

الإحالات

Chapter 1: Principles and Prudence

1. The administration's decision was indicated in the so-called Downing Street memo, written by Matthew Rycroft, an aide to British Prime Minister Tony Blair's foreign policy advisor David Manning, on July 23, 2002, after a visit to Washington to consult with the Bush administration.
2. Walter Russell Mead, "The Jacksonian Tradition and American Foreign Policy," *National Interest* 58 (1999): 5–29.

Chapter 2: The Neoconservative Legacy

1. Elizabeth Drew, quoted in Joshua Muravchik, "The Neoconservative Cabal," and Howard Dean, quoted in Adam Wolfson, "Conservatives and Neoconservatives," in Irwin Stelzer, ed., *The Neocon Reader* (New York: Grove Press, 2005), 243, 216; Mary Wakefield, *The Daily Telegraph*, Jan. 9, 2004.
2. See David Brooks, "The Neocon Cabal and Other Fantasies," and Max Boot, "Myths About Neoconservatism," in Stelzer, *Neocon Reader*.

3. See Irving Kristol, *Reflections of a Neoconservative: Looking Back, Looking Ahead* (New York: Basic, 1983); Kristol, *Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea* (New York: Free Press, 1995); and Norman Podhoretz, "Neoconservatism: A Eulogy," in Norman Podhoretz, *The Norman Podhoretz Reader* (New York: Free Press, 2004).
4. Alain Frachon and Daniel Vernet, *L'Amérique messianique* (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 2004); James Mann, *The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Viking, 2004); Murray Friedman, *Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); see, inter alia, Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clark, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
5. Joseph Dorman, *Arguing the World: New York Intellectuals in Their Own Words* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
6. See Norman Podhoretz, *Breaking Ranks: A Political Memoir* (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), *Ex-Friends* (New York: Free Press, 1999), and *My Love Affair with America* (New York: Free Press, 2000).
7. Nathan Glazer, *Affirmative Discrimination* (New York: Basic, 1975); James Q. Wilson, *Thinking About Crime* (New York: Basic, 1975); Wilson and Richard Herrnstein, *Crime and Human Nature* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985); Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety," *Atlantic Monthly* (March 1982): 29–38.
8. Daniel P. Moynihan, *The Negro Family: A Case for National Action* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 1965); Charles Murray, *Losing Ground* (New York: Basic, 1984). Many of the premises of Murray's critique of AFDC were accepted by analysts on the Left. See William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

9. Mark Lilla, "Leo Strauss: The European," *New York Review of Books*, Oct. 21, 2004; Lilla, "The Closing of the Straussian Mind," *New York Review of Books*, Nov. 4, 2004; Anne Norton, *Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); Shadia B. Drury, *The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss* (New York: St. Martin's, 1988). Drury is the source of the idea that Strauss promotes "noble lies" by public officials. See Danny Postel, "Noble Lies and Perpetual War: Leo Strauss, the Neocons, and Iraq," *OpenDemocracy.com*, Oct. 16, 2003. For a rebuttal, see Mark Blitz, "Leo Strauss, the Straussians and American Foreign Policy," *OpenDemocracy.com*, Nov. 13, 2003. Lyndon LaRouche, commercial, WTOP Radio, Washington, D.C., 2004.
10. Harry V. Jaffa, *Crisis of the House Divided: An Interpretation of the Lincoln-Douglas Debates* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959). These themes are continued in his later *A New Birth of Freedom: Abraham Lincoln and the Coming of the Civil War* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). See also Lilla, "Closing of the Straussian Mind."
11. The lecture that eventually became the article "The End of History?" was originally given at Bloom's John M. Olin Center at the University of Chicago on Feb. 8, 1989, in the context of a series entitled "The Decline of the West?" Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).
12. Plato, *Republic*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 561c-d.
13. Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 294-323, esp. 314-16. On the founding fathers see, for example, David F. Epstein, *The Political Theory of the Federalist* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
14. Adam Wolfson, "Conservatives and Neoconservatives," 225.
15. The single most important decision that MacArthur made as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Tokyo was to retain the Japanese

emperor. It is perhaps not an accident that MacArthur lived in East Asia almost continuously from the time he helped establish the Philippine Army in the 1930s until his recall by President Truman during the Korean War.

