


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
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


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Secret

Headquarters,
Royal Air Force,
Middle East.

To:-

The Secretary,
Air Ministry,
Kingsway,
London, W.C.2.

GS/1023.
2/12/22.

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1024	
REGISTRY	

CONTEMPLATED INSTITUTION OF AN EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that I have been informed by the R.A.F. Liaison Officer (Squadron Leader W.D. Long) attached to the Ministry of Communications, Egyptian Government, that the institution of small air force units at Sollum and Rafa is contemplated by the Egyptian Government.

2. The object of these units is to carry out patrol work in connection with the prevention of gun-running, etc., on the Egyptian Frontiers. Such units would probably consist of four two-seater machines each.

3. I understand that the present intention of the Egyptian Government is to form an air force which is not dependent in any way on the Royal Air Force. As it is possible, however, that when they have assessed the cost of the proposal they will find it excessive, I request to be informed whether the Air Ministry would view favourably a proposal that the work should be done by the Royal Air Force on repayment, and if so, what would be the cost to the Egyptian Government of two flights of four machines each, stationed at Sollum and Rafa respectively. The cost of the provision of buildings could be estimated at this Headquarters, so that the figures supplied by the Air Ministry should include all other charges.

4. It is obvious that the Egyptian Government cannot raise an air service without the assistance of European instructors for training purposes, and that they must obtain the equipment from Europe or America. It appears to me also that if the Egyptian Government wish to raise an air service and are prepared to find the money, the British Government would not wish to oppose it. If this is the case, it is obviously to the interest of the British Empire in general and the British aviation in particular, that they should be dependent upon us rather than on some foreign country.

5. In case, therefore, the Egyptian Government make a request for information as to the possibility of training facilities being afforded at R.A.F. stations in Egypt, for Egyptian Army personnel training as pilots, observers and mechanics, may I please be informed:-

تابع ملحق (1)

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- 2 -

- 4 (a) Whether the Air Ministry would allow such training to be undertaken at say No. 4, Flying Training School.
- 5 (b) What would be the estimated cost of training pilots up to the graduation stage of Bristol Fighters or D.H.9.As.
- 6 (c) What would be the average cost of training Egyptians to qualify for trades in the several R.A.F. groups.
- 7 6. Further, I request to be informed whether the Air Ministry would be prepared to assist by carrying out overhauls of engines and machines, supply of spares, etc., on repayment, should the Egyptian Government so desire.

7. It may happen that I am in a position to influence the Egyptian Government in the choice of the type of machine for this air service. The actual work required by them could probably be carried out by a type of machine of lower performance than the Bristol Fighter or D.H.9.A. which could be obtained for a lower price than these types. An Egyptian air force equipped with such a type of machine would be of less danger to British Forces in the event of trouble between us and the Egyptians, than if more efficient machines were obtained. On the other hand, if the Egyptian air service was equipped with one of the British standard types, it would be of use as a reinforcement in the event of an attack on Egypt from outside. In this connection it is to be remembered that the British Government have undertaken the defence of Egypt against external enemies.

8 As reduction of cost is likely to be of some consideration with the Egyptian Government, and as I do not think that the Egyptian Air Force would be of any fighting value for many years, if ever, I am of opinion that they should be advised to employ one of the cheapest type which will do the work required, but I should like to have the views of the Air Ministry on this subject.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

R. Clayton

H.C., Cairo.
3/12/1922.

Air Vice Marshal,
Air Officer Commanding,
Royal Air Force,
Middle East.

ملحق (٢)

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39A

NOTE ON PRESENT SITUATION.

1. On the 22nd July, the S. of S. asked us for the present position with regard to the formation of an Egyptian Air Force as reported in the "Times" and "Morning Post" of the 21st inst. You will remember that the advisability of raising an Egyptian Air Force was first contemplated by the Egyptian Government in November 1922 and Sir E. Ellington (then A.O.C. Egypt) asked for our views on the subject.

It was decided then that our policy should be to give Egypt as much help in the formation of an Air Force as we could if they were determined to go on with it. A.O.C. Egypt was informed of this decision by letter on the 19th January 1923.

2. On November 7, 1924, the matter was again raised (semi-officially) by the A.O.C., Middle East, as a result of which, a letter was drafted to the Foreign Office stating that the Air Council had been informed that the Egyptian Government were reopening the question. This letter however was never despatched as we were semi-officially advised that owing to the present situation in Egypt, the matter should be delayed. The A.O.C. was accordingly informed of this in a private letter from C.A.S. dated 24.11.24.

3. Nothing further was heard of the project until early this year. On February 6th A.O.C. Egypt reported that a sum of £300,000 had been set aside in the Estimates for certain military forces and equipment which included an air force. He stated further that £150,000 had been already appropriated for military requirements, leaving only £150,000 now for distribution. The general impression, which was shared by Lord Altonby and the A.O.C., was that nothing would be done in the matter during the present financial year.

4. The A.O.C. has now been asked to forward a report on the situation as it stands to-day. It is known that S/L Long (Aeronautical Adviser to Ministry of Communications) has prepared a report, at the request of the Egyptian Government, on the possibility of creating an Egyptian Air Force, and the A.O.C. has been asked to forward a copy of this.

5. I have just been informed by the Foreign Office that a letter has been received from the Acting High Commissioner, Egypt, stating that proposals have been put forward for an Egyptian air force and asking for our co-operation. The Foreign Office are sending over the letter asking us for our comments.

6. Apart from the above we have also heard from a secret source that the Egyptian Government are negotiating with Junkers for the establishment of a civil postal route between Alexandria and Trieste.

25.7.25

ملحق (3)

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SECRET.

SECRET

Headquarters,
Royal Air Force,
Middle East.

To:-
The Secretary,
Air Ministry,
Kingway, London. WCC.

ME/2259/Air.1.
1/0/25.

EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE.

Letter No.	10 AUG 1925
File No.	
AIR MINISTRY	
Received	10 AUG 1925
Allocated to	
By	
Initial of receiving	

Sir,

With reference to my submission No. ME/2259/Air.1., dated the 26th. July, 1925, I have the honour to report that, on Monday, the 27th. July, 1925, I was informed that the Egyptian Council of Ministers had rejected the proposals put forward by Squadron Leader W.D. Long, O.B.E., Air Consultant to the Egyptian Government, in response to their request, and had instructed him to prepare new proposals based on the principle of the creation of a small force solely for anti-smuggling and contraband services. On no account had the force to be a military one, and the aeroplanes were to be of a simple and safe type, easy to fly and suitable for desert reconnaissance work.

2. Squadron Leader Long accordingly prepared a new scheme, a précis of which I submitted to you by telegram on the evening of the 27th. July, 1925. I now forward a copy of the actual report prepared by Squadron Leader Long, in which it will be noticed that he was only given 48 hours in which to prepare it: therefore, all the figures must be regarded as liable to considerable revision.

3. For convenience, I summarise the proposals hereunder :-

- (a) The Force to consist of two flights of four aeroplanes each, to be stationed at Bersa Bahrah, on the western desert.
- (b) A combined Repair and Stores Section to be established in the vicinity of Alexandria, preferably at an aerodrome which will also be used for civil aviation purposes.
- (c) The British Government to be asked to give their sanction to the following :-
 - (1) Four Egyptian Officers to be sent forthwith to Cranwell to be taught to fly.
 - (11) Nine Egyptian Officers for training as pilots; five officers for training in technical and stores duties, and 150 mechanics, to be trained by the Royal Air Force in Egypt; the course lasting two years.

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- (iii) In the 3rd. year of development of the scheme, one Flight Lieutenant and four skilled airmen to be loaned from the British Royal Air Force to act as advisors to the Egyptian Flying Unit.
- (iv) In the 4th. year of development; a similar staff to be loaned as advisors for the repair and Stores Sections, and for general staff work.

With regard to civil aviation; the proposals are :-

- (d) To establish two aerodromes - one near Alexandria, and the other one near Cairo - for the reception of commercial aircraft.
- (e) To send five officials to England for a two years' course to learn technical and administrative duties in connection with the supervision of civil aviation as in force in the United Kingdom.

4. The question of sending certain of the personnel to other European countries to be trained was discussed at length, and I understand there was a certain amount of feeling in support of this proposal. Squadron Leader Long was able to persuade the Council to have all personnel trained under the same "aegis", as set forth in paragraph 3(c) above. I understand the Council of Ministers were particularly gratified with Squadron Leader Long's suggestion that possibly the British Air Ministry might agree to train the majority of the Egyptian personnel in Egypt.

5. I understand sanction was not actually granted to this scheme, though it was favourably received; and Squadron Leader Long was instructed to prepare further details, and to prepare a draft letter to the High Commissioner of Egypt asking the British Government to provide the facilities outlined above.

6. I attach extracts from a private letter received from Squadron Leader Long, and report of the meeting of the Council of Ministers, which throw light on the present situation.

7. I have not yet discussed this reduced scheme for the Egyptian Air Force with the High Commissioner or the General Officer Commanding, British Troops in Egypt, but, from a previous conversation, I gathered the following :-

- (a) That the Acting High Commissioner is in favour of allowing the Egyptian Government to have a small Air Force if they desire it, and that he considers we should minimise the military risks that we may have to run, by limiting the size, etc., of the Egyptian Air Force.

تابع طحق (٢)

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(b) That the view of the General Officer Commanding, British Troops in Egypt, is bound to be that the creation of any Egyptian Air Force to a certain degree increases his responsibilities in connection with the preservation of order in Egypt, and the safeguarding of British interests. The possibility of Egyptian troops, and, similarly, any Egyptian Air Forces, taking hostile action against the British Forces in the case of internal unrest has to be considered.

8. Except for the military point of view, and the incentive it may give to mandated territories, and to India, to create similar local forces, I can see no objection to the Egyptian Government possessing an Air Force. I do not think that they would interfere in any way with any forces of British aircraft which the Air Ministry may desire to station in Egypt for purposes other than co-operation with the British Troops in Egypt.

9. With regard to the military point of view, whilst in sympathy with the view I feel and the General Officer Commanding holds, I do not think that those particular proposals of the Egyptian Government constitute much of a menace. Very possibly, the General Officer Commanding will agree on this.

