BC	651D06B0	CC53B0F6	3BCE3C3E		
	27D2604B								
$n = 0x$	FFFFFFFF	00000000	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	BCE6FAAD	A7179E84	F3B9CAC2		
	FC632551								
$x = 0x$	6B17D1F2	E12C4247	F8BCE6E5	63A440F2	77037D81	2DEB33A0	F4A13945		
	D898C296								
$y = 0x$	4FE342E2	FE1A7F9B	8EE7EB4A	7C0F9E16	2BCE3357	6B315ECE	CBB64068		
	37BF51F5								
P-384: $p = 2^{384} - 2^{128} - 2^{96} + 2^{32} - 1$, $a = -3$, $h = 1$									
$S = 0x$	A335926A	A319A27A	1D00896A	6773A482	7ACDAC73				
$r = 0x$	79D1E655	F868F02F	FF48DCDE	E14151DD	B80643C1	406D0CA1	0DFE6FC5		
	2009540A	495E8042	EA5F744F	6E184667	CC722483				
$b = 0x$	B3312FA7	E23EE7E4	988E056B	E3F82D19	181D9C6E	FE814112	0314088F		
	5013875A	C656398D	8A2ED19D	2A85C8ED	D3EC2AEF				
$n = 0x$	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	C7634D81		
	F4372DDF	581A0DB2	48B0A77A	ECEC196A	CCC52973				
$x = 0x$	AA87CA22	BE8B0537	8EB1C71E	F320AD74	6E1D3B62	8BA79B98	59F741E0		
	82542A38	5502F25D	BF55296C	3A545E38	72760AB7				
$y = 0x$	3617DE4A	96262C6F	5D9E98BF	9292DC29	F8F41DBD	289A147C	E9DA3113		
		B5F0B8C0	0A60B1CE	1D7E819D	7A431D7C	90EA0E5F			
P-521: $p = 2^{521} - 1$, $a = -3$, $h = 1$									
$S = 0x$	D09E8800	291CB853	96CC6717	393284AA	A0DA64BA				
$r = 0x$	000000B4	8BFA5F42	0A349495	39D2BDFC	264EEEEB	077688E4	4FBF0AD8		
	F6D0EDB3	7BD6B533	28100051	8E19F1B9	FFBE0FE9	ED8A3C22	00B8F875		
	E523868C	70C1E5BF	55BAD637						
$b = 0x$	00000051	953EB961	8E1C9A1F	929A21A0	B68540EE	A2DA725B	99B315F3		
	B8B48991	8EF109E1	56193951	EC7E937B	1652C0BD	3BB1BF07	3573DF88		
	3D2C34F1	EF451FD4	6B503F00						
$n = 0x$	000001FF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF		
	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFA	51868783	BF2F966B	7FCC0148	F709A5D0	3BB5C9B8		
	899C47AE	BB6FB71E	91386409						
$x = 0x$	000000C6	858E06B7	0404E9CD	9E3ECB66	2395B442	9C648139	053FB521		
	F828AF60	6B4D3DBA	A14B5E77	EFE75928	FE1DC127	A2FFA8DE	3348B3C1		
	856A429B	F97E7E31	C2E5BD66						
$y = 0x$	00000118	39296A78	9A3BC004	5C8A5FB4	2C7D1BD9	98F54449	579B4468		
	17AFBD17	273E662C	97EE7299	5EF42640	C550B901	3FAD0761	353C7086		
	A272C240	88BE9476	9FD16650						

B.2. Random Elliptic Curves Over F_{2^m}

Table B.2 lists domain parameters for the five NIST-recommended randomly chosen elliptic curves over binary fields F_{2^m} . The extension degrees m are prime and were selected so that there exists a Koblitz curve over F_{2^m} having almost-prime group order [31,32,33]. The following parameters are given for each curve:

m	The extension degree of the binary field F_{2^m} .
$f(z)$	The reduction polynomial of degree m .
s	The seed selected to randomly generate the coefficients of the elliptic curve.
a, b	The coefficients of the elliptic curve $y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b$.
n	The (prime) order of the base point P .
h	The cofactor.
x, y	The x and y coordinates of P .