16. See Francis Fukuyama, "The March of Equality," *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 1 (2000): 11–17.
17. Albert Wohlstetter, Henry S. Rowen, et al., *Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, R-266, 1954). A shorter version was published as "The Delicate Balance of Terror" in *Foreign Affairs* 27, no. 2 (Jan. 1959).
18. Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Europe After Napoleon* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1973); Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).
19. This was true of Strauss's students as well; it is even harder to extract an economic ideology from his writings than a political one.
20. See Wolfson, "Conservatives and Neoconservatives."
21. Boot, "Myths About Neoconservatism."
22. William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 4 (1996): 18–32; Kristol and Kagan, *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy* (San Francisco: Encounter, 2000); Jeane Kirkpatrick, "A Normal Country in a Normal Time," *National Interest* (Fall 1990): 40–44; Kristol and Kagan, *Present Dangers*, 12.
23. Boot, "Myths About Neoconservatism."
24. See Robert Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 2 (2004): 65–87, and the subsequent debate between him and Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson; Tucker and Hendrickson, "The Sources of American Legitimacy," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 6 (2004); and Kagan, "A Matter of Record," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (2005); Kristol and Kagan, *Present Dangers*, 16–17.

25. David Brooks, "A Return to National Greatness," *Weekly Standard*, Mar. 3, 1997.
26. On neoconservative issues see Francis Fukuyama, "The National Prospect Symposium Contribution," *Commentary* 100, no. 5 (1995): 55–56. On economics see, for example, Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Basic, 1976), and Irving Kristol, *Two Cheers for Capitalism* (New York: Basic, 1978). That neoconservative treatments of economics tended toward orthodoxy was not universally true; for an interesting critique of neoclassical economics from a Straussian point of view, see Steven E. Rhoads, *The Economist's View of the World: Government, Markets, and Public Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
27. See Kiron Skinner, ed., *Reagan: A Life in Letters* (New York: Free Press, 2003). Later on, of course, Reagan recognized the reality of the changes brought about by Mikhail Gorbachev and negotiated with him actively.
28. This was in his speech at the American Enterprise Institute, Feb. 26, 2003.
29. For a comprehensive realist critique of international institutions, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 5–49. On multilateral cooperation see Boot, "Myths About Neoconservatism."
30. Stephen Sestanovich, "American Maximalism," *National Interest* 79 (Spring 2005): 13–23.
31. See Michael Mandelbaum, "Coup de Grace: The End of the Soviet Union," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 1 (1991): 164–83, and *The Dawn of Peace in Europe* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1996).
32. In 1989 many Soviet observers believed that Yegor Ligachev represented the hard-liners in Gorbachev's Politburo and imagined that there was an active debate in the Kremlin on whether to intervene

militarily in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany as these countries moved away from Moscow. I had the remarkable experience of meeting Ligachev in Washington a few years later, when he explained that military intervention had never crossed the minds of anyone in the Politburo.

33. For both a restatement of the argument in *The End of History and the Last Man* and an analysis of what I regard as the most salient critiques of it, see the preface to the second paperback edition (New York: Free Press, 2006).
34. Kenneth Jowitt, "Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change: The Urge to Speed History Along," *Policy Review* 118 (April–May 2003): 33–42.
35. Kristol and Kagan, *Present Dangers*, 20.
36. See Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: Norton, 2003); Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002): 5–21.
37. G. John Ikenberry and Daniel Deudney, "The International Sources of Soviet Change," *International Security* 16, no. 3 (1991): 74–118.
38. For an example, see Donald Kagan and Frederick W. Kagan, "Peace for Our Time?" *Commentary* 110, no. 2 (Sept. 2000): 42–47.