10. No doubt the political aspect of the question as to whether or not the Egyptian Government should be allowed to have an Air Force will be adequately represented by the High Commissioner; but I feel bound to say it seems rather difficult to deny the Egyptian Government the establishment of a small Air Force ostensibly purely for civil and administrative purposes. As far as I am able to learn, it would appear that there is no ulterior motive in the minds of the Egyptian Government in the direction of converting this Force into a military one if occasion demands it.

11. There seems to be considerable justification for the Egyptian Government wishing to employ aircraft on frontier anti-smuggling and contraband services. I rather they are very anxious to stop the illicit trade which goes on over the Eastern and Western Frontiers, and I consider aircraft might be of assistance in doing so.

Should the British Government decide to object to the creation of this Egyptian Air Force, I would suggest they should offer, as an alternative, the services of British aircraft to undertake any civil or administrative air duties which the Egyptian Government may require. Some years ago, a certain amount of assistance was given by the British Royal Air Force in connection with illicit trade over the frontiers, but, since the declaration of independence in February, 1922, no request for assistance of this nature has been made. Annual surveys of the Nile for the Irrigation Department only have continued to be carried out.

تابع طحى (٢)

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12. In my previous above-quoted letter, I raised the question, in the event of an Egyptian Air Force being created, of allowing some portion thereof being stationed in the Canal Zone. Although this project does not feature in the latest scheme which is now being considered, I think it would be well to deal with this point now.

I understand the General Officer Commanding is averse to permitting any unit of the Egyptian Air Force being stationed on the Canal Zone, but I have pointed out to him that it is almost impossible to forbid stationing Egyptian aircraft within effective flying range of the Canal, and that, in some respects, it might be preferable to have the aircraft stationed close to the military camps on the Canal Zone than to have them in some less accessible station within 40 or 50 miles of the Canal, where they would be within easy bombing range of the Canal.

Personally, I am of the opinion that, if there is any fear of the employment of units of the Egyptian Air Force for military purposes against the British, it would be best to safeguard against it by endeavouring to persuade the Egyptian Government to station those units, as far as possible, close to British troops.

13. With regard to the proposals for the training of personnel for the Egyptian Air Force, I foresee a certain amount of difficulty in arranging for the training of this personnel in Egypt, on account of the lack of accommodation and instructors; but I have little doubt similar difficulty will arise in the United Kingdom.

I feel that there are considerable advantages in undertaking the training of the personnel in Egypt. Pupils can be more easily exchanged for others; difficulties with regard to leave, language and discipline are certain to be more acutely felt in the United Kingdom than in Egypt.

In any case, I would venture to recommend most strongly to the Air Ministry that, if the creation of this Force be approved, the minimum amount of objection be raised to undertaking the training, lest, in consequence, the Egyptian Government should decide to send this personnel to other European countries.

14. In my previous letter I referred to the question of the possible employment by the Egyptian Government of Europeans other than British in connection with the Egyptian Air Force. I most strongly recommend that it be insisted on that the only non-Egyptian personnel employed in the Egyptian Air Force should be Britishers.

15. Squadron Leader Long's earlier proposals envisaged the aircraft being of a reliable, somewhat slow and very safe type of aircraft. He proposed that the same type of aircraft be employed for the training of pupils and for use in the service squadrons. I fancy the Council of Ministers have this in mind in the proposals now under consideration.

تابع ملحق (٣)

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In these latest proposals, Squadron Leader Long has not, up to the present, formulated any proposals as to the type of aircraft to be supplied to the units in the Egyptian Air Force. In his previous report he suggested obtaining a new type, and did not state it would necessarily be British. Under the present scheme, if pilots are trained by the British government, whether in Egypt or in the United Kingdom, it would appear to be essential that they be trained on the English type of elementary training machine. Also, a certain amount of difficulty may be anticipated unless the service type to be used by them is British Royal Air Force standard equipment.

It may, however, be difficult to find a British R.A.F. type suitable for the duties the Egyptian Government have in mind, and it is most undesirable that they be supplied with a type which is unsuitable, and which would draw forth criticism from Egyptian or non-British European critics.

There is also the point; in time of emergency, if the Egyptian Air Force were equipped with a standard British R.A.F. type of aircraft, the aircraft might possibly be regarded as a reserve for the British R.A.F.

This question of the type of aircraft to be employed is therefore an important one, which requires considerable consideration.

16. I understand that Squadron Leader Long is forwarding me various appendices to this report, copies of which I will forward in due course. In the meantime, I trust the Air Ministry will see their way to give me a definite decision on the policy to be adopted with regard to this general question.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant.


Oswain

Air Vice Marshal,
Air Officer Commanding,
Royal Air Force,
Middle East.

Cairo.

Enclosures:- Report by S/Ldr. W.D. Long, O.B.E.
Extracts from private letter from S/Ldr. Long.

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120 H.

SECRET.9th May, 1927.

B.22268/B.6.

Desp: by Special bag, letter N^o 327

Sir,

I am commanded by the Air Council to refer to your letter of the 12th February (CHMK/2259/Air) and to other recent correspondence in connection with the possibility of the formation of a Military Air Unit by the Egyptian Government and of assistance being rendered by the Royal Air Force for that purpose in the event of the proposed formation being approved by His Majesty's Government.

2. The Air Council understand from the various recent letters and memoranda on this subject, that the scheme (if it matures) would provide for the formation of one flight of four aircraft (with four aircraft in reserve); that its primary objects would be:-

- (a) To assist in anti-contraband work;
- (b) to assist in controlling the movement of desert tribes;
- (c) to promote rapid communication between the various posts of the Frontier Districts Administration.

3. The Air Council further note that application may be made to the Royal Air Force to provide training facilities for Egyptian personnel, both officers and men. It is not clear what numbers would be involved. The figures given in the enclosure to your last letter (March 5th, CHMK/2259/Air) suggest that training would be asked for as many as 20 fitters and 24 riggers at the outset, whereas the tables prepared by Spinks Pasha provided for only 12 carpenters and riggers and 12 fitters. The higher numbers would be excessive for the maintenance of only one flight.

4. On the basis of the scheme prepared by Spinks Pasha

The Air Officer Commanding,
Middle East, Royal Air Force,
CAIRO.

تابع ملحق (٤)

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the cost of training the various categories included therein at Air Force stations would be:-

8 Pilots - £4 a day per head, exclusive of days of leave or sickness.

3 Technical officers - £400 per head for one year's training, or £800 for two years.

53 Airmen - £15 per month per head for training tradesmen. (It is observed that 16 of the 53 are described as Aircrafthands. A much shorter period of training should suffice for them than for the skilled tradesmen. It could be assumed that the fitters would require two years' training, and the riggers and other skilled trades at least one year's training).

A course of instruction for six N.C.Os for six months would also be at the rate of £15 per month per head.

5. The above charges would include accommodation, rations, medical and hospital treatment, but not pay, or travelling or clothing; nor, in the case of officers, messing expenses. In the event of accommodation for the airmen being provided by the Egyptian Government the rates would be rather lower.

6. Training of the mechanics could be undertaken at Aboukir, but the Air Council would not be disposed to approve the training of pilots at No. 4 Flying Training School. The resources of the Flying Training Schools will be inadequate during the next few years to meet the needs of the Air Force itself. They would prefer that any flying training for Egyptian pilots should be given by the Detaché Flight at Heliopolis, or at some other unit in your Command, and to allow some increase in Establishment for the purpose. They further consider that not more than 4 pilots should be trained in the first year and four more in the second year as it would in any case take two years to complete the training of the tradesmen.

7. The questions (a) whether any attachment of Egyptian personnel to Air Force service units after their training

تابع ملحق (٤)

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would be required; (b) whether the major repairs of aircraft for an Egyptian Air Force could be carried out by the Royal Air Force Repair Depot, can be considered later, when and if definite proposals for the formation of an Egyptian air service have been put forward and approved.

8. The Air Council desire to enjoin upon you that it is of extreme importance that no information whatever in regard to training costs or facilities, or to any other matters touching the formation of an Egyptian Air Service, should at present be supplied by you except to the Inspector-General (Major General Spinks). This is essential to avoid misunderstanding and to secure that any information supplied to the Egyptian Government will be made at such time and in such form as will be in accordance with the general policy of H.M. Government in Egypt.

Copies of this letter are being sent to the Foreign Office and to the War Office.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd) J. A. WEBSTER

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C O P Y.

16329/165.

Confidential and Immediate.

THE RESIDENCY,

CAIRO,

2nd January 1929.

Sir,

I am directed by the High Commissioner to inform you that the terms on which training in military aviation can be given to Egyptian cadets in Egypt have now been finally settled by the Air Ministry and that the Air Vice Marshal has agreed to give effect to these proposals.

2. The Air Ministry are prepared to afford facilities for the training of four Egyptian cadets at the Flying Training School at Abu Sueir at the rate of £4 per day for each cadet exclusive of days of leave or sickness. This charge would include accommodation, rations, medical and hospital treatment but the Egyptian Government would be responsible for travelling expenses except those arising on training duty, for pay and allowances received by cadets and for any third party damages. The Air Ministry emphasise the importance that as long notice as possible should be given of any intention of the Egyptian Government to avail themselves of this offer.

3. You will remember that it was hoped that it would be found possible to train two cadets free

/os

Major-General Sir Charlton Spinks Pasha, K.B.E.,
 etc., etc., etc.,
 Ministry of War and Marine,
 CAIRO.

تابع ملحق (٥)

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of charge but the Air Ministry have pointed out that other Governments, for instance, the Government of India, have been offered worse terms for similar facilities and it is therefore felt that to allow such free training would be unfair discrimination in favour of the Egyptian Government.

4. The Air Vice Marshal has added certain detailed stipulations to those terms. He points out in the first place that cadets for training must of necessity know English well. Secondly he also emphasises the importance of ample notice being given of the intention to send cadets to the Flying Training School in order that the necessary messing and accommodation arrangements may be made and of fixing the date on which the cadets join the course to coincide with the commencement of the Flying Training course. Each of the two yearly courses held lasts eight months and is divided into two terms of four months. The dates of commencement in the current year are April 26th and September 26th.