B.3. Koblitz Elliptic Curves Over F_{2^m}

Table B.3 lists domain parameters for the five NIST-recommended Koblitz curves over binary fields, the binary fields F_{2^m} are the same as for the random curves. Koblitz curves were selected because point multiplication can be performed faster than for the random curves [18,19]. The following parameters are given for each curve:

m	The extension degree of the binary field 2^m .
$f(z)$	The reduction polynomial of degree m .
a, b	The coefficients of the elliptic curve $y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b$.
n	The (prime) order of the base point P .
h	The cofactor.
x, y	The x and y coordinates of P .

Table B.2. NIST-Recommended Random Elliptic Curves Over Binary Fields [9].

B-163: $m = 163$, $f(z) = z^{163} + z^7 + z^6 + z^3 + 1$, $a = 1$, $h = 2$							
$S = 0x$	85E25BFE	5C86226C	DB12016F	7553F9D0	E693A268		
$b = 0x$	00000002	0A601907	B8C953CA	1481EB10	512F7874	4A3205FD	
$n = 0x$	00000004	00000000	00000000	000292FE	77E70C12	A4234C33	
$x = 0x$	00000003	F0EBA162	86A2D57E	A0991168	D4994637	E8343E36	
$y = 0x$	00000000	D51FBC6C	71A0094F	A2CDD545	B11C5C0C	797324F1	
B-233: $m = 233$, $f(z) = z^{233} + z^{74} + 1$, $a = 1$, $h = 2$							
$S = 0x$	74D59FF0	7F6B413D	0EA14B34	4B20A2DB	049B50C3		
$b = 0x$	00000066	647EDE6C	332C7F8C	0923BB58	213B333B	20E9CE42	
	81FE115F	7D8F90AD					
$n = 0x$	00000100	00000000	00000000	00000000	0013E974	E72F8A69	
	22031D26	03CFE0D7					
$x = 0x$	000000FA	C9DFCBAC	8313BB21	39F1BB75	5FEF65BC	391F8B36	
	F8F8EB73	71FD558B					
$y = 0x$	00000100	6A08A419	03350678	E58528BE	BF8A0BEF	F867A7CA	
	36716F7E	01F81052					
B-283: $m = 283$, $f(z) = z^{283} + z^{12} + z^7 + z^5 + 1$, $a = 1$, $h = 2$							
$S = 0x$	77E2B073	70EB0F83	2A6DD5B6	2DFC88CD	06BB84BE		
$b = 0x$	027B680A	C8B8596D	A5A4AF8A	19A0303F	CA97FD76	45309FA2	
	A581485A	F6263E31	3B79A2F5				
$n = 0x$	03FFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFEF90	399660FC	
	938A9016	5B042A7C	EFADB307				
$x = 0x$	05F93925	8DB7DD90	E1934F8C	70B0DFEC	2EED25B8	557EAC9C	
	80E2E198	F8CDBECD	86B12053				
$y = 0x$	03676854	FE24141C	B98FE6D4	B20D02B4	516FF702	350EDDB0	
	826779C8	13F0DF45	BE8112F4				
B-409: $m = 409$, $f(z) = z^{409} + z^{87} + 1$, $a = 1$, $h = 2$							
$S = 0x$	4099B5A4	57F9D69F	79213D09	4C4BCD4D	4262210B		
$b = 0x$	0021A5C2	C8EE9FEB	5C4B9A75	3B7B476B	7FD6422E	F1F3DD67	4761FA99
	D6AC27C8	A9A197B2	72822F6C	D57A55AA	4F50AE31	7B13545F	
$n = 0x$	01000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	000001E2
	AAD6A612	F33307BE	5FA47C3C	9E052F83	8164CD37	D9A21173	
$x = 0x$	015D4860	D088DDB3	496B0C60	64756260	441CDE4A	F1771D4D	B01FFE5B
	34E59703	DC255A86	8A118051	5603AEAB	60794E54	BB7996A7	
$y = 0x$	0061B1CF	AB6BE5F3	2BBFA783	24ED106A	7636B9C5	A7BD198D	0158AA4F
	5488D08F	38514F1F	DF4B4F40	D2181B36	81C364BA	0273C706	
B-571: $m = 571$, $f(z) = z^{571} + z^{10} + z^5 + z^2 + 1$, $a = 1$, $h = 2$							
$S = 0x$	2aa058f7	3a0e33ab	486b0f61	0410c53a	7f132310		
$b = 0x$	02F40E7E	2221F295	DE297117	B7F3D62F	5C6A97FF	CB8CEFF1	CD6BA8CE
	4A9A18AD	84FFABBD	8EFA5933	2BE7AD67	56A66E29	4AFD185A	78FF12AA
	520E4DE7	39BACA0C	7FFEFF7F	2955727A			
$n = 0x$	03FFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF
	FFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFF	E661CE18	FF559873	08059B18	6823851E	C7DD9CA1
	161DE93D	5174D66E	8382E9BB	2FE84E47			
$x = 0x$	0303001D	34B85629	6C16C0D4	0D3CD775	0A93D1D2	955FA80A	A5F40FC8
	DB7B2ABD	BDE53950	F4C0D293	CDD711A3	5B67FB14	99AE6003	8614F139
	4ABFA3B4	C850D927	E1E7769C	8EEC2D19			
$y = 0x$	037BF273	42DA639B	6DCCFFFE	B73D69D7	8C6C27A6	009CBBCA	1980F853
	3921E8A6	84423E43	BAB08A57	6291AF8F	461BB2A8	B3531D2F	0485C19B
	16E2F151	6E23DD3C	1A4827AF	1B8AC15B			