Chapter 3: Threat, Risk, and Preventive War

1. Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2001); Graham T. Allison, Jr., *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe* (New York: Times Books, 2004). For an argument that September 11 represented a unique case rather than the beginning of a long-term trend, see John Mueller, "Harbinger or Aberration? A 9/11 Provocation," *National Interest* 69 (Fall 2002): 45–50.
2. See Norman Podhoretz, "World War IV: How It Started, What It Means, and Why We Have to Win," *Commentary* 118, no. 2 (2004):

- 17–54; Charles Krauthammer, “In Defense of Democratic Realism,” *National Interest* 77 (Fall 2004).
3. Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West* (Cambridge: Belknap, 2004); Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). See also Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
 4. Roy, *Globalized Islam*, chap. 1.
 5. Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand, “Terror, Islam, and Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 5–20. That jihadism is a syncretism of Western beliefs is also the essence of Olivier Roy’s characterization of Islamism.
 6. This argument is made more fully in Francis Fukuyama and Nadav Samin, “Can Any Good Come of Radical Islam?” *Commentary* 114, no. 2 (2002): 34–38.
 7. In 2005, Mali assumed chairmanship of the Community of Democracies.
 8. Among the older group of respondents, 51 percent expressed a desire to emigrate from their home countries. Of these, 46 percent wanted to emigrate to Western Europe and 36 percent to the United States or Canada. Among younger respondents, 45 percent wanted to emigrate, with 45 percent wanting to go to North America (UNDP, Arab Human Development Report, 2002, 30).
 9. Max Boot, “Exploiting the Palestinians: Everyone’s Doing It,” *Weekly Standard*, Jan. 28, 2003; Barry Rubin, “The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism,” *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 6 (2002): 73–85.
 10. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002).
 11. Cover letter to the *National Security Strategy*. This echoes language in the speech given by President Bush at West Point in June 2002 in which he stated: “For much of the last century, America’s defense re-

lied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. . . . If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. . . . We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge” (“Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy,” West Point, N.Y., June 1, 2002).

12. John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).
13. For a discussion, see John Lewis Gaddis, “Grand Strategy in the Second Term,” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (2005): 2–15.
14. *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*. Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (New York: United Nations, 2004), 63–64.
15. Of course, this outcome was itself dependent on Saddam Hussein’s poor judgment; had he waited until he had a nuclear weapon before invading Kuwait, he might still be ruler of that country today.
16. Anthony Eden, *Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960); Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disaster* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Richard K. Betts, “Suicide from Fear of Death?” *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 1 (2003): 34–43.
17. Kenneth Jowitt, “Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change: The Urge to Speed History Along,” *Policy Review* 118 (April–May 2003): 33–42.
18. Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965).

19. President Bush added: "Saddam Hussein is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction. And he cannot be trusted. The risk is simply too great that he will use them, or provide them to a terror network" (speech in Cincinnati, Oct. 8, 2002).
20. Laurie Mylroie, *Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein's Unfinished War* (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 2000); Stephen F. Hayes, *The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004); Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq* (New York: Random House, 2002).
21. By her own contention, Mylroie's case that Ramzi Yousef, the man convicted of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, was an Iraqi intelligence agent could be shown to be false if one could prove that he and Abdul Bassit (from whom he allegedly stole his identity) were the same height. To date, no evidence has been produced that they were different people.
22. The presidential commission on prewar intelligence concerning Iraq has indicated that our knowledge of the Iranian and North Korean programs is not much better than it was for Iraq's. See *The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Mar. 31, 2005).
23. *Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, Sept. 30, 2004).

Chapter 4: American Exceptionalism and International Legitimacy

1. See Paul D. Wolfowitz, "Clinton's First Year," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 1 (1994): 28-43.
2. For a reiteration of this well after the war, see the interview with Condoleezza Rice in *American Interest* 1, no. 1 (2005): 47-57.