5. I am therefore to suggest that you should now be good enough to lay before the Minister of War the offer of the Air Ministry for his consideration. In doing so you will no doubt omit any reference to paragraph 3 above, which is for your own information.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Sgd MAURICE PATERSON.

FIRST SECRETARY.

ملحق (7)

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C O P Y.

Ministry of War and Marine,
CAIRO.

TRANSLATION.

No. M.D/8-3-D (7019).

His Excellency the Inspector General.

Having seen Your Excellency's letter No. E/SCM/702 dated 8th January, 1929, on the subject of an Aviation Mission, we beg to express our best thanks to the British Ministry of Aviation for being prepared to offer the necessary facilities in this respect, and to agree, as a preliminary measure, to the selection of four cadets who will be sent to the School of Aviation at ABU SUHUR.

(Signed) OAMFAK WALI
Minister of War and Marine.

16-1-29.

V.Y

(٧) طحق

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Headquarters,
Royal Air Force,
Middle East,
Cairo.

W/PMS/1.

4th June, 1930.

S E C R E T.

Dear C.A.S.,

As you may remember the three Egyptian Army officers complete their third term's training and leave No. 4 Flying Training School ABU SUEIB, on 30th June. Five more have been accepted for the course commencing on 1st. August.

So far as I can ascertain, the Egyptian Government have taken no steps with regard to the further training of these Officers. They have no aircraft, no mechanics and no organisation.

It is possible that the Officers may, on leaving ABU SUEIB, return to Army duty and so lose what skill in flying they now possess. If later they again take to the air, the results may be disastrous, and owing to the Egyptian mentality we would be blamed for faulty training.

There seems little point in our continuing to train pilots unless they are going to be utilised as such. I am against attaching them to Squadrons as I do not think it is a workable or desirable solution.

I think therefore that the time is now ripe to suggest that some air unit of the Egyptian Army be formed. It is bound to come in time in any event and if the suggestion were made by us, our position would probably be strengthened rather than weakened and any suggestions we might make in the way of safety regulations, etc., would be more acceptable.

An Army Co-operation Squadron of say Avros would be of most value to the Egyptian Government and the limited range of the aircraft would probably discourage them from making flights to PALESTINE or the SUDAN.

I should be glad to have your views on this proposal. The sooner something of this nature is in being, the greater will be the satisfaction of the Egyptian Government and the risk of their sending their trained pilots to other countries for further training will be considerably lessened.

In the interim these pilots might be usefully employed in a round of Courses at C.F.S., EASTCHURCH, etc., as suggested to me by Spinks. This would have the effect of making their training and outlook yet more British.

If you would signal a reply it will enable me to answer Spinks, as he requests, without delay.

Yours

(Sd.) F.R. Scarlett.

Air Chief Marshal Sir John M. Salmond, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O.
Air Ministry,
Kingsway, London, W.C.2.

ملحق (أ)

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PARAPHRASE

A.M. 1531.

S.22268.

Time of Origin 1047)
Time of Receipt 2028 GMT) 31.7.30.

Cipher telegram from Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East to Air Ministry.

G.S.654 31/7. Your A.M.595 23/7. (?Egyptian) (?Government)

have accepted the programme and terms. The names of the three officers are as follows:

1. AHMED (?EFFENDI) IBRAHIM ABDEL RAZIK
2. MOHAMMED (?EFFENDI) ABDEL MONEIM EL MIKATI
3. FUAD { ? (?EFFENDI) } ABDEL HAMID HAGGAG
EL

They will leave (?Egypt) by P. & O. sailing August 4th arriving at London August 15th where they will be met by Director of Egyptian Education Office, London, who will conduct them to Director of Training, Air Ministry.

Registry (Telegrams)

Copies to:-

S.6.(3) action copy.

ملحق (٩)

رئيس مجلس الوزراء

رقم ١٦٥ - ٢ / ٥٢

سرفات سيد

فلس

حضرة صاحب السعادة وزير الحرية والبحرية

أتشرف بان ارسل لمعادنكم مع هذا صورة من كتاب سعاده
المنذوب السامي بالنيابة الموزع ٣١ أغسطس سنة ١٩٣١ رقم
٥١٧ / ٢٢ / ٣١ بشأن زيادة عدد الطائرات الحرية المصرية
من ٥ الى ١٠ .

وتفضلوا سعادهنكم بقبول فائق الاحترام .

رئيس مجلس الوزراء

الكل

بولكلى فى ٤ سبتمبر سنة ١٩٣١ .

أشرف فائق نائب السعادة
بالنيابة وزير الحرية والبحرية
رقم ١٦٥ - ٢ / ٥٢
١١٢

١٠ - ٥٥
١١٢

ملحق (١٠)

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MINUTE SHEET.			

-1-

SECRET

S. 6. (thro' D.D.P.)

With reference to the attached signal from the Air Officer Commanding, Middle East, courses as required in para.3 of the signal are due to be held as follows :-

Unit.	Next Course.	Future Course.
Army Co-operation.	1.9.30.	January, 1931.
Armament & Gunnery.	2.9.30.	March, 1931.
Air Pilotage.	16.9.30. *	January, 1931.
C.F.S.	30.9.30.	February, 1931.
Henlow	(As required for parachutes. (Special arrangements for (engine etc., maintenance (course would be necessary.	

* In doubt.

2. 14 these Egyptian officers are to be accepted for courses at home, I suggest that they should go through the courses as follows :-

- (a) Firstly, all should go to the C.F.S. for refresher flying prior to the following -
- (b) Nos. 1 and 2 to S. of A.C. on the 1st September, 1930 and then to A.P. (Culchot) in January 1931, finishing about April 20th, 1931.
- No. 3. to the Armament & Gunnery School on the 2nd September, 1930, and then to Henlow for parachute training in March, 1931, finishing early in April.
- (c) The best of these officers might then go on the flying instructors' course at the C.F.S. in May 1931. They will be very inexperienced for training as flying instructors but presumably that cannot be helped.

3. Would the D.D.P. please remark as they must occupy vacancies on these courses and cannot be additional.

R. J. Ingham
Wing Commander.

F. J.
12/17/30.
D.C.A.S.

I agree to all except (c). There is little chance of Egypt starting flying instruction for some time they have not even got a Flight "A" Squadron yet. They are not good pilots and would not suit C.F.S. standards after a year's training. I think you should make what they are fit for.

ملحق (11)

وزارة الحربية
القاهرة

القاهرة

E.A.A.F./36

MINISTRY OF WAR AND MARINE,
CAIRO.

11th. July, 1932.

Excellency,

I have the honour to request that your Excellency will kindly transmit the following particulars, regarding aircraft in possession of the Egyptian Army Air Force, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


1. Two AVRO-10 type aircraft, bearing British Registration letters G - AASP and G - AASB, arrived and were taken over in Egypt on 18th. January, 1932. They have been allotted Egyptian Registration numbers as under :-

G - AASP allotted F - 200
G - AASB allotted F - 201


2. Five E.III (10TH) type aircraft arrived in Egypt on 2nd. June, 1932. They have been allotted Registration numbers:

E.101 to E.105.

I have the honour to be,
Excellency,
Your obedient Servant,


A. E. A. F.
ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL

Via Excellency the Minister,
thro' H.E. the Under Secretary of State,
Ministry of War and Marine,
Cairo.



ملحق (١٢)

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No. W/6.

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BRITISH MILITARY MISSION,

Kubri-El-Qubbeh,

Cairo, 6th May 1937.

Sir,

In accordance with my instructions from the Army Council I have the honour to forward herewith a half-yearly report on the Egyptian Army Air Force, dated 26th April 1937, prepared by Group Captain V.H. Tait, Senior Air Adviser on the British Military Mission.

I shall take this opportunity of placing on record the story of the negotiations as a result of which the Royal Air Force personnel, formerly wearing the uniform of the Egyptian Army Air Force, and holding executive command therein, have been transferred to the British Military Mission.


Before I came out with the Mission in January of this year, I was informed by the Chief of the Air Staff that the future status of the British officers serving with the Egyptian Army Air Force, not having been specifically regulated by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, was somewhat uncertain, but that "it would be desirable that some British officers should be retained in executive positions at all events for the next few years". There were at that time 4 British officers and 11 non-commissioned officers so serving.

When I arrived in Cairo I asked the War Minister about the position of these officers. I was informed by him that the Egyptian Government had decided to dispense with all the British Army officers and N.C.O's on Spinks Pasha's staff, but that the R.A.F. personnel would be retained "for the present".

The "status quo, ante" was thus maintained until the

end /

The Secretary,
The Air Ministry,
London, W.C.2.



V. A

تابع ملحق (١٢)

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2.

end of March, prior to Nahas Pasha's departure to attend the Montreux Conference, when the Egyptian Government suddenly decided, for purely political reasons, to get rid of all the R.A.F. officers, with the exception of Wing Commander Tait, whose services they felt to be indispensable. I at once made representations to the War Minister and to Nahas Pasha personally, pointing out that such a step on the eve of the expansion project would prove disastrous. Eventually I obtained Nahas Pasha's consent to retain two British officers (Wing Commander N.P.Dixon, A.F.C. and Squadron Leader S.N. Webster, A.F.C.) on condition that they definitely became members of the Military Mission, and ceased to wear Egyptian uniform or to exercise executive command. This arrangement was brought into effect as from the 1st April 1937, and on 20th April the services of the fourth British officer (Flight Lieutenant S.J.Stocks, retired list) were dispensed with.

On 17th April I was informed by the War Minister that the services of the 11 R.A.F. non-commissioned officers were being retained, also as members of the Military Mission, and wearing British uniform.

At the same time a senior artillery officer, El Miralal Ali Islam Bey, was transferred from his post as Commandant of the Military School and placed in executive command of the Egyptian Army Air Force.