Table B.3. NIST-Recommended Koblitz Curves Over Binary Fields [9].

K-163: $m = 163$, $f(z) = z^{163} + z^7 + z^6 + z^3 + 1$, $a = 1$, $b = 1$, $h = 2$	
$n = 0x$	00000004 00000000 00000000 00020108 A2E0CC0D 99F8A5EF
$x = 0x$	00000002 FE13C053 7BBC11AC AA07D793 DE4E6D5E 5C94EEE8
$y = 0x$	00000002 89070FB0 5D38FF58 321F2E80 0536D538 CCDAA3D9
K-233: $m = 233$, $f(z) = z^{233} + z^{74} + 1$, $a = 0$, $b = 1$, $h = 4$	
$n = 0x$	00000080 00000000 00000000 00000000 00069D5B B915BCD4 6EFB1AD5 F173ABDF
$x = 0x$	00000172 32BA853A 7E731AF1 29F22FF4 149563A4 19C26BF5 0A4C9D6E EFAD6126
$y = 0x$	000001DB 537DECE8 19B7F70F 555A67C4 27A8CD9B F18AEB9B 56E0C110 56FAE6A3
K-283: $m = 283$, $f(z) = z^{283} + z^{12} + z^7 + z^5 + 1$, $a = 0$, $b = 1$, $h = 4$	
$n = 0x$	01FFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFE9AE 2ED07577 265DFF7F 94451E061E163C61
$x = 0x$	0503213F 78CA4488 3F1A3B81 62F188E5 53CD265F 23C1567A 16876913 B0C2AC24 58492836
$y = 0x$	01CCDA38 0F1C9E31 8D90F95D 07E5426F E87E45C0 E8184698 E4596236 4E341161 77DD2259
K-409: $m = 409$, $f(z) = z^{409} + z^{87} + 1$, $a = 0$, $b = 1$, $h = 4$	
$n = 0x$	007FFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFE5F 83B2D4EA 20400EC4 557D5ED3 E3E7CA5B 4B5C83B8 E01E5FCF
$x = 0x$	0060F05F 658F49C1 AD3AB189 0F718421 0EFD0987 E307C84C 27ACCFB8 F9F67CC2 C460189E B5AAAA62 EE222EB1 B35540CF E9023746
$y = 0x$	01E36905 0B7C4E42 ACBA1DAC BF04299C 3460782F 918EA427 E6325165 E9EA10E3 DA5F6C42 E9C55215 AA9CA27A 5863EC48 D8E0286B
K-571: $m = 571$, $f(z) = z^{571} + z^{10} + z^5 + z^2 + 1$, $a = 0$, $b = 1$, $h = 4$	
$n = 0x$	02000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 131850E1 F19A63E4 B391A8DB 917F4138 B630D84B E5D63938 1E91DEB4 5CFE778F 637C1001
$x = 0x$	026EB7A8 59923FBC 82189631 F8103FE4 AC9CA297 0012D5D4 60248048 01841CA4 43709584 93B205E6 47DA304D B4CEB08C BBD1BA39 494776FB 988B4717 4DCA88C7 E2945283 A01C8972
$y = 0x$	0349DC80 7F4FBF37 4F4AEADE 3BCA9531 4DD58CEC 9F307A54 FFC61EFC 006D8A2C 9D4979C0 AC44AEA7 4FBEBBB9 F772AEDC B620B01A 7BA7AF1B 320430C8 591984F6 01CD4C14 3EF1C7A3