3. This official is quoted in the preface to the paperback edition of Clark's Kosovo memoir. Clark was upset at this interpretation of his own book (Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* [New York: Public Affairs, 2002], pp. xxvi–xxvii).
4. Stephen Sestanovich, "American Maximalism," *National Interest* 79 (Spring 2005): 13–23.
5. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
6. During the 1991 Gulf War, both the French and the Russians kept their distance from the United States in the six-month run-up to the war. France joined the coalition only at the last minute after it had extracted a number of concessions from the Americans. It was not unreasonable to think that the French and the Russians might try to do the same in 2003. On the "European nation" see Timothy Garton Ash, *Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportunity of Our Time* (London: Allen Lane, 2004), 54.
7. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1990–91); see also Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," *National Interest* 70 (2002): 5–20. Charles Krauthammer, "Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World" (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Short Publications Series, Feb. 10, 2004).
8. William Kristol and Robert Kagan, *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy* (San Francisco: Encounter, 2000), 22.
9. Condoleezza Rice, "A Balance of Power That Favors Freedom," the 2002 Wriston Lecture at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, New York, Oct. 1, 2002.
10. Walter Russell Mead, *Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk* (New York: Knopf, 2004).
11. These data are as of March 2004; "somewhat" to "very negative" feel-

ings about the United States were 93 percent in Jordan, 61 percent in Pakistan, 68 percent in Morocco, and 63 percent in Turkey (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "A Year After the Iraq War," March 16, 2004. Data available at people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206).

12. Barlow's "Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace" begins: "Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather" (<http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-final.html>).
13. The transistor and the integrated circuit were initially developed at Bell Labs as spin-offs of Defense Department-funded projects to develop computer systems for military purposes. Radar, jet aircraft technology, and a good deal of U.S. commercial aerospace similarly benefited from military spending. The Internet was developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency as a means of communicating after a nuclear attack.
14. Historically, the Washington Consensus developed in response to the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, where heavy foreign borrowing and lack of fiscal discipline led to a pathological cycle of currency crisis, devaluation, expansionary monetary policy to cover fiscal deficits, hyperinflation, and then renewed exchange rate crisis. The economic policy measures outlined in the Washington Consensus were necessary to break this cycle, and through a painful series of adjustments countries like Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina managed, by the early 1990s, to stabilize their macroeconomic balances.
15. The final story in Latin America is more complicated: while the rise of Lula in Brazil, Gutierrez in Ecuador, Vázquez in Uruguay, and Chavez in Venezuela marks a turn to the left, most of these new leaders have continued to follow relatively orthodox macroeconomic policies. Ar-

gentina's meltdown is unfairly blamed on the United States; its roots are complex and lie much more heavily in defective Argentine institutions and leadership.

16. Kishore Mahbubani, *Beyond the Age of Innocence: Rebuilding Trust Between America and the World* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), chap. 1.

Chapter 5: Social Engineering and the Problem of Development

1. James Q. Wilson has been consistently skeptical about the chances for democracy promotion, both generally and in Iraq. See his article "Democracy for All?" in *Commentary* 107, no. 3 (2000).
2. Rick Atkinson, *In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2004); Tim Russert, interview with Vice President Dick Cheney, *Meet the Press*, NBC News, Mar. 16, 2003.
3. See Adam Garfinkle, "The Impossible Imperative? Conjuring Arab Democracy," *National Interest* 69 (Fall 2002): 156–67; *President Discusses the Future of Iraq*, Speech to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., Feb. 26, 2003. As noted earlier, the long trend toward the spread of liberal democracy is the central theme of my book *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).
4. William Kristol and Robert Kagan, *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy* (San Francisco: Encounter, 2000), 14–17.
5. For a description of these models, see Kaushik Basu, *Analytical Development Economics: The Less Developed Economy Revisited* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).
6. See David Ekbladh, "From Consensus to Crisis: The Postwar Career of Nation Building in U.S. Foreign Relations," and Frank Sutton, "Nation-Building in the Heyday of the Classic Development Ideology: Ford Foundation Experience in the 1950s and 1960s," in Francis Fukuyama, ed., *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