The position now is that Wing Commander Tait, with the local rank of Group Captain, acts as Air Adviser to the War Minister, and also to the Military Mission. The next senior R.A.F. officer on the Mission, Wing Commander Dixon, will act as adviser to the Egyptian Air Officer Commanding, while the Mission will gradually be reinforced to a strength allowing for one R.A.F. officer as adviser or instructor to each

squadron /

تابع طحق (١٢)

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3.

squadron of the Egyptian Army Air Force. This will involve an increase in the British personnel during the current financial year of 2 officers and 10 N.C.O.'s. The British officers and N.C.O.'s now act in a purely advisory capacity, without executive responsibility or authority. With tact and good will on both sides, and with the increasing experience of Egyptian flying officers, I see no reason why this system should not produce excellent results.

The arrival from England in April of 6 Hawker Audax machines, with Panther VI engines, has raised the enthusiasm and moral, as well as the material fighting strength, of the Egyptian Army Air Force.

In consultation with the Air Officer Commanding, Middle East, and with the Air Ministry, Group Captain Tait has devised an expansion programme which should raise the Egyptian Army Air Force, within a period of three years, to an efficient fighting service suitable for co-operation with their land forces and with the British Royal Air Force. The cost of this expansion scheme was estimated to amount to rather less than £500,000 in each of the three years covered. By the end of the first year (1937/38) it was hoped to raise a complete new Bomber Squadron, and increase the Egyptian Army Air Force from its present strength of 38 to a total of 64 machines.

With a view to consulting the Air Ministry and British manufacturing establishments as regards the execution of this programme, Group Captain Tait proceeded to England for 5 weeks at the end of April.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

M. Mansour - Corbett
Major-General,
Chief of the British Military Mission.

ملحق (١٢)

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(18)

Half-Yearly Report No.1 on the Egyptian Army Air Force,
by the Air Adviser on the British Military Mission,
26th April, 1937.

---000---

1. The Egyptian Army Air Force was formed early in 1932 and consisted of one flight of 5 Moth type light training aeroplanes, commanded by a British Royal Air Force officer, with a British R.A.F. officer as second-in-command, six Egyptian Flying Officers, six British non-commissioned officers and forty Egyptian civilian and soldier mechanics. Since then annual increases have been made to the Air Force until its present establishment is as follows:-

(a) Personnel.

British officers	4
Egyptian officers	27
British N.C.O's	11
Egyptian civilian mechanics, soldier mechanics and ordinary soldiers	372
		total 414

(b) Aircraft.

(i) Avro type 626, Armstrong Siddeley 275 H.P. Cheetah Mk.V Engine	..	22
(ii) De Havilland type E.III Moth Gypsy II, 110 H.P. engine	..	6
(iii) Hawker Audax, Armstrong Siddeley 675 H.P. Panther VI Engine	..	6
(iv) Avro type 632 (Anson), two Armstrong Siddeley 315 H.P. Cheetah Mk.IX Engines.		1
✓ (v) Westland Wessex, three Armstrong Siddeley 140 H.P. Genet Major Engines	..	1
✓ (vi) Avro type 612 (Commodore) Armstrong Siddeley 210 H.P. Lynx Mk.IVC Engine	..	1
		total aircraft 37

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2.

2. Organization.

The present organization of the Egyptian Army Air Force is as follows:

(a) Air Section, Ministry of War and Marine.

This section of the War Ministry has at its head a British officer appointed as Air Staff Officer on the Headquarters Staff of the Inspector General of the Egyptian Army. (This British officer is also Officer Commanding, Egyptian Army Air Force). The Egyptian Staff consists of one officer of the rank of Sach, three civilian clerks and four soldier orderlies. All questions of policy regarding the development, employment, co-operation and training of the air force are investigated, and the instructions for them to be carried out issued from this section. Annual budget proposals are prepared by the Air Section, and arrangements made for the provision of all technical equipment and personnel.

(b) Elmaza aerodrome (Cairo).

(1) Station Headquarters. This is the headquarters of the Officer Commanding the Air Force. He has an Egyptian Bombardier as Staff Officer (Adjutant) and junior Egyptian officers in charge of the Wireless, Parachute and Workshop sections. The Armament, Stores and Photographic sections have a British W.C.O. (local Warrant Officer) in charge, as there are no Egyptian officers qualified in these specialist subjects. The Egyptian Staff Officer is responsible for the internal administration and discipline of the Station and for all Station non-technical routine, such as guards, rations, clothing, barrack rooms and the officers' mess. The Wireless, Armament, Stores, Photographic, Parachute, Mechanical Transport and Workshop sections are all on a Station /

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3.

station basis and supply the necessary facilities for the three squadrons at Almaza.

(11) No. 1 Squadron, commanded by a British officer with an Egyptian officer as second-in-command.

Strength:

- 1 British officer.
- 10 Egyptian officers.
- 2 British Warrant Officers (1 Fitter, 1igger).
- 15 Civilian mechanics.
- 11 Soldier mechanics.
- 7 Soldier aircraft-handls.

Aircraft:

- 8 Avro type 623.
- 3 Hawker Audax.

This unit is a general purpose squadron whose training has fitted them for co-operation with the Egyptian Army and frontiers administration units. (The training and equipment of the Army and frontiers administration units is elementary and therefore the air co-operation required is on very simple lines.) The pilots and air gunners are trained in air gunnery and have all fired at least one complete course on ground targets, but not at air targets, as no drogue or other form of air target is available. The results obtained in the air firing tests have been average. All pilots have passed at least one annual training programme, which includes airmanship, navigation, signals, photography and aerobatic, cross country and formation flying practices and tests. No bomb aiming instruction or practices have as yet been carried out.

as Not Sqdn (111) No. 2 Squadron. Also commanded by a British officer, with an Egyptian officer as second-in-command.

Strength:

- 1 British officer.
- 10 Egyptian officers.
- 2 British warrant officers.
- 15 Civilian mechanics.
- 11 Soldier mechanics.
- 7 Soldier aircraft-handls.

aircraft: /

تابع ملحق (١٣)

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4.

Aircraft.

3 Avro Type 626
3 Hawker Audax.

Duties and training as for No.1 Squadron above.

(iv) No.3 Squadron. Commanded by a ^{... / ...} ~~British~~ officer.

Strength.

1 British officer.
1 Egyptian officer.
6 Cadets, or officers under training.
2 British Warrant Officers.
8 Civilian mechanics.
6 Soldier mechanics.
6 Soldier aircraft-handers.

Aircraft.

(a) training flight: 6 De Havilland G.III Moths.
4 Avro type 626.

(c) Communication flight:
1 Avro 652 (Anson)
1 Westland Wessex.
1 Avro 612 (Commandore)

The training flight of this squadron, in addition to supplying aircraft for refresher flying to officers who have been off flying for a long period due to illness, absence on missions etc., carries out "an initio" flying training for Egyptian cadets to prepare them for a course at the Royal Air Force flying training School, Abu Sueir. At present only one Egyptian officer has qualified as a flying instructor and the number of pupils that can be dealt with on each "an initio" course is limited to five.

The communication flight of this squadron supplies transport for senior Army staff officers, Cabinet Ministers and senior Government officials during their duty visits and inspections to places in Egypt where other means of transport are slow and uncomfortable, and in some cases almost non-existent. In addition, it is being used to train the senior Egyptian pilots in flying multi-engined aircraft.

3. Morale and professional efficiency.

(a) Officers. The Egyptian officer generally has considerable courage when he is in the presence of other officers.

(١٣) تابع ملحق

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officers, especially foreigners, but if faced with serious difficulties or danger when entirely on his own, is inclined to take the line of least resistance, whether or not in so doing he carries out his duty.

Their flying ability in normal circumstances is a good average, but generally they lack the ability to make a quick sound decision when faced with unexpected difficulties. They show considerable keenness on attaining proficiency in pilotage but generally display little if any interest in their aircraft, its equipment or the specialised subjects such as wireless, photography, navigation etc essential for an efficient service pilot.

Their discipline is good but they show a lack of ability to realise the importance of detail in carrying out orders with the result that their work generally just misses being well done.

The conditions of service for officers serving in the Air Force are the same as for other Army units. Promotion is thus slow, an officer not becoming a 1st Lieutenant until he has four to five years service, a captain after 12 to 14 years, a sa'h (between captain and major) after over 20 years and a major after 23 to 25 years total service. This rate of promotion is unsuitable for the Egyptian Air Force, and a scheme to provide a separate graduation list for Air Force officers, with a more rapid rate of promotion, earlier retiring age and pension compensation, has been under discussion for over four years without a decision being given. This has caused considerable dissatisfaction amongst the Egyptian flying officers.

(b) Mechanics. The soldiers are well disciplined, and if well led would show considerable courage; with indifferent officers their fighting value would be of a low /

تابع ملحق (١٣)

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G.

low order. The majority of the soldiers are conscripts and have little if any education, and therefore are not suitable for training as mechanics. A small percentage of conscripts with some education, and who can read and write, are obtained and have been found to make average mechanics when trained. The majority of these are allowed, at the end of their conscript service, to volunteer for a further five years, when they obtain increased rate of pay and are found to make average mechanics.

The civilian mechanics are good tradesmen but generally lack the education required to train them as senior aircraft mechanics capable of taking charge of sections or workshops.

In the case of both soldier and civilian mechanics they show no signs of being capable, without the supervision and assistance of European mechanics, of taking over the entire maintenance of aircraft.

4. Training.

(1) Flying. All the Egyptian flying Officers have passed through a course at a Royal Air Force Flying Training School. Egyptian pilots average 200 hours flying per year when with squadrons. Total flying times for the last five years are as follows:

1932	1,699	hours
1933	2,135	"
1934	3,121	"
1935	4,634	"
1936	4,765	"

All pilots are familiar with and periodically visit landing grounds in all parts of Egypt, and continually carry out flying practices over the desert areas. The navigation of the senior pilots is good.

(ii) Airground. All aircraft crews have completed air firing courses on ground targets, with average results. No

Contd /

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7.

bomb aiming instruction has been carried out; this is due to commence shortly.

(iii) Photography. The majority of the pilots have had practice in air photography; the results obtained are below average.

(iv) Signals. Wireless air practices are continually carried out and the standard of the operators is average.

(v) Army Co-operation. Simple forms of co-operation have been practised, and schemes carried out with Army and Frontiers Administration units. Considerable co-operation with the Camel Corps and Police in the anti-contraband service has been done, with some success.