ملخص الرسالة

نظراً للتطور الكبير في وسائل الإتصالات وخاصة شبكات الحاسب الآلي واستخدامها للربط بين الأفراد والشركات في جميع أنحاء العالم لنقل البيانات بكافة أشكالها (فيديو – صوت – بيانات) وبإختلاف أهميتها وخاصة في عمليات التجارة الإلكترونية ونقل الحسابات البنكية وغيرها من الأمور، مما يتطلب وجود طرق أكثر أماناً لنقل هذه البيانات عبر شبكات الحاسب الآلي وشبكة الإنترنت مع الحفاظ على سلامتها وسريتها وخاصة مع تطور أساليب المخترقين. ولذلك تم استخدام خوارزمات وتقنيات كثيرة لتشفير البيانات المرسله لضمان سريتها وصحتها ومن بين هذه التقنيات، تقنية حماية بروتوكول شبكة الإنترنت والتي تستخدم منذ بضع سنوات وهي تتضمن مجموعة من البروتوكولات المختلفة التي تستخدم لتشفير وتوثيق البيانات أثناء إنتقالها بين نقطتين عبر شبكات الحاسب الآلي .

ويتضمن موضوع الرسالة دراسة تفصيلية لحماية شبكات الحاسب الآلي ودراسة بروتوكول حماية شبكة الإنترنت المستخدم وتطبيقه عملياً وكذلك دراسة تفصيلية لنظم التشفير وتوثيق البيانات باستخدام المفتاح العام ودراسة بعض الخوارزمات التي استحدثت بعد ذلك ومن أهمهم خوارزم التوقيع التشفيري الذي يقوم بعملية تشفير وتوثيق البيانات في خطوة واحدة وبتكلفة أقل من الطريقة التقليدية وهي توثيق الرسالة ثم تشفيرها، وأيضاً دراسته في حالة ارسال رسالة إلى أكثر من فرد.

ونقدم خوارزم جديد باستخدام المنحنيات الناقصة حيث يعمل على توثيق وتشفير البيانات بتكلفة أقل تتمثل في استخدام حيز موجي أقل يصل إلى ٥٠% مقارنة بالطريقة التقليدية مع تحقيق جميع الخواص الأمنية المطلوبة وبسريرة اكبر من الخوارزمات السابقة حيث يقوم باستخدام مفتاح تشفير يعتمد علي قيمة عشوائية بالإضافة إلى المفتاح الخاص بالمرسل وأيضاً يمكن من خلاله التأكد من توثيق البيانات دون الحاجة إلى المفتاح الخاص بالمرسل إليه الرسالة أي دون الحاجة إلى فك الرسالة ويمكن الاستفادة من ذلك في عمل برامج حماية الشبكات حيث يمكنه من تمرير البيانات من أفراد معينة دون الحاجة إلى فك الرسالة.