7. William R. Easterly, *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).
8. Ruth Levine et al., *Millions Saved: Proven Successes in Global Health* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2004).
9. Walt Whitman Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
10. See Nicolas van de Walle, *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
11. For an analysis of state weakness and failure in Africa, see Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), Jeffery Herbst, *States and Power in Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), and William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999). For an account of how international aid sustained Siad Barre's dictatorship in Somalia, see Michael Maren, *The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity* (New York: Free Press, 1997).
12. See Douglass C. North and Robert P. Thomas, "An Economic Theory of the Growth of the Western World," *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 28 (1970): 1–17, and Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). On the importance of institutions see Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation*, NBER Working Paper 7771, 2000, and Acemoglu and Robinson, *Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective*, NBER Working Paper 8831, 2002. The leading alternative theory of underdevelopment, associated with Jeffrey Sachs, currently concerns the impact of geography on development. See Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner, *Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth*, NBER Working Paper 5398, 1995, Sachs, *Tropical Underdevelopment*, NBER Working Paper 8119, 2001,

- and, for a direct response to the institutionalist findings of Acemoglu and Robinson, Jeffrey D. Sachs and John W. McArthur, *Institutions and Geography: Comment on Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson* (2000), NBER Working Paper 8114, 2001. See also Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian, "The Primacy of Institutions (And What This Does and Does Not Mean)," *Finance and Development* 40, no. 2 (2003): 31–34. William R. Easterly and Ross Levine, *Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development*, NBER Working Paper 9106, 2002.
13. Francis Fukuyama and Sanjay Marwah, "Comparing East Asia and Latin America: Dimensions of Development," *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 4 (2000): 80–94; Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).
 14. Francis Fukuyama, "'Stateness' First," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 1 (2005): 84–88.
 15. For a historical overview, see Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).
 16. For the Left, see, inter alia, Vernon Ruttan, "What Happened to Political Development?" *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 39, no. 2 (1991): 265–92, Mark Kesselman, "Order or Movement? The Literature of Political Development as Ideology," *World Politics* 26 (1973): 139–54, and Ian Roxborough, "Modernization Theory Revisited: A Review Essay," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 30 (1988): 753–61. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
 17. See the multivolume work by Philippe C. Schmitter, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). On the applicability of this model to postcommunist states, see Valerie Bunce,

- “Should Transitologists Be Grounded?” *Slavic Review* 54, no. 1 (1995): 111–27, and Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?” *Slavic Review* 53, no. 1 (1994): 172–85.
18. Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002): 5–21.
19. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” *American Political Science Review* 53 (1959): 69–105.
20. The process could be emulative without being adaptive and without producing an overall evolution toward political fitness; the shift toward democracy, in other words, could simply be a fad.
21. Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Douglass North and Arthur Denzau, “Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions,” *Kyklos* 47, no. 1 (1994): 3–31.
22. Ghia Nodia, “Debating the Transition Paradigm: The Democratic Path,” *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 3 (2002): 13–19.
23. This began in many ways with Theda Skocpol and Peter B. Evans, *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). See also J. P. Nettl, “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” *World Politics* 20, no. 4 (1968): 559–92, and Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State,” in John A. Hall, ed., *States in History* (New York: Blackwell, 1986; originally published in *European Journal of Sociology* 25, no. 2 [1984]: 185–213).
24. Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1999), and Carothers,

Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 2004).

25. *President Discusses the Future of Iraq*. With regard to regime change, only Afghanistan among recent cases resembles Germany and Japan in the thoroughness with which it has rejected the political order in place before the U.S. intervention.
26. See the chapter on Bosnia in James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, MR-1753-RC, 2003); Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, "Traavails of the European Raj," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 3 (2003): 60–74.
27. This was the theme of Jeanne Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary* 68, no. 11 (November 1979): 34–45. There is continuing controversy over the Nixon administration's role in the coup that brought down the Allende government in Chile.
28. See Thomas Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), and Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1999).