(vi) Specialisation. Instruction is given annually to the junior Egyptian officers in subjects required before a specialist course; an examination is then held and on the results obtained officers are selected to attend Royal Air Force Schools. Egyptian officers have taken specialist courses at Royal Air Force Schools and qualified in the following subjects:

Engineering.
Signals.
Army Co-operation.
Navigation.
Flying Instructor.

Further, Egyptian officers are at present attending courses in:

Signals.
Navigation.
Engineering.
Armament.
Army Co-operation.

Other ranks and civilian personnel have attended courses in England and qualified in the following subjects:

Photography.
Armament.
Wireless.

5. /

تابع ملحق (١٢)

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
5. Sport.

The Air Force takes a prominent part in all Army athletics, and there is a fair "esprit de Corps" amongst the personnel.

6. Accidents.

The number of flying accidents resulting in injury to personnel has been small in the first five years of the Air Force, the total being two involving death and two resulting in minor injuries to the pilot.

Cairo,
26th April 1937.


Group Captain,
Air Adviser,
British Military Mission.

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11/6/4.

SECRET.

HALF YEARLY REPORT NO.5 ON THE ROYAL EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE

BY THE AIR ADVISER ON THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION.

PERIOD 1st NOVEMBER, 1938 to 30th APRIL, 1939.

1. INTRODUCTION.

Considerable progress in the development of the Air Force has been achieved in the period under review both in training schools and service units. The flying time for the period under review increased to 7550 hours as compared with 3500 hours during the same period last year.

All the technical training schools have accelerated their training syllabus and although progress is made difficult by delays in obtaining equipment, especially certain types of training aircraft and aircraft spares, the output of trained personnel from these schools has been satisfactory.

One new fighter squadron has been formed and the Army Co-operation Squadron has been re-armed with Lysander aircraft during this period.

The unsettled international situation and threats of war have enabled the British officers to exert more direct influence on the training and organization of the service, although periodical moments of optimism on the international situation immediately bring about a falling off in the authority that can be exerted over the Egyptian officer personnel.

Attached to this report are Appendices showing :-

"A" Strength in personnel of the Royal Egyptian Air Force on 30th April, 1939.

"B" Numbers and types of aircraft held by the Royal Egyptian Air Force on 30th April, 1939.

"C" New rank titles now used by the Royal Egyptian Air Force.

2. ORGANIZATION.

(a). Separation from the Army.

The Air Force has to a large extent been separated from the Egyptian Army but the exact relations between the services is not clearly defined. The Director of the Air Force is responsible to the Minister for National Defence, through the Under-Secretary, for the organization, training and equipment of the Air Force, the command and responsibility for operations has not been defined and the Army Chief of Staff exercises some form of control in this connection. The Air Force continue to be served by the Army Medical, Ordnance and Supply Services. In spite of this apparently unsatisfactory organization, it has so far worked with as good effect as would be likely to obtain from any other organization which could be introduced under present conditions.

(b). Air Force Ranks.

The titles for ranks in the Air Force have been changed from the Army ones previously in use and new titles introduced which are as closely as could be obtained to the Arabic equivalent of Royal Air Force titles of rank. A list of these new Egyptian Air Force rank titles with the Royal Air Force equivalent is shown in Appendix "C".

(c). Air Force Uniform.

The Royal Egyptian Air Force uniform has been changed to the same colour and material as used by the Royal Air Force, and the officers now wear the same badges of rank i.e., a "Flight-Lieutenant" or "Kaed Gerb" wears two braided rings on his sleeve on the blue winter uniform and on the shoulder straps of the khaki summer jacket.

The.....

تابع ملحق (١٤)

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2.

The new uniform was brought into use for officers in March, they wear service blue or forage caps at work, but retain the tarboosh for ceremonial.

The other rank personnel of the Air Force are to be given blue uniform when they go into winter kit at the end of the present summer.

(d). Air Headquarters, Ministry of National Defence.

It should be noted that the name of the Ministry of War and Marines has been changed to the Ministry of National Defence.

The expansion and reorganization of the Air Headquarters stated in the last report to be an immediate and urgent requirement has not been carried out in spite of continual proposals for this to be done having been put forward by the Chief of the Military Mission. Actually the situation has deteriorated by the only Staff Officer at this Headquarters - he had been here for seven years and was therefore experienced - being removed by the Minister for National Defence, for reasons which were not revealed to members of the Mission, and replaced by a very junior and inexperienced officer.

This headquarters is now almost entirely dependent on the services of the Air Adviser who has to carry out most of the routine organization required for the Air Force in addition to his duties regarding the policy, employment and training of the service. Unless an increase of this headquarters, in keeping with the expansion of the Air Force, is brought about in the near future, the organization and administration of the Air Force will be most adversely affected; this is again being pointed out to the Egyptian Author: ties with proposals as to how the expansion can be best carried out.

(e). Civil Aviation.

The Department of Civil Aviation was transferred from the Ministry of Communications to the Ministry of National Defence in March, 1939. As no provision for the accommodation of the Civil Aviation Department had been made in the Ministry of National Defence, nor had provision for their expenditure been made in the Defence Budget, this Department continues to be accommodated and administered by the Ministry of Communications, but all questions of policy are decided by the Defence Ministry. It is expected that when the 1939/40 Budget is approved new accommodation will be made available to house both the Civil Aviation Department and the Air Force Headquarters, that some form of co-operation between these Departments will be effected, and that an Under-Secretary of State for Air, or some senior civil official, will be appointed to co-ordinate the work of both.

The transfer of the Civil Aviation Department to the Ministry of National Defence has enabled the project for a new civil airport at Alexandria to be approved and work to provide this aerodrome has commenced. A large area of Lake Maryut immediately south of the centre of the city is being drained to provide the area for this new aerodrome and a scheme to provide a flying boat basin adjacent to this site by raising the level of a part of the lake is probably going to be approved in the near future. When these schemes are completed in some two years time Dikheila will become a purely military aerodrome.

3.....

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3.

3. SCHOOLS.

(a) Flying Training School.

The expansion of this School outlined in my last report has been carried out in so far as the number of pupils to be put into training was planned and this training, although made difficult by delays in providing the hangars, technical instructional buildings, landing grounds and training aircraft required, is progressing.

The training at this School has been retarded by the lack of an advance trainer type of aeroplane and it is understood that aircraft of this type cannot be supplied to Egypt until 1940.

To provide aircraft for advanced training at this School, twelve of the Panther Audax aeroplanes of No. 4 (B) Squadron had to be withdrawn from that unit, which has been reduced to one flight of six aircraft with no reserve. This provided eighteen Panther Audax for the School, but great difficulty is being experienced in maintaining these aircraft due to the delays or impossibility of obtaining delivery of both aircraft and on the spares.

The School recently obtained delivery of twenty three additional Magister aeroplanes for use in elementary training. This type of aircraft is proving satisfactory for this part of the School training and no difficulty is experienced in obtaining airframe or engine spares required for their maintenance.

The School aircraft strength now consists of :-

Miles Magisters.....	43.
De Haviland Gypsy II Moths.....	2.
Avro type 626.....	1B.
Panther VI Audax.....	6.
Panther X Audax.....	12.
<u>Total.....</u>	<u>81.</u>

Since my last report a new course commenced instruction at the School in January and consisted of the following pupils :-

Cadets.....	9.
Officers(direct gazette from Military College)..	9.
N.C.O.s.....	32.
<u>Total.....</u>	<u>50.</u>

(The total number of cadets or officers on the course should have been 33, but it was not possible to obtain this number from the Military College who could pass the necessary medical examination).

Of the 48 pupils reported having commenced training in September last the following numbers passed into the second term in January :-

Cadets (or officers).....	33.
N.C.O.s.....	13.
<u>Total.....</u>	<u>46.</u>

They are due to complete their flying training at the end of May when they will be posted to squadrons.

The following number of pupils have left the School during the last six months for the reasons shown :-

- (i). Cadets (or officers).....6.
 - 4 - Unable to make progress in flying training.
 - 1 - Sickness.
 - 1 - Disciplinary reasons.
- (ii). N.C.O.s.....11.
 - All found unable to make satisfactory progress with flying training.

There...

(١٤) تابع طحق

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4.

There is no difficulty in obtaining volunteers for flying training but great difficulty is being experienced in passing candidates for the flying school due to their inability to pass the qualifying medical examination.

This applies to both volunteer N.C.O.s and the Cadets at the Royal Military College. This is probably to some extent due to excessive zeal on the part of the Egyptian Army Medical Officers who lack experience in this form of examination and turn down candidates for minor and unimportant physical defects.

Six additional British N.C.O. flying instructors were seconded to the Air Wing of the British Military Mission in January together with two R.A.F. Sergeants, Fitter 1, for duty with the Flying Training School.

As the Egyptian Authorities would not agree to a British Officer Instructor for the new Fighter Squadron formed in February, it was necessary to post Squadron Leader P.B. Coote from flying instructor duties at the School to the fighter squad-ron. The loss of this officer from the School will adversely affect the efficiency of the School training.

(b). Mechanics School.

The pupils of the first course to pass out from the School were posted to units in January last. Their instruction had been curtailed from 18 to 12 months, but they are proving fairly satisfactory in squadrons.

The third entry to the School commenced instruction in February and consists of 125 pupils who have been well selected from Trade School students.

(c). Armament and Wireless Schools.

Both these schools had classes which passed out in March last, sixteen aerial gunners and eighteen wireless operators qualified and have been posted to units.

Training of armourers and wireless operator mechanics at these schools is progressing, but it will be some time before the shortage of this class of personnel can be made good in squadrons by the output from the schools.

4. SQUADRONS.

(a). Army Co-operation Squadron.

No. 1 (AC) Squadron R.E.A.F., has now been re-armed with Lysander Mark I aeroplanes. The unit is organized into a headquarters and two flights of five aircraft each, with four reserve aircraft for each flight. All aircraft have been delivered and airframe spares are available, but Mercury XII engine spares have not been received with the result that four aircraft are unserviceable. The squadron has not yet received complete bombing or wireless equipment, but sufficient is available to enable the flights to operate if required.

Training of the squadron is progressing and it is anticipated that the annual training syllabus will be completed early in June.