وقد تم مقارنة الخوارزم الجديد بالخوارزمات السابقة وتطبيقه في حالة ارسال رسالة إلى أكثر من فرد وكيفية إدخاله على تقنية حماية بروتوكول شبكة الإنترنت لتقليل الحيز الموجي المستخدم وزيادة سرية وأمان البيانات أثناء انتقالها عبر شبكات الحاسب الآلي.

وتتكون الرسالة من ستة أبواب بيانهم كالاتي :

- **الباب الأول :** يضم هذا الباب تعريف لحماية البيانات علي شبكات الحاسب الآلي وشرح مفصل لتقنية حماية بروتوكول شبكة الإنترنت وأهميتها والبروتوكولات التي تتكون منها وكيفية استخدامها في تشفير وتوثيق البيانات أثناء انتقالها عبر شبكات الحاسب الآلي .
- **الباب الثاني :** يضم الباب الثاني ملخص للأساسيات الرياضية والنظريات المتعلقة بنظم التشفير وهي مقدمة في نظرية الأرقام وتتضمن تعريف الأعداد الأولية والمقسومات ونظرية فيرمات و نظرية أويلر ودالة أويلر وهم الأكثر استخداما في حسابات نظم التشفير بالإضافة إلى شرح للمنحنيات الناقصة والعمليات الحسابية الخاصة بها .
- **الباب الثالث :** يضم الباب الثالث شرح لنظم التشفير الغير متماثلة وعلاقتها بنظرية الأرقام وكيفية استخدامها في تشفير وتوثيق البيانات والمقارنة بينهم ومن أهم نظم التشفير الغير متماثلة التشفير باستخدام المنحنيات الناقصة. ويضم أيضا شرح للخوارزمات التي استحدثت بعد ذلك ومن أهمها خوارزم التوقيع التشفيري و تطبيقه في حالة ارسال الرسالة إلى أكثر من فرد .

- الباب الرابع : يقدم الباب الرابع شرح لخوارزم جديد باستخدام المنحنيات الناقصة حيث يعمل على توثيق البيانات وتشفيرها معا بتكلفة أقل تصل إلى ٥٠% وتحقيق درجة أمان عالية. وكيفية حساب التكلفة ومقارنة الخوارزم الجديد بالخوارزمات السابقة.
- الباب الخامس : يعرض الباب الخامس كيفية تطبيق الخوارزم الجديد في حالة إرسال الرسالة إلى أكثر من فرد وكيفية إدخاله على تقنية حماية بروتوكول شبكة الإنترنت.
- الباب السادس : يضم الباب السادس توضيح لما ورد في الرسالة وعرض موجز للخوارزم الجديد وكيفية تطبيقه في المستقبل على تقنية حماية بروتوكول شبكة الإنترنت في حماية البيانات أثناء انتقالها خلال شبكات الحاسب الآلي .



تأمين إتصالات شبكات الحاسب الآلي

رسالة علمية

مقدمة إلى الدراسات العليا بكلية الهندسة – جامعه الإسكندرية
إستيفاء للدراسات المقررة للحصول على درجة

ماجستير العلوم

فى

الهندسة الكهربية

مقدمة من

المهندس / محمد حسن محمد حسن العتيقي

٢٠١٤



تأمين إتصالات شبكات الحاسب الآلي

مقدمة من

المهندس / محمد حسن محمد حسن العتيقي

للحصول على درجة

ماجستير العلوم

في

الهندسة الكهربائية

موافقون

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لجنة المناقشة والحكم على الرسالة

أ.د. حسن محمد الكمشوشي

أ.د. محمد السعيد نصر

أ.د. نور الدين حسن اسماعيل

وكيل الكلية للدراسات العليا والبحوث
كلية الهندسة – جامعة الاسكندرية

أ.د. هبه وائل لهيطة

لجنة الاشراف

..... أ.د. حسن محمد الكمشوشي

..... د. محمد محمود علي

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