Vice President Cheney once suggested that America's intervention in El Salvador during that country's civil war in the 1980s might be a model for Iraq. But in El Salvador we had a strong democratic ally in the person of President José Napoleon Duarte. The U.S. Congress imposed a "light footprint" of no more than fifty-five American military advisers, which meant that the Salvadorians themselves had to bear the brunt of the struggle for their own freedom. The fact that the United States had no organized local allies in Iraq similar to the Salvadorian Christian Democrats or the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan should have been a warning.

29. Eric C. Bjornlund, *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
30. This is not to say that there are no prodemocracy activists in Russia,

China, or the Arab world but rather that their chances of mobilizing broad antiregime sentiment are lower than in other places.

31. Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 1 (1996): 16–32.
32. Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: Norton, 2003).
33. The Millennium Development Goals were adopted at the U.N. Millennium Summit in 2000 and consist of eight broad objectives for improving the condition of poor countries by the year 2015. See Jeffrey D. Sachs, *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005). Carol Adelman argues that private voluntary giving amounts to \$35 billion a year, or 3.5 times as much as official ODA. She counts private remittances in this figure, however, which inflates it tremendously beyond the official USAID estimate of \$15 billion in private aid. (By this logic, Mexican and Philippino guestworkers in the United States sending money home to their families, as well as American parents paying tuition for their children to go to Oxford, would count as individuals providing private overseas development assistance.) Carol Adelman, "The Privatization of Foreign Aid: Reassessing National Largesse," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 6 (2003): 9–14.
34. See Michael A. Clemens, Charles J. Kenny, and Todd J. Moss, "The Trouble with the MDGs: Confronting Expectations of Aid and Development Success" (Washington: Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 40, May 1, 2004).
35. For an overview, see Steven Radelet, *Challenging Foreign Aid: A Policymaker's Guide to the Millennium Challenge Account* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2003). See also Radelet, "Bush and Foreign Aid," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 5 (2003): 104–17.
36. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

37. For an early history of USAID, see Judith Tendler, *Inside Foreign Aid* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).
38. Jeremy M. Weinstein, John E. Porter, and Stuart Eisenstadt, eds., *On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2004).
39. Redistributing USAID's functions in this fashion would orphan a number of the agency's activities, like the military assistance program (EMET) and funds that have overtly political purposes in support of U.S. foreign policy, such as assistance to Egypt and Israel. These types of programs, which do not even pretend to have a humanitarian or developmental purpose, should properly remain with the State Department. Breaking them off from the general foreign assistance budget would, moreover, give Americans a better idea of how many taxpayer dollars are actually going to support developing countries.

Chapter 6. Rethinking Institutions for World Order

1. For a comprehensive discussion of the legitimacy of U.N. action, see the new foreword to the paperback edition of Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America vs. Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2004), and Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 2 (2004): 65–87.
2. See Daniel P. Moynihan, "The United States in Opposition," *Commentary* 59, no. 3 (1975): 31–45.
3. See James Dobbins et al., *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, MG-304-RC, 2005); Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (1994): 20–33.
4. For an overview, see Virginia Haufler, *International Business Self-Regulation: The Intersection of Public and Private Interests* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), and Haufler, *A Public Role for the Private Sector: Industry Self-Regulation in*