Some difficulty has been experienced operating Lysander aircraft from landing grounds in the Western Desert where the surface is soft, the hard pressure tyres sink into the sand and have resulted in aircraft being overturned. It is considered that low pressure balloon tyres on these aircraft would be an advantage for their use in Egypt.

The Lysanders used by this squadron were fitted with Vokes type air cleaners which are proving satisfactory.

(b)...

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5.

(b). Fighter Squadron.

No. 2 (F) Squadron R.E.A.F., formed in February last at Almasa and in March moved to Dikhella, which is to be this unit's base station. The squadron is organized into a headquarters and two flights of six aircraft, with three reserve aircraft for each flight. The squadron is armed with the latest type of Gloucester Gladiator aeroplane. The aircraft equipment of the squadron is complete, but so far no airframe or engine spares have been delivered and difficulty is experienced in maintaining the aircraft serviceable for this reason. These aircraft are also fitted with Vokes type air cleaners.

Squadron training is progressing satisfactorily and it is anticipated that the annual training syllabus will be completed in June.

(c). Communication Squadron.

No. 3 (Communication) Squadron, R.E.A.F., have received no additional aircraft since my last report, three additional Ansons are due for delivery in May, 1939, and a proposal to equip a King's Flight in this unit with a De Havilland "Flemingo" and two Percival "Q.6" type aeroplanes is under consideration.

(d). Bomber Squadron.

As reported above No. 4 (3) Squadron R.E.A.F., has been reduced to a headquarters and one flight of six Panther X Audax aeroplanes, the remainder of this type aircraft being now used in the Flying Training School. Eighteen Blenheim aircraft have been ordered to re-arm this squadron and it is expected that they will be available in October next.

The present flight of this squadron have now completed a syllabus of training and are capable of carrying out reconnaissance and light bomber duties with a fair degree of efficiency. The flight equipment is complete but there is a serious shortage of airframe and engine spares.

The buildings for this squadron at Dikhella aerodrome are now completed, workshops and technical buildings are in course of equipment.

(e). Towed Target Flight.

This unit formed at Dikhella in March equipped with four Gordon aeroplanes with two additional in reserve. It was expected that the Target Towing Equipment for the flight would be available at that time, but it has not yet been received for information available as to when it will be delivered. Delay in obtaining this equipment has made it impossible for both the Anti-Aircraft Artillery of the Egyptian Army and Squadrons of the Royal Egyptian Air Force to carry out their air firing training.

5. NEW UNITS.(a). Fighter Squadron.

Gloucester Gladiator aircraft have been ordered to form a second fighter squadron of the R.E.A.F. These aircraft are due for delivery in July next and the squadron will form at Dikhella in August, 1939.

(b). Mersa Matruh Station Headquarters.

This unit has not yet been formed or has any work commenced on the construction of the buildings required. Work has been completed at this place to provide drainage at the landing ground with a view to making it serviceable immediately after heavy rains.

(c)...

تابع ملحق (١٤)

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6.

(c). Aircraft Repair Depot.

This unit was due to form at the end of 1950, but owing to difficulty in obtaining the land required for the site of the Depot, no construction work on the buildings has as yet commenced. Delay in forming this unit will adversely affect the maintenance of the equipment of the service, which in the meantime has to be carried out in the Station Headquarters workshops at Almaza and Dikheila, which do not provide all the facilities required.

(d). Landing Grounds.

Work has been completed on landing grounds at the following places :-

Dhaba.	Hamam	Burg El Arab.
Bir Hooker.	Qasaba.	Ikingi Maryut.

Work is in progress and due to be completed shortly at :-

Fuka.	Matotba.	Suez.	Baharia Oasis.	Tor.
-------	----------	-------	----------------	------

Two areas approximately five miles East of Almaza, to be used by F.T.S. aircraft.

6. TRAINING.(a). Flying.

The total flying hours for the Air Force for the six months under review was 7550 hours.

Two Egyptian Flying Officers completed the course at the Central Flying School, England, and qualified as "A.2." flying instructors.

Five formations of nine aircraft each carried out a fly past at a military review held in March during the visit of the Crown Prince of Iran to Egypt.

K.M. King Farouk was taken by air to Upper Egypt on an official visit early in the year. He was accompanied by an air escort of nine aircraft. He has in addition been flown on various occasions to Alexandria and Aboukir.

(b). Co-operation.

No. 1 (AC) Squadron R.E.A.F., has carried out several exercises with the Canal Brigade of the British Army and with the Egyptian Army Armoured Car Regiment in the Baharia Oasis area.

No. 2 (F) Squadron took part in Air Defence Exercises held at the end of April. They moved to their war station and carried out the exercise from that station.

No. 4 (B) Squadron co-operated in the Alexandria Air Defence Exercises from 15th to 27th April, when they carried out day and night attacks on that place.

(c). Armament.

Armament training of units is progressing satisfactorily with the exception of air firing exercises which cannot be carried out due to the lack of Target Towing Equipment.

Air firing on ground target results with Lysander aircraft have been poor, especially the front gun; efforts are being made to improve this and it is hoped with more experience in flying the aircraft average results may be obtained.

An Egyptian Flying Officer completed the Long Armament Course at the R.A.F. School in England in December, he then carried out three months attachment at an armament station in England to obtain practical experience. He has now returned to Egypt and has been posted for armament duties at Dikheila. A second officer proceeded to England in April to undergo a similar course.

(d)...

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7.

(d).Photography.

Training in photography has been satisfactory.

(e).Signals.

The remote control transmitting station for Almaza aerodrome has been completed and taken into use.

A remote control transmitting station for Dikhella is urgently required and a temporary building for this purpose is being erected but the necessary transmitters, etc., for the station have not yet been received.

There is a shortage of aircraft and mobile station W/T sets. This equipment has been on order for several months.

7. Air Observation System.

A temporary air observation centre and operation room has been equipped at Dikhella and was tried out during Air Defence Exercises at the end of April.

8. Accidents.

There has been a considerable increase in the number of flying accidents during the past six months. These have been mainly due to the increase in flying, the larger number of pupils under training at the Flying Training School, and the inexperience of the Egyptian Squadron Commanders. The great majority of these accidents have been of a minor nature, in only one case was any member of the aircraft crew seriously injured. This case was a N.C.O. pilot pupil on his first cross country flight, who unsuccessfully attempted aerobatics at a low altitude over his father's house and was fortunate enough to escape with a broken leg.

9. Sport.

The Royal Egyptian Air Force during the period under review won the football, boxing and cross country championships of the Egyptian Services.

10. Reserve.

No action has yet been taken regarding the formation of a reserve for the Royal Egyptian Air Force. The question continues to be put forward by the Chief of the Military Mission.

M. J. J. J.

Cairo.
30th April, 1939.

Group Captain.
Senior Air Adviser.
British Military Mission.

تابع طحق (١٤)

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Appendix "A" to Half-Yearly Report No.5
on the Royal Egyptian Air Force.

Personnel of Air Wing, British Military Mission.

Senior Air Adviser.

Group Captain V.H.Tait, O.B.E.

Instructor, Station H.Q., Almaza.

Wing Commander H.F.Dixon, A.F.C.

Instructor Nos.1 and 3 Squadrons, Almaza.

Wing Commander S.N.Wobster, A.F.C.

Instructor, Station H.Q., and No.4 Squadron, Dikheila.

Wing Commander C.E.N.Guest, O.B.E.

Instructor No.2 Squadron, Dikheila.

Squadron Leader P.E.Coote.

Flying Training School, Almaza.

Chief Flying Instructor.

Wing Commander C.E.N.Britton, D.F.C.

Flying Instructor.

Squadron Leader D.W.Reid.

Total British Officers.....7.
R.A.F., N.C.O., Flying Instructors.....11.
R.A.F., N.C.O., Technical Instructors.....21.
Total.....39.

Royal Egyptian Air Force personnel.

officers (5 now flying) including officers under training...89.

Military (Technical) Other Ranks (includes under training)...761.

" (Non-technical) " "774.

Civilian employees (mechanics, clerks, etc).....721.

Total.....2345.

تابع ملحق (١٤)

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Appendix "B" to Half-Yearly Report No.5 on the
Royal Egyptian Air Force.

Aircraft on strength on 30th April, 1939.

Avro Type 626.....	18.
Armstrong Siddeley 275 H.P. Cheetah Mk.V engines.	
Fairy Gordons.....	8.
Armstrong Siddeley Panther Mk.II engines.	
De Haviland type E.III Moth.....	2.
Gypsy II. 110 H.P. engine.	
Hawker Audax.....	8.
Armstrong Siddeley 575 H.P. Panther Mk.IV engines.	
Hawker Audax.....	18.
Armstrong Siddeley 650 H.P. Panther Mk.X engines.	
Hiloe Magisters.....	45.
Gypsy Major 180 H.P. engines.	
Avro Type 652 (Anson).....	1.
Two Armstrong Siddeley 315 H.P. Cheetah Mk.IX.	
Westland Wessex.....	1.
Three Armstrong Siddeley 140 H.P. Genet Major Engines.	
Avro Type 642 (Commodore).....	1.
Armstrong Siddeley 210 H.P. Lynx Mk.IV engine.	
Westland Lysander Mk.I.....	18.
Bristol Mercury Type XII engine.	
Gloucester Gladiator.....	18.
Bristol Mercury Type IX engines.	

Total.....	152.

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Royal Egyptian Air Force Rank Titles
with Royal Air Force Equivalent

Appendix "O"

<u>R. E. A. F.</u>	<u>R.A.F. Equivalent</u>	<u>Arabic</u>
Tayar Tani	Pilot Officer	طيار ثاني
Tayar Awal	Flying Officer	طيار اولى
Kaed Corb	Flight Lieutenant	كائد صرب
Kaed Aseraab	Squadron Leader	كائد اسراب
Kaed Ginah	Wing Commander	كائد جناح
Kaed Lewa	Group Captain	كائد لواء
Kaed Ferkah Gawia	Air Commodore	كائد لواء جوية
Kaed Astool Gawi	Air Vice-Marshal	كائد امطيل جوي
Kaed Aasteel Gawia	Air Marshal	كائد امطيل جوية
Elmarishal ElGawia	Marshal of the Royal Air Force	المارشال الجوي

ملحق (١٥)

وزارة الدفاع الوطني

رئاسة سلاح الطيران الملكي المصري

القاهرة

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
H. H. ROYAL EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE
CAIRO.

في ٢٥ نوفمبر سنة ١٩٦٦

مرط ١٥/١

حضرة صاحب المعالي وزير الدفاع الوطني

حضرة صاحب السعادة وكيل الدفاع الوطني

لما كانت الرغبة في التوقف على ماهية سلاح الطيران الملكي المصري ومقدار توته العادية والاذنية فاني سارح لسمايليم فيما يلي ذلك ذاكرنا
خواص كل طائرة ومقدار استمدادها للقتال .

ان اسراب سلاح الطيران الملكي المصري تنحصر في ثلاثة اقسام

- ١ - الاسراب الاولى تعاون
- ٢ - اسراب القتال
- ٣ - اسراب تذف القنابل الخفيفة

اولا - الاسراب الاولى تعاون

طائرات هذه الاسراب ثمانية عشر طائرة طراز لايسندر منها طائرتان

تحت التصلح . ندم هذه الاسراب بالتعاون مع الجيش علاوة على قيامها بعمليات الاستششاف بانواعه .

حمولة الطائرة = الانسداد - تحمل كل طائرة من الانراد القائد ومدنسي او عامل لاسلكي .

الاسلحة - تسليح كل طائرة بالاسلحة الاتية ٠٠٠

أ - ١ مدفع براوننج امانى سرح

الطلقات (١١٥٠) طلعة في الدبقة)

ب - ١ مدفع لويس خلقى معه ثمانية

خزن بكل منها ٨٦ طلعة

(٢٠٠ طلعة في الدبقة)

هذا غير ما نحمله كل طائرة من احد مجاميع

القنابل الاربعة الاتية ٠٠٠

١ - ٤ قنبلة شديدة الانفجار زنة

الواحدة ١٢٠ رطلا معها

تابع طحق (١٥)

(٢)

ثمانية قنابل اخرى شديدة الانفجار

زنة الواحدة عشرين رطلا

٢ - ٢ قنبلة من نوع المجموعة (أ) كزنة

الواحدة ٢٥٠ رطلا معها

ثمانية قنابل اخرى من نوع المجموعة (أ)

أر ٣ - ١٦ قنبلة من نوع المجموعة (أ)

زنة الواحدة ٢٠ رطلا

أر ٢ - ١٦ قنبلة محرقة زنة الواحدة ٢٥ رطلا

ثانيا - اسراب العناب

طائرات هذه الاسراب ستة وثلاثون طائرة طراز جلا ديبر منها طائرة تحت

التصليح • وتتعم هذه الاسراب الى وحدتين ٠٠٠

١ - الاسراب الثانية

٢ - الاسراب الخامسة

حمولة الطائرة • الافراد • تحمل كل طائرة من الافراد العائد

الاجهزة • تجهز كل طائرة بثلاثين لاسلكي وجهاز الكسجين

للطيران الى طبقات الجو العليا •

الاسلحة • تحمل كل طائرة باربعة مدافع براوننج امامية

سرعة الطلقات (١١٥٠ طلقة في الدقيقة)

ثالثا - اسراب قذف القنابل الخفيفة

طائرات هذه الاسراب خمسة عشر طائرة طراز اودكس •

حمولة الطائرة • الافراد • تحمل كل طائرة من الافراد القائد ومدفعا

او عاملا لاسلكيا •

الاجهزة • تجهز كل طائرة بآلة لاسلكيه - آلة تصوير

الاسلحة • تحمل كل طائرة بمدفع فيكز امانى سريع (٢٠٠

طلقة في الدقيقة) - مدفع فيكز (ك) خفيف سريع

(١١٥٠ طلقة في الدقيقة)

القنابل • ١ - ٢ قنبلة شديدة الانفجار زنة الواحدة ١٢٠

رطلا زائدا اربعة قنابل اخرى شديدة

الانفجار زنة الواحدة ٢٠ رطلا •

٤ عدد
 صندوق قنابل محرقة سعة
 الواحد اربعمون قنبلة زنة
 القنبلة ثلث رطل (٤ اوزية)
 ب - ٨ قنبلة شديدة الانفجار زنة
 الواحدة ٢٠ رطلا

واني اود ان اقرر لمعاليمك وانا بصدور هذه الاسراب الفاذة للقنابل
 الخفيفة بان طيارها من ذوى الخبرة والدرابة التامين مما يوهمهم لتلبية نداء
 الوطن عند الدفاع عنه اذا ما حانت ساعة الخطر - هذا مع العلم بان هذه
 الاسراب قد وزعت بالفعل على محطاتها الحربية في ميادينها المخصصة للدفاع
 عن مصر وذلك منذ اللحظة الاولى لتشوب الحرب . واكثر من ذلك انها اشتركت
 في عملياتها مع اسراب سلاح الطيران البريطانى جنباً الى جنب كما وان السرب
 الذى تعين للتعاون مع الاسطول البريطانى بمنطقة الغنال والسويس قد قام بواجباته
 على الوجه الذى نرضاه مما حدا بالقيادة العليا البريطانية الى تقدير هذا
 التعاون والاطناب بذكوره . ولا زالت هذه الاسراب تعمل مع اسراب حليفتنا حتى
 الآن . وقد عمل الترتيب اللازم لاشترك سلاح الطيران الملكى المصرى فى
 المناورات التى سيجريها سلاح الطيران البريطانى بمنطقة الاسكندرية فى ١٢ ديسمبر
 القادم .

هذا با صاحب المعالي ما اردت ابضاحه لمعاليمك كي تتكون لدى
 معاليمك الفكرة عن قوة سلاح الطيران الملكى المصرى المادية والادبية مما يبين
 بجلاء مقدار ما وصل اليه هذا السلاح من التقدم واني لانتشم ان يستمر فى
 سببه الى الامام حتى يصير معادلا ان لم يكن اقوى من اى سلاح آخر .

وتفضلوا معاليمكم بقبول فائق الاحترام

فائد اسطول جوى

م. م. م.

مدير سلاح الطيران الملكى

١٠ - ٢٥
 ١٥٩٨

٤١
(١٧) ملحق

Telephone No ---BUTAN 8466
Telegraphic Address ---UKRANUIA, CAIRO

Any communication on the subject of
this letter should be addressed to :-

HEADQUARTERS,
ROYAL AIR FORCE,
MIDDLE EAST,
CAIRO.

MOST SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS,
ROYAL AIR FORCE,
MIDDLE EAST,
CAIRO.

and the following reference quoted :-

2nd November, 1930.

S.21196.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to refer Your Excellency to the Combined Plan for the Defence of Egypt which was agreed to by His Excellency the Prime Minister early this year, and wherein are set out certain defence measures for consideration of the Egyptian Government, details of which it was agreed should be arranged in consultation between the Egyptian authorities concerned and the British Military and Air Force authorities.

2. It is understood that, in pursuance of this arrangement, the G.O.C.-in-C, British Troops in Egypt, and his Staff Officers have already had several consultations with you and your Staff with the object of co-ordinating details of defence action to be taken by the Egyptian and British Army, and I now desire, subject to Your Excellency's concurrence, to discuss certain outstanding points relative to action by the Royal Air Force.


3. If Your Excellency, therefore, has no objection to this proposal, I would in the first place propose to get in touch with the Director of the Royal Egyptian Air Force to discuss the question of the role of the Royal Egyptian Air Force in defence, in order to co-ordinate its proposed action with that of the Royal Air Force.

4. Further points detailed in the Combined Plan and which I should also wish to discuss with the Director are :-

- (a) The completion and co-ordination of the air raid warning system.
- (b) The institution of Prohibited Areas.
- (c) Measures for the control of civil aviation.

5. An additional and rather urgent matter, which has arisen out of the recent emergency, is the question of military aerodromes in the Western Desert. This also calls for some discussion in order to co-ordinate our requirements with those of the Royal Egyptian Air Force, and I am addressing a separate letter to you on this subject.

I have the honour to be,
Your Excellency's obedient Servant.



Air Vice-Marshal,
Commanding Royal Air Force,
Middle East.

His Excellency,
The Minister of War & Marine,
CAIRO.

طحق (١٧)

N^o 9-1/2

Cairo,

7th November, 1938.

SECRET

The Air Vice-Marshal,
Commanding Royal Air Force,
Middle East,
Cairo.

Reference your letter No.S.21196 dated 2nd November, 1938, I have no objection to your proposal to discuss any outstanding points with the Director of the Royal Egyptian Air Force relative to the Combined Plan for the Defence of Egypt.

Yours Sincerely,

Sgd. H. Salim
MINISTER FOR WAR AND NAVAL.

Copy to :- Director, Royal Egyptian Air Force,
for information, please.

(1A) ملحق

DO/S.21196/11.

SECRET.

Headquarters,
Royal Air Force,
Middle East.

CAIRO. 28th January, 1939.

Dear Hussein Sirri Pasha.

You will remember that in the course of our conversation this morning I informed you that I wished to send, for your approval, a record of a recent discussion I have had with the Director of the Royal Egyptian Air Force at which we agreed on certain details of the defence plans in which we are jointly concerned.

2. I record below the several points discussed, and this record has been agreed by the Director.

3. War Role of the R.E.A.F. Army Co-operation Squadron.

(a) It was agreed that one Flight of this Squadron would, in war, be employed on duties in connection with the defence of the Suez Canal, and that its main role would be reconnaissance of the Gulf of Suez and Northern part of the Red Sea.

It was agreed that Suez would be the most suitable base for the Flight, and that the Director, R.E.A.F., would arrange for the accommodation of the Unit at Suez and for communications between the Unit's base and the Headquarters of the Officer Commanding, Canal Defence Forces.

*What arrangements
have been made at
Suez. Consider
the matter as urgent*

The advantage of having this unit located at Suez rather than at Ismailia is that it shortens the length of operational flight required for reconnaissance in the Gulf of Suez and, moreover, the presence of Lysander aircraft there would act as a partial deterrent to enemy air attack on Suez in that this modern type aircraft possesses characteristics which qualify it to undertake work of defensive air fighting.

In the event of an emergency arising before arrangements at Suez have been completed, the Flight will be based at Ismailia as was done in the case of the Squadron in the recent emergency.

(b) It was agreed that the second Flight of the R.E.A.F. Army Co-operation Squadron should be employed in reconnaissance and bombing duties in the Western Desert in the Bahariya area. The primary role of the Flight would be to locate enemy movements from the frontier.

The Director of the Royal Egyptian Air Force undertook to ensure that the aerodrome at Bahariya was kept in readiness for occupation by this Unit, and that the necessary supplies of fuel, bombs, etc. were maintained there. It is to be understood,

His Excellency,
Hussein Sirri Pasha,
The Minister of Defence,
Cairo.

however, that the Unit will not actually move to Bahariya until the protection of this place against land attack has been ensured by the Army.

If protection against land attack cannot be guaranteed, it is proposed that the Unit should remain based at Almaza, but should make use of Bahariya as an advanced operational landing ground for refuelling, etc.

4. War Role of the R.E.A.F. Fighter Squadrons.

It was agreed to be desirable that the Fighter Squadrons of the Royal Egyptian Air Force should be allocated in the first place to the "home defence" of Cairo and Alexandria areas, and that No. 1 (Fighter) Squadron, when formed, should be allocated to the defence of Cairo.

It was also agreed that this Squadron should in war be located at Helwan, which will be the peace time station of the Royal Air Force Fighter Squadron which, in war, moves to the Western Desert. (One Fighter Squadron of the Royal Air Force will also be located at Amiriya for the defence of Alexandria and the Fleet Base).

It was also agreed that the operational control of all Fighter Squadrons employed on "home defence" should, in war, be under one command, and that this Commander should be stationed at the 'Air Raid Report Centre' now being established at Dekheila Aerodrome. Until the time when sufficient Egyptian Fighter Squadrons are available to take over this duty it is proposed that a British Air Force officer should, in war, direct the operations of all the Fighter Squadrons employed in "home defence", and that with him should be an Egyptian Air Force officer who would issue the required orders to the Egyptian Fighter Squadron.

With regard to the Air Raid reporting system and Report Centre which is at present being organised, it is proposed to hold in the near future an Exercise in the Alexandria area in which the Royal Egyptian Air Force and the Royal Air Force Fighter Squadrons will co-operate from their War Stations.

The formation of the second Royal Egyptian Air Force Fighter Squadron was discussed, and it was agreed that it would be an advantage if this could be expedited, as it is considered that the presence of R.E.A.F. Fighter aircraft operating in the defence of Cairo and Alexandria would have a most beneficial moral effect on the population, in addition to their material effect as a deterrent to enemy air attacks on these important centres. It was therefore agreed that the provision of further Fighter Units for the Royal Egyptian Air Force should be given priority over the provision of Bomber or other type Units.

5. War Role of the R.E.A.F. Bomber Squadron.

It was agreed that until such time as the second Fighter Squadron of the R.E.A.F. has been formed and is available to take its place in the defences of Alexandria, the flight of Panther Audax Bomber aircraft should, in war, remain at Dekheila to act in the first

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تابع ملحق (18)

Page 3.

place as a reserve for short distance reconnaissance or offensive action against enemy forces in the Western Desert.

6. Preparation of Operational Landing Grounds in the Western Desert.

*The Director
R.E. A.F. should
keep me informed
of both*

It was agreed that the Director of the Royal Egyptian Air Force should keep me informed of the progress made in this important work of preparing operational landing grounds in the Western Desert, and that I should keep him informed of the requirements of these aerodromes for operations.

7. Corridors and Prohibited Areas.

The necessity for providing corridors of approach to defended areas for Egyptian and British aircraft and for laying down prohibited areas was discussed, and it was agreed that details of the arrangements proposed should be supplied to the Director of the Royal Egyptian Air Force by me, but that, in order to ensure secrecy, they will not be issued down to Units of either service until the time arrives when it becomes necessary to put them into force.

8. Employment of Mizr Airways in War.

*تقدير زائد
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It was agreed that in the event of war, it would be of great value if Mizr Airways could be taken over completely by the Director, Royal Egyptian Air Force, and the personnel and aircraft employed for the operation of a transport service for the evacuation of casualties or other work. If this scheme is approved, it is proposed that the Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, shall approach the Air Ministry for approval for British personnel employed with Mizr Airways to continue to operate with them in war.

9. Air Mail Reporting System.

With regard to the Air Mail Reporting System, the Director, Royal Egyptian Air Force is at present engaged in organising a Report Centre at Dekheila. This scheme, as at present organised, will only partially meet all requirements for obtaining reports on movements of enemy aircraft about to attack, and warning military units and civil population, and the Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force is at present engaged, in collaboration with the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, in drawing up a comprehensive scheme for Air Mail Reports and warnings which it is hoped will be communicated to Your Excellency for approval in the near future.

10. I shall be grateful if Your Excellency will approve in principle the foregoing arrangements which have been agreed with the Director, Royal Egyptian Air Force, with regard to the role of the R.E.A.F. in war and the other subjects mentioned, and if you would approve the continuance of the system of direct communication and discussion of details between the Director and myself.

*Right I approve in principle
and approve B*

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H.A. Nicholl*

ملحق (١٩)

٤٥. 2-1/8.

Cairo,

¹²
19th February, 1939.

SECRET.

Dear Vice Marshal Nicholl,

Reference your letter No. DO/S.21196/14 dated 28th January, 1939 for which I thank you very much.

I approve in principle the arrangements which have been agreed with the Director, R.E.A.F., with regard to the role of R.E.A.F., in war and the other subjects mentioned in your letter.

I also approve the continuance of the system of direct communication and discussion of details between you and the Director, R.E.A.F.

Yours

A. H. Seung

MINISTER FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE.

Air Vice-Marshal,
H.R. Nicholl, C.B., C.B.E.,
Air Officer Commanding,
Royal Air Force,
Middle East.

طحق (٢٠)

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11/6/4.

SECRET.

HALF YEARLY REPORT NO. 8 ON THE ROYAL EGYPTIAN
AIR FORCE BY THE SENIOR ADVISER ON THE
BRITISH MILITARY MISSION - PERIOD 1st APRIL
to 31st OCTOBER, 1940.

1. GENERAL.

As mentioned in the last report, the R.E.A.F. Squadrons, after being for two months at war stations, returned to their peace stations in November to facilitate training. At that time units were handicapped by the large percentage of their personnel being inexperienced. Since then, however, it has been possible to avoid any substantial change in personnel and operational training has been able to go ahead on the whole satisfactorily, so that at the outbreak of war between the Allies and Italy in June, 1940, the squadrons were in a much better condition to take an active part in hostilities. Since then advantage has been taken of the of intensive operations, in as far as the R.E.A.F. is concerned, to proceed with training as quickly as possible. It can fairly be stated that by the end of the period under review squadrons were within measurable distance of the highest standard likely to be maintained.

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H(1)
absence

2. ORGANIZATION.

It was hoped that, when Italy joined in the war, the R.E.A.F. would be placed under the command of the A.O.C.-in-C., Middle East, and cooperate with the R.A.F. Egypt, however, remained neutral, and political considerations have circumscribed R.E.A.F. operational activities. Briefly, the effect has been that -
(a) The R.E.A.F. have not been placed under the orders of the A.O.C.-in-C, except that the fighters take their patrol orders from the R.A.F. fighter commander.
(b) Squadrons are not allowed to work from aerodromes or landing grounds occupied by the R.A.F.
(c) The A.C. squadron may operate in the Western Desert in support of the Egyptian Mobile Brigade, provided no control is exercised by the British Command. The Government, however refused to permit any fighters to operate in the Western Desert, even in support of their A.C. Squadron. This was presumably to minimise the chances of air combat near the Anglo-Italian war front.
(d) The Egyptian Government agreed to one squadron of fighters being located at Almbaza for the defence of Cairo, and the other at Suez, but refused to employ fighters in the defence of Alexandria, although their A.A. batteries form part of the ground defence.
(e) In contrast with this, however, much valuable patrol work has been done by Ansons in the Gulf of Suoz, and by Ansons in escorting shipping convoys at the Northern end of the Red Sea in cooperation with the Royal Navy. Two of the three Ansons have recently been crashed, rendering further cooperation impossible, unless replacements can be obtained.

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This inconsistency in the Government's policy is apparently due to the fact that the Director of the R.E.A.F., Air Vice-Marshal Hassan Abdel Wahab Pasha, who has, personally, afforded the R.A.F. as much help as he was able, deliberately omitted to inform his Ministry as to the nature of the duties being carried out by the Ansons.

3. PERSONNEL.

Hassan Abdel Wahab Pasha has recently left the R.E.A.F. for another appointment, since he felt that he could not cooperate with the Army's new Chief of Staff, a man considerably junior to Wahab Pasha, who himself had designs on that appointment.

He is..

VYA

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2.

He is a very able and energetic man and, although a martinet in many respects, and unpopular for that reason, undoubtedly helped to raise the efficiency of the R.E.A.F., particularly as regards operational training.

The new Director, Lewa Ali Msaifi Pasha, took over during the last week in October. He is a man with considerable experience in the Army, but with none in the R.E.A.F. He has the reputation of being very willing to cooperate with the British and has created a favourable impression during the short time he has been Director. There may, however, be a considerable reaction among the senior R.E.A.F. officers who were allowed to display little initiative and authority under their late Chief. The result will probably be more growing pains.

4. EQUIPMENT.

The war has had the effect of seriously delaying the despatch of the initial spares and equipment for Gladiators, Lysanders and Ansons, which are recent types in the R.E.A.F. Maintenance of these types has therefore been extremely difficult in spite of help from local R.A.F. resources. The position appears to be improving as considerable consignments have been shipped, and should be received within the next few weeks.

5. EXPANSION.

After many delays in the delivery of Bloemhofs to equip a new squadron as part of the new expansion scheme, Air Ministry finally decided that these aircraft would definitely not be available. The failure to form this, or any other squadrons in accordance with