

## ARAB AWAKENING DURING THE CRUSADES

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Towards the close of the fifth century Rome fell into the hands of the Barbarians, and so the ancient Caesars' State came to an end. On its ruins the Germans set up their kingdoms in the Western Mediterranean area. Meanwhile, the Eastern Roman Empire moved to dominate over the Balkan and the Levant.<sup>1</sup>

Consequently, the decline and fall of the ancient Roman Empire took place, and the Middle Ages started in an atmosphere of utter confusion. About this Edward Gibbon, the eminent historian, said in his book *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, that he would write a story full of base and mean incidents that reveal how barbarism and religion could overcome discipline and civilization.<sup>2</sup>

To Gibbon's mind, it is plain that the Barbarian Invasions and the coming of Christianity, were the first and most fatal disadvantages with which the Middle Ages started upon the ruins of the Ancient Roman Empire and its brilliant civilization.

Western Europe and the Eastern Roman Empire continued to suffer great weakness up to the beginning of the seventh century, the very decades in which very important events began to occur in Arabia—events that had far-reaching effects on the course of human history. Islam arose with a general aim for all people: to call them to the worship of the One God and the rejection of idols; and with another specific aim for the Arabs themselves: to achieve unity and love by renouncing division and disagreement. Not many years passed before that new call was firmly established finding a ready response from all the diverse Arab tribes that had previously suffered from dissension. They considered Islam the symbol of their unity and of their hopes for realising a prosperous and glorious future.

On this sound basis the first Arab State took root in its confined home in Arabia, and from there sprang to conquer, hoping to spread the principles of Islam and defend its existence against the threats of its neighbours with their continuous intrusions on its borders. Thus in the conflict between this Islamic state and its neighbouring powers, the Arabs found their struggle against the Byzantines on one side and the Westerners on the other, to be part and parcel of their policy to secure their safety. At this stage both the Byzantines and the Latin nations were on the defensive because of their weakness, whereas the Arabs were advancing quickly on the western and eastern fronts after achieving a measure of unity. On the eastern front the Arabs won a series of quick victories and during the seventh and eighth centuries could lay their hands on Syria, the eastern part of Asia Minor, Egypt, North Africa and some of the Mediterranean islands. On the western front, the Arab conquests extended as far as Spain and across the Pyrenees to France itself, although they were not able to remain there for long. In the ninth century the conquests of the Islamic state included Crete, and in the beginning of the tenth century Sicily and Southern Italy were subdued. 3

This was the inevitable prelude to later events, for it was the first vivid proof of the miracles that Arab unity could perform. It was enough that the balance of power in that struggle that had gone on since the beginning of the Conquest up to the tenth century was in favour of the Arabs. Many Arab regions and towns dominated by Arab culture and the Arabic tongue rose along the coasts of the Mediterranean, a state of affairs that led the Belgian historian Henri Pirenne,<sup>4</sup> to say that that sea which had been all Roman, and had been called by the Romans themselves "Mare Nostrum" as John LaMonte said,<sup>5</sup> had become a purely Arab sea.

However, that great triumph that the Arabs had won, as a result of uniting their efforts was soon followed by painful blows. The first relapse was in the tenth century when the balance of power between East and West was upset and Europe began to regain its power after the blows that the Arabs had dealt it. The Arab decline began as a result of the political decay of the Abbasids in the East. At the same time the Arab states in the western Mediterranean also grew weak. That upset of the balance of power had sorrowful effects on the Arabs, most noticeably in the border areas between the Arabs and the Byzantines and Latins. The Eastern Roman Empire began to capture some towns in Asia Minor and Syria, while the Normans subdued southern Italy and Sicily. In Spain, invaders from the West won several victories, the most

important of which was the capture of Toledo in 1085. The gradual retraction of Arab power in the Levant and the western Mediterranean was doubtless the result of the weakness and division of the Arabs that prevailed at the time. 6

From that bitter experience, extending from the tenth century up to the Crusades, the Arabs drew a valuable lesson that benefited them later on. It showed clearly how division of the Arabs gave the Byzantines and Latins a chance to attack their dominion and devour a large part of it. Consequently, the Byzantines and Westerners undervalued Arab power and took the offensive against the Arabs who were then forced to be generally on the defensive.

Amid that upsurge of sad events occurring in the Arab World, there rose in Europe toward the close of the eleventh century a call that historians have agreed to term "The Crusades". That movement began when one of the Roman popes, Urban II, announced its birth in a speech that was delivered in the clerical council of Clermont in France.<sup>7</sup> In that speech he called on Westerners to bear the cross to the Holy Land and establish Latin colonies there. Many contemporary Latin historians, including Foucher de Chartres and Baudri de Bourgueil, with Guibert de Nogent at their head,<sup>8</sup> have preserved the text of the speech that is full of hatred and insults for the Arabs and Arabism. Contemporary accounts say that the crowds that listened to the Pope's speech shouted their famous cheer "Deus lo Vult," and soon bore the sign of the cross as their symbol. Thus the movement began to take on a religious form. One of the old western writers, Robert le Moine, said it was a divine deed and not a human one.<sup>9</sup> Another modern western writer, Count Paul Riant, said that the Crusades were purely religious wars and their motives and aims were merely religious. The first and last aim was to deliver Palestine and the Holy Sepulchre from the hands of the Arabs.<sup>10</sup>

The latest historical research, approaching the Crusades from a more objective point of view, have proved that they were undoubtedly not solely religious, and that their aims since the beginning had been expansion and colonization. Under the disguise of a religious call, the actual purpose of the Crusades was to capture Palestine by military force, and establish Latin colonies there. The next step was to strengthen those colonies by expanding and fortifying them so that they might form a bridge for imperialism to cross and break up Arab unity, thus weakening the Arab World and securing influence and interests in the

area.<sup>11</sup> It is remarkable that some modern Western historians have admitted frankly the truth of the objectives of that movement. 12

However, under the guise of religion, great numbers of Crusaders, started from Western Europe and proceeded towards the Arab East, and in a few years won several quick victories that could never have been dreamt of before. Thus in the period between May 1097 and June 1098, the Crusaders were able to get rid of the Seljuk Sultanate in Asia Minor and Northern Syria and to form their first two colonies : Edessa on the Euphrates uplands, and Antioch on the Syrian uplands. All that was achieved within one year. 13

We have to ask whether the rapid advance of the Europeans was the result of certain characteristics that distinguished them—characteristics that the Arabs and the Seljuks did not possess — or whether it was due to their boldness and courage in their fight to death and martyrdom. Charles Oman answers these questions in his book *A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages*, saying that the Franks were weak from the military point of view. They lacked discipline, good order and careful preparation, and they had no sound tactics for war. They were also composed of small feudal armies and needed unified leadership to which all could be loyal. However, they could win decisive victories over well-trained and well-disciplined forces that outnumbered them. The truth that lay behind those victories had more profound causes than these apparent ones. They were attributed, above all, to the division that broke up the Arabs and the Seljuks at that time.<sup>14</sup>

This was the first stage of defeat that befell the Arab World in the age of weakness and decline through which it passed at the beginning of the Crusades. It was a continuation of the state of affairs that had prevailed since the tenth century, one that led to serious and dangerous consequences. There were grave misunderstandings between the Arab kings and princes. The Shi'ite Fātimids in Egypt and the Sunnite 'Abbasids in Baghdad were worn out by wide political and religious differences that caused them to grow increasingly weaker. At the same time the Turcomans, including the Seljuks, snatched from the Fātimids and the 'Abbasids whatever regions they could lay hands on, for instance Syria. Even the Seljuks' Sultanate was divided into minor states with a prince to rule each of them. That state of affairs in Antioch, Aleppo

and Damascus<sup>15</sup> has been confirmed by a contemporary Arab historian, Ibn al-Qalanisī who wrote about the first campaign. He says that if the princes of Aleppo and Damascus had reached an agreement, they could have won a decisive victory over the Franks and checked their advance through Asia Minor and Northern Syria. Notwithstanding the great danger that threatened them both, they did not unite to face their enemy or even exert any positive effort to stop its advance through the Arab East. 16

While all this dissension was going on, the Franks were waiting to seize the opportunity for their attack, for they were well-pleased at the division between the Arabs and the Seljuks that enabled them to achieve a great deal within a few years.

Shortly after the Crusaders had established their first two princedoms in the East, they began to march on Jerusalem and were able to reach it in 1099. At that time, Jerusalem was one of the Fatimids' possessions. 17 After besieging it for about forty days, Jerusalem fell into the hands of the Latins, and that holy city saw many atrocities when they entered. They pursued the peaceful citizens who resorted to the Dome of the Rock and to Aqsa Mosque for shelter when they found themselves surrounded by the enemy. The natives escaped from the violence of the Franks to these sacred places, hoping that they would not break into them or try to pollute their sanctuary. However, the Franks did not recognize their sacredness, and the blood of the martyrs flowed into rivers in which the invaders waded up to their knees. The cruelty of their actions has been described by two Frankish historians who witnessed the massacre. They are Raimond d'Agiles and Albert d'Aix.<sup>18</sup> Many Arab writers, especially Ibn al-Qalanisī 'Abu-al-Fidā, Ibn al-Wardī, Ibn Kathīr, al-Maqrīzī and Ibn al-'Imād al-Kātib, have given us numerous examples of the barbarism of the Franks during the Crusades.<sup>19</sup>

Palestine finally fell to the Westerners in July 1099, after the Arabs had ruled it for more than four and a half centuries. The Franks' dreams were realized when they set up their Latin kingdom in Arab territory and appointed one of their leaders as its ruler. He soon divided it into feudal princedoms and distributed them among the Latin generals, his companions, exploiting the Arab schism that still existed. Marshall Baldwin, the western historian, says, "The Crusaders' states in the

Levant may, therefore, best be understood as experiments in colonization, the first chapter in the long history of Europe overseas."20

Thus the first part of the struggle between the Arabs and the Latins ended with that decisive victory that was achieved within a few years. If we look a little at the overall pattern of this period, rather than just at individual battles, it seems that the success the invaders attained over the Arabs can be attributed to the state of affairs among the Arabs themselves. The division that prevailed then in the Arab East paralyzed their resistance against the Westerners.

The Westerners undoubtedly knew well from the start that if the Arabs in Egypt and Syria united their efforts and reached an agreement, their united forces would repel the Crusaders and get rid of them very easily. The Arabs themselves could never forget the losses that they suffered and the gains the Franks had made since the beginning of their campaign because of the decline and division of Arab power. They fully realized that the more they were united, the more eager they would become to attack their enemies and drive them out of their princedoms in the East. There would be strength in their unity, and if they were strong they could get rid of all trace of the Latins. But division meant weakness, and failure to resist their enemies would mean that Western influence would grow until it dominated the whole area.<sup>21</sup>

The disputes and wars among the Arab rulers kept them from giving their full attention to the struggle against the invaders. Nobody would ever deny that if they had been united when the first Crusade broke out, the Latins would never have won any military or political victories in Palestine, and the Arabs would have destroyed them totally before they could reach it or set up colonies there. Even if the Crusaders had settled on their lands, they would not have given them any opportunity to set up a strong state, and could have kept Palestine free from any foreign interference if they had put the welfare of their peoples above their own interests and differences.

However, in spite of the rapid success that the Franks were able to achieve, their society in the East was clearly weak, weary and collapsing. It did not have the necessary prerequisites for building a strong legitimate state. It was born so weak and so frail that it could not stand on its feet alone. It had no morality, no traditions, no national army and no public wealth or invested capital. That is why it was continually exposed to changes.

and upheavals as well as to violent crises, and it suffered much from the disastrous events that occasionally befell it. From the beginning the colonies were plagued with weakness stemming from factors such as their poor financial resources, their small number of warriors, their clashing interests, their varied desires, their different racial origins, their corrupt morals and their cool religious enthusiasm. Moreover, there were continuous disputes and quarrels between the Franks who recently arrived from the West, and those who had settled in the East before about their private interests and possession of estates. Finally, we must not forget the enmity that was then growing between the invaders and their subjects. The Franks knew that they were living among the lawful owners of the land who were eager to unite their forces in order to give the fatal blow that would enable them to regain their usurped lands.<sup>22</sup>

The gradual decline of the Crusader's princedoms was met by the feeling of the Arab peoples that the existence of those princedoms among them was a threatening danger that should be uprooted before it was able to grow and spread over other parts of the Arab World. They realized that every day that passed without an achievement of unity meant a sure loss that would delay their holy wars against their enemy.

Unfortunately, no leader appeared on the Arab stage at that time who could lead the Arabs in one unified front against the Franks. The Franks in that early period had only adversary princes to face, so they did everything to divide the Seljuks and the Arab rulers in order to establish their own influence, and ensure their own interests.

As the danger to the Arab World grew more and more threatening, a feeling of consciousness and awakening appeared on its horizon at the beginning of the twelfth century. The Arabs then began to estimate the danger that they faced, and did their best to unite against the foreigners and drive them out of their homeland. Such an awakening first appeared in Egypt, Iraq and Northern Syria in the form of Arab stirrings, but it had not yet ripened into a unified movement. For example there was the alliance of the ruler of Aleppo and the Fātimids in Egypt against the Latin princedom of Antioch at the beginning of the century, as well as the attempts of the rulers of al-Maueşel and Damascus to form an axis that would go around the Latin possessions in the north and the north-east. These partial attempts did not bear fruit because the Arabs attacked the Franks' princedoms of Edessa, Tripoli and Antioch before having a perfectly unified front. The result was that they could not win an ultimate victory at that time.<sup>23</sup>

Thus a sort of balance was created between the Arabs and the Franks in this second stage of the struggle in which neither of them could win a decisive victory over the other. This stage has been analysed and described in detail by René Grousset and Steven Runciman in their books about the Crusades. Prof. Aziz Suryal Atiya put this theory in its final form in his book "Crusade, Commerce and Culture" published in Bloomington in 1962.

Several circumstances helped the invaders to maintain their declining position in the Arab East, such as building castles and forts, fortifying the coastal towns, and exploiting any division that occurred between the Arab rulers, as well as arousing new misunderstandings. In addition, they were aided by the armed European pilgrims who arrived irregularly in small numbers. They also adopted the device of political marriage to join the princedoms that were in dispute with each other. Finally, they called on the military religious orders and the Italian commercial fleets that came from Genoa, Pisa and Venice to capture the Arab ports on the Syrian coast in return for a share of the profits and plunders. 24

But for these circumstances, that stage of struggle would have ended with the supremacy of the Arabs over the Crusaders who were surrounded in the north, the east and the south-west by the strong forces of the enemies who waited for the chance to go on the offensive. The odds were such that the invaders knew well that they would undoubtedly perish, and they had to choose either to return to their homes by sea or wait to be thrown into it by enemy forces when the proper time came.

These were the only alternatives for the Latins. As for the Arabs, they had two possible courses before them at that stage. The first was to block the coastal border of the Levant in front of the Franks, but that was not possible at that time because of the Frankish forts and ports along the coast which were strongly fortified against Arabs. Besides, the Arabs could not be sure about winning a decisive victory in that way because of the gaps that might take place within the Arab front itself before they could reach a state of perfect unity, gaps that could be exploited by the enemy. The second solution was for the Arabs to begin at once to form a united front extending from Syria and Iraq in the north to Egypt in the far south that would enable them to attack the Latin state from all directions, and thus push the Franks toward the sea.

This is what actually happened in the third and last stage of the Crusades. A movement known as the "Arab Awakening" arose,

Some strong Arab powers bore the responsibility of uniting the shattered Arab front so that it could stand against the Franks and check the threat they presented. That movement resulted in the appearance of the great leaders ʿImād al-Dīn Zinkī and his son Nūr al-Dīn Mahmūd<sup>25</sup> and the hero Saladin (Salāḥ al-Dīn Youssef, the Ayyubid), who knew most effectively how to organize opposition in that bitter struggle against the Franks. The result was that within a few years they established a united Arab front that extended from the Euphrates in the far north to the Nile in the far south; there was beginning to be one state with one ruler, with Cairo as its capital. The Franks saw the danger now that their possessions were surrounded by a strong belt from all directions, and they had nothing before them except the sea. Even in that direction their position was threatened by the strong Egyptian navy that was waiting to begin a battle with them.<sup>26</sup> They were so terrified that Guillaume de Tyr the Latin historian who lived in that period and witnessed its events, says that the change in the balance of power had struck the Westerners, and was a disaster that destroyed their interests in Palestine and the Arab East.<sup>27</sup>

Thus after the awakening, when the invaders had lost any hope for expansion and conquest, or even for mere survival, the stage was set for giving a final overwhelming blow. It happened in the days of Saladin when after he had secured the unity of all Arabs in the East, he began his well-known struggle against the Crusaders that ended with their defeat at Hittīn in July 1187 and withdrawal from Jerusalem in October of the same year. The balance of power in the zone was now in favour of the Arabs, and the invaders' state retracted and became a narrow coastal patch on the Syrian coast. One Arab victory succeeded another and from that date on, all the campaigns that the Crusaders waged, failed. When the third Crusade arrived to reconquer Jerusalem two years after liberating it, it failed to attain its aim<sup>28</sup> and so the campaigns to which Egypt was exposed during the first half of the thirteenth century ended with failure and defeat on the Nile banks.<sup>29</sup> The fate of the last Crusade that Louis IX, king of France, directed against Tunis on the north African coast in 1270 fared no better than those formerly waged. 30

With the failure of all the campaigns, the rest of the Latin colonies on the Syrian coast awaited a terrible destiny. It was only a question of time before that sacred struggle, left to Saladin's successors from the Ayyubids and Māmlūks, succeeded in driving away the Latins from Arab

land toward the close of the thirteenth century when the Sultan al-Ashraf Khalil regained Arce, their last stronghold, in 1291.<sup>31</sup>

The Europeans attempted to revive a Crusade spirit in the fourteenth century, but these later Crusades were only slight hopes that could never succeed.

As a result of the failure of these campaigns, events in both the West and the Near East went through a great change. The West gave up the idea of the Crusades and began to take interest in its domestic affairs. In the Near East, Egypt, because of its geographic and strategic position, was able to dominate the coasts of the Levant. Turkey also became a great European power as well as a great Asian power. Reaction to these events took the form of Arab Islamic campaigns against the Latins that aimed at driving them out of the regions that were still in their hands. In the south, Egypt won numerous victories in the lands of the Near East as well as on the eastern parts of the Mediterranean Sea. Egyptian forces occupied Armenia in 1375, and campaigns against Cyprus continued until it was subjected in 1426. To the north the Ottomans swept over the Balkan Peninsula and captured Constantinople in 1453, and Rhodes fell into their hands in 1523. All these gave evidence of the end of the Middle Ages with its ideals and conceptions and signified the beginning of a new age.<sup>32</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

From the evidence mentioned above we can deduce important facts and conclusions that can be summarized as follows :<sup>33</sup>

1. The details of this research project reveal a significant idea : that ages of power, unity and progress, and others of weakness, decay and backwardness succeeded each other in the Arab Near East in the period between the seventh and the fifteenth centuries A.D. It also highlights the factors and causes that led to the waxing and waning of power, unity and progress, and the result of such changes.

2. There is also the related idea of the balance of power between the Latin West and the Arab East. That balance was closely connected with the political, economic and social circumstances that prevailed then in both worlds, and had significance in each sphere.

3. The third fact involves the conflict between the Latins and the Arabs in the Near East, a conflict beginning with the attacks of the Crusaders toward the end of the eleventh century, and lasting throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. They were followed by other campaigns in the fourteenth century called the later Crusades. The West always began an attack when it was in the centre of power, and every Western offensive was followed by local Arab amassments in the regions exposed to danger, with the intention of repelling the aggressors. A widespread Arab awakening was followed by counter-attacks to regain the Holy Land from European hands. For instance, there was an uprising in the twelfth century during the reign of 'Imād al-Dīn Zinkī involving his son Nūr al-Dīn Mahmūd and Ṣalah al-Dīn the Ayyubid hero. Then there were the Arab Islamic counter-attacks by the Mamluks of Egypt and the Ottomans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in answer to the later Crusades.

4. We should also differentiate between the local Arab amassments directed against Frankish attacks and the comprehensive Arab awakenings that were aroused by the Crusade colonization of the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. At the same time, these awakenings must be distinguished from the complete Arab unity achieved later, for each had its own circumstances leading to it and its own philosophy and ideology, though each movement was connected naturally to the other like links of a chain.

5. Another fact related to the preceding one is the lesson the Arabs learned from their struggle with the Franks. They found that the amassment of Arab powers into a united front was essential for any kind of effective defence against the Franks.<sup>34</sup> This means that the Arabs, in order to obtain final and decisive victory over their enemies, have first to make a united front. In other words, Arab unity must precede armed struggle. Sometimes the two went together, but in some cases the holy war preceded Arab unity, when the Arabs were suddenly confronted by a situation in which they find themselves compelled to fight against their enemies.

6. From the beginning, the revelation of the real aims of the Crusades-expansion and colonization-was a spur to the rise of Arab power, culminating in the comprehensive Arab awakening, leading to the complete Arab unity.

7. The violence, cruelty and fanaticism of the Latins in their campaigns were important factors that excited the nationalist spirit among the Arabs.

8. It has also been proved that during this bloody conflict, Egypt was undoubtedly the heart of the Arab World and the centre for distribution of money, men, provisions and weapons.<sup>35</sup> From Egypt the shout for holy wars (al-Jihād) against the Crusaders always arose. It was Egypt that went out to fight them, and it played its part in gathering the Arab powers in a stand against Latin expansion. That was why the Westerners concentrated their attacks on it during the first half of the thirteenth century in the campaigns of Jean de Brienne and Louis IX.

9. The Crusades against the Arab East revealed another fact that cannot be ignored. Because of the geographical and strategic position of Egypt, as well as the ambitions of the invaders, it was necessary to strengthen its land and naval forces. The army was molded into a strong unit, at the same time the navy guarding the long Arab coast was being strengthened. In other words, there is a close relation between the geographical and strategic position of the Arab East and the invasions to which the Arabs were exposed, necessitating a great force on land and sea in the Arab East.<sup>36</sup>

10. The Crusades showed that the Arab peoples did not live in isolation from the events that took place round them. They have proved in many situations that they understood and were well aware of current events. They assured their existence and individuality during the conflict. Undoubtedly, popular resistance within the Arab World has played a great part in its defence.<sup>37</sup>

11. It is easy to show the strong spiritual unity between the Arabs in the East and the Arabs in the West during that period. While the tribes of the East struggled against the Franks in the Levant, the Arabs in the West around the Mediterranean were fighting the Europeans there. In addition the Maghreb peoples played an important part in the struggle against the Crusaders. This is a concrete expression of the unity that joined all the Arabs from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Gulf in their sacred struggle against the Westerners.<sup>38</sup>

Finally, we have to change the current and traditional ideas prevailing in the West concerning the crusading movement, and we have to look at it with a fresh mind as a movement aiming, above all, at expansion and colonization.<sup>39</sup>



10. P. Riant, *Inventaire critique des lettres historiques des croisades*, ed. A.O.L., I (Paris, 1881), 2.

11. Joseph N. Youssef, *The Arabs, the Byzantines and the Latins during the First Crusade* (Alexandria, 1963), pp. 51—91 (in Arabic).

12. Cf. René Grousset, *The Sum of History*, English trans. by Helen and A. Temple Patterson (Oxford, 1951), p. 182; George Trevelyan, *A Shortened History of England* (Aylesbury, 1960), p. 141; Bernard Lewis, *The Arabs in History* (London, 1958), p. 140; Henry W.C. Davis, *Mediaeval Europe* (London, 1941), pp. 182, 198.

13. Matthieu d'Edesse, *Extraits de la Chronique de Matthieu d'Edesse*, ed. R.H.C. — Doc. Arm., I (Paris, 1869), 37 — 38; Foucher de Chartres, *op. cit.*, III, 496 — 97.

14. Charles Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages*, I (London, 1924), p. 233.

15. Cf. Runciman, *op. cit.*, I, 75—78; Kenneth M. Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, I (Philadelphia, 1958), 96—97; W. Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East* (Cambridge, 1907), 19—20. For further details concerning the political and economic decline at the end of the Fatimids, see Ibn al-Athīr, *Kitāb al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh*, ed. R.H.C. — H. Or., I (Paris, 1872), 550; al-Maqrīzī, *Ighāthat al'Umma fī Kashf al-Ghumma*, ed. Ziada, M. M. and Shayyal, G. (Cairo, 1940), pp. 18 — 27; Abu al-Fidā, *al-Mukhtasar fī Akhbār al-Bashar*, II (Istanbul, 1286 A.H.), 40—42.

16. Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl Tārīkh Dimashq*, ed. Amedroz (Beirut, 1908), pp. 134 — 35.

17. Cf. Ibn al-Qalanisi, *op. cit.*, p. 135; Ibn al-Wardī, *Tatimmat al-Mukhtasar fī Akhbār al-Bashar*, II (Cairo, 1285 A.H.), 11.

18. Raimond d'Agüles, *Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem*, ed. R.H.C. — H. Occ., III (Paris, 1866), 291 ff.; Albert d'Aix, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, ed. R.H.C. — H. Occ., IV (Paris, 1879), 470 ff.; cf. also Anna Comnena, *The Alexiad*, English trans. by Elizabeth Dawes (London, 1928), p. 251.

19. Cf. Ibn al-Qalanisi *op. cit.*, p. 136; Abu al-Fidā, *op. cit.*, III, 128—29; Ibn al-Wardī, *op. cit.*, II, 137; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa al-Nihāya fī al-Tārīkh* (Cairo, 1358 A.H.), pp. 83—84; al-Maqrīzī, *al-Mawā'iz wa al-I'tibār fī Dhikr al-Khitāt wa al-Athār*, I (Cairo, 1270 A.H.), 212; Ibn al'Imād, *Shadhārat al-Dahab fī Akhbār man Dhahab*, V (Cairo, 1351 A.H.), 66.

20. Marshall W. Baldwin, *The Mediaeval Church* (New York, 1960), p. 103.

21. The best reference in Arabic in this respect is : Hasan Habashy, *Nūr al-Dīn and the Crusaders : A Historical Study of the Awakening of Islam* (Cairo, 1948).

22. René Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades*, II (Paris, 1948), 24 ff., 310 ff., 609 ff.; Runciman, *op. cit.*, II, 291 ff.

23. Ibn al-Athīr, *Tārīkh al-Dawla al-Atābikiya Melūk al-Mausil*, ed. R.H.C. — H. Or., II, 2e. partie (Paris, 1876), 33; cf. also Albert d'Aix, *op. cit.*, IV, 670; Matthieu d'Edesse, *op. cit.*, I, 19—24, 96 — 97.

24. 'Omar Kamāl Tawfik, *The Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Alexandria, 1958), pp. 73 — 76, 164 ff. (in Arabic).

25. Runciman, *op. cit.*, II, 325—44, 403—35; Grousset, *op. cit.*, II, 62 ff., 363 ff., 650 ff. Concerning the wars of 'Imād al-Dīn Zīnkī and Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd against the Franks, see: Ibn al-Qalānisi, *op. cit.*, pp. 279—80, 333, 339—42; Ibn al-Shihna, *al-Durr al-Muntakhab fi Tārīkh Mamlakat Ḥalab*, ed. Surkis (Beirut, 1909), p. 219; Ibn al-Athīr, *op. cit.*, II, 2c. partie, 118, 125, 194, 207, 219—24, 233—36; Ibn Wāsil, *Mufarrij al-Kurūb fi Akhbar Banī 'Ayyub* (The History of the Ayyubids), ed. Gamal al-Dīn al-Shayyāl, I (Cairo, 1953), 72—75, 81—83, 120—25, 127—28, 134—36, 143 ff. Cf. also Gregoire le Pretre, *Chronique*, ed. R.H.C. — Doc. Arm., I (Paris, 1869), 157.

26. Cf. Gamal al-Dīn al-Shayyāl, "The Unity of Egypt and Syria during the Islamic Period," (Alexandria, 1958), 7, 13 (in Arabic).

27. Gaillaume de Tyr, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum*, ed. R.H.C. — H. Occ., I, 2c. partie (Paris, 1844), 895—97.

28. Concerning Saladin's holy wars against the Franks and the third Crusade, see: Ibn Shaddad, *al-Namadir al-Sultāniya wa al-Mahāsīn al-Yusufiya* (The Biography of Saladin), ed. Gamal al-Dīn al-Shayyāl (Cairo, 1964), pp. 21—23, 41, 43, 45, 48—49, 63, 66, 74, 75 ff.; Ibn Wāsil, *op. cit.*, II, ed. Shayyāl (Cairo, 1957), 148 ff., 157 ff., 165 ff.; al-Asfahāni, *al-Fath al-Qūssi fi al-Fath al-Qudsi* (Cairo, 1321 A.H.), 17—25, 36—45, 140—260, 314—17; cf. also Vartan le Grand, *Extrait de l'histoire universelle*, ed. R.H.C. — Doc. Arm., I (Paris, 1859), 439; Ambroise, *The Crusade of Richard Lion-Heart*, trans. by M. J. Hubert (New York, 1941), pp. 108 — 118, 124 ff.

29. For example, the Crusade of Jean de Brienne of Acre and the nominal king of Jerusalem (1218 — 1221 A.D.) and that of St. Louis of France (1248—1250 A.D.). Many good studies have appeared recently in Arabic concerning the Crusade of St. Louis, especially those written by M.M. Ziada, Gamal al-Dīn al-Shayyāl, Hasan Hababiy and Joseph N. Youssef.

30. Cf. al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-Khitāt*, *op. cit.*, I (Cairo, 1270 A.H.), 223; *idem*, *Kitāb al-Suluk lima 'rifat Duwal al-Muluk*, ed. Ziada, M. M., I, Part II (Cairo, 1936), 364—65, 502, 590. Cf. also Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, ed. de Wailly, M. N. (Paris, 1874), 404 ff.; Erables, *L'Estoire de Erables Empereur*, ed. R.H.C. — H. Occ. II (Paris, 1859), 458 ff.

31. Al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-Suluk*, *op. cit.*, I, Part II, 567 ff.; I, Part III, 47 ff. Cf. also Aziz S. Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (London, 1938), 29 ff.

32. Prof. Dr. Aziz S. Atiya is an authority in the later Crusades. We may refer here to his valuable works concerning this subject: *The Crusade of Nicopolis* (London, 1934); *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (London, 1933), pp. 3 — 9, 17 — 23, 43, 52, 74 ff., 123 ff., 345 ff., 398 ff., 435 ff., 463 ff., 480 — 83; *Crusade, Commerce and Culture* (Bloomington, 1962), pp. 92 — 111, 129 ff. As regards the part played by Cyprus under Latin domination during the period of the crusades, the best and only work in Arabic is: Said Ashour, *Cyprus and the Crusades* (Cairo, 1957), pp. 86 — 122.

33. These facts have been dealt with in detail in my book written in Arabic : *The Unity and the Awakening Movements of the Arabs During the Crusades* (Alexandria, 1967), pp. 45 — 66.

34. Cf. Stevenson, *op. cit.*, pp. 723 — 24.

35. Cf. Gamal al-Din al-Shayyal, *A Short Political and Economic History of Damietta* (Alexandria, 1949), p. 20 (in Arabic). Cf. also St. Lane-Poole, *A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages* (London, 1936), p. 218 ; *idem*, *The Story of Cairo* (London, 1924), 193.

36. Al-Qalqashandī, *Subh al-A'sha fi Sina'it al-Insha*, II (Cairo, 1913), 135 ff., IV (Cairo, 1914), 11 — 16; Ibn Mammāṭī, *Qawānīn al-Dawāwīn* ed. Aṭiya, A.S. (Cairo, 1943), pp. 339 ff., 354; al-Nuwairī, *Nihāyat al-'Arab fi Finān al-Adab*, XXVII (Cairo ms.), General Knowledge 549, plate no. 92. Cf. also : al-Maqrīzī *al-Sulūk*, *op. cit.*, I, Part II, 339 n. 1; *idem*, *al-Khitāt*, *op. cit.*, II, 194—95; Claude Cahen, "Un traité d'armurerie composé pour Saladin," *Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales*, XII (1947—1948), 15 ff.; Oman, *op. cit.*, II, 46 ff.

37. We find good and clear examples in the following sources : Ibn Wāsil, *op. cit.* (Cairo ms.), Hist. 5319, II, 357b, 366a; al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, *op. cit.*, I, Part II, 337, 350; *idem*, *al-Khitāt*, *op. cit.*, I, 221. Cf. also : Joinville, *op. cit.*, p. 120; Rothelin, *Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr dite du manuscrit de Rothelin* (1229 — 1261 A.H.), ed. R.H.C. — H. Occ., II (Paris, 1859), 605.

38. Ibn Wāsil, *op. cit.*, II, 496 — 517; cf. Painter, *op. cit.*, pp. 191 ff. A valuable study written by Prof. Dr. Saad Zaqloul Abd-El-Hamid about the relation between Saladin in the Islamic East and Abu Youssef Ya'coub in the Islamic West sheds light on this important point. Cf. S.Z. Abd-El-Hamid, "The Relation between Saladin and Abu Youssef Ya'coub," *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts*, VI & VII (Alexandria University, 1952 — 53), 84—100 (in Arabic).

39. Concerning this important point see the excellent work of Prof. Dr. Said Ashour, *The Crusades*, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1963) (in Arabic).