- a Global Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001). There is by now a large literature on NGOs as international actors; see Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 1 (1997): 50–66, and Ann M. Florini, *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 2000). On soft law see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance," *International Organization* 54, no. 3 (2000): 421–56.
5. For a critique of NGO participation in international agreements, see Daniel C. Thomas, "International NGOs, State Sovereignty, and Democratic Values," *Chicago Journal of International Law* 2, no. 2 (2001): 389–97.
 6. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, "Shifting the Point of Regulation: The International Organization for Standardization and Global Law," *Ecology Law Quarterly* 22 (1995): 479–539.
 7. Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
 8. John R. Bolton, "Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?" *Chicago Journal of International Law* 1, no. 2 (2000): 205–21; Jeremy Rabkin, *Why Sovereignty Matters* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1998); Rabkin, *The Case for Sovereignty: Why the World Should Welcome American Independence* (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 2004).
 9. Roht-Arriaza, "Shifting the Point of Regulation"; Marsha Echols, "Food Safety Regulation in the EU and the U.S.: Different Cultures, Different Laws," *Columbia Journal of European Law* 23 (1998): 525–43; Ved Nanda, "Genetically Modified Food and International Law—The Biosafety Protocol and Regulations in Europe," *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 28, no. 3 (2000): 235–63; and Robert Paarlberg, "The Global Food Fight," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 3 (2000): 24–38.

10. Zoe Baird, "Governing the Internet," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 6 (2002): 15–21; Milton Mueller, "ICANN and Internet Governance: Sorting Through the Debris of 'Self-Regulation,'" *Info* 1, no. 6 (1999): 5–8; David R. Johnson and Susan P. Crawford, "Why Consensus Matters: The Theory Underlying ICANN's Mandate to Set Policy Standards for the Domain Name System," *ICANN Watch*, 2000, at www.icannwatch.org/archive/why_consensus_matters.htm.
11. William J. Drake, "The Rise and Decline of the International Telecommunications Regime," in Christopher T. Marsden, *Regulating the Global Information Society* (London: Routledge, 2000). ICANN's functions were performed in the early days of the Internet by a single ponytailed, sandal-wearing graduate student named Jon Postel, who worked at the University of Southern California under contract to the Defense Advanced Projects Agency.
12. Michael A. Froomkin, "Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution," *Duke Law Journal* 50, no. 17 (2000): 17–184.
13. For a fuller elaboration of this proposal, see Francis Fukuyama, "Re-envisioning Asia," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (2005): 75–87.
14. Rabkin, *Case for Sovereignty*.
15. Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
16. Stephen D. Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2004): 85–120.

Chapter 7: A Different Kind of American Foreign Policy

1. See, for example, Robert W. Merry, *Sands of Empire: Missionary Zeal, American Foreign Policy, and the Hazards of Global Ambition* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), and David Rief, *At the Point of a Gun: Democratic Dreams and Armed Interventions* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005).

2. What I have labeled realistic Wilsonianism could be alternatively described as a hard-headed liberal internationalism. This is distinguished from the soft-headed version by several characteristics: first, the United States should work toward a multi-multilateral world, not give special emphasis to the United Nations; second, the goal of foreign policy is not the transcendence of sovereignty and power politics but its regularization through institutional constraints; and finally, democratic legitimacy embedded in real institutions ought to guide the design of the system overall.
3. See "President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and the Middle East: Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy," Washington, D.C., Nov. 6, 2003. In her interview in *The American Interest*, Rice states, "When it comes to the question of whether you might, in fact, get extremists elected . . . I think you have to ask yourself if you are better off in a situation where extremists, Islamists and others, get to hide behind their masks and operate on the fringes of the political system, or would you rather have an open political system in which people have to actually contest for the will of the people?"
4. It might be possible to argue for an authoritarian transition in the Middle East if one could find any truly modernizing autocrats in the region, comparable to Park Chung-Hee of South Korea or Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore. The vast majority of Arab autocrats have shown little interest in development and have been very clever in preventing democratic openings from proceeding beyond a few initial small steps. See Daniel Brumberg, "Liberalization Versus Democracy," in Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, eds., *Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 2005).
5. An example of the former is Europe's refusal to go along with an American effort to have Mohamed El-Baradei removed as head of the International Atomic Energy Agency; an example of the latter is the stead-

fast refusal of France and Germany to participate in the reconstruction of Iraq.

6. G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
7. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Dilemma of the Last Sovereign," *American Interest* 1, no. 1 (2005): 37–46.
8. Pierre Hassner, "Definitions, Doctrines, and Divergences," *National Interest* no. 69 (2002): 30–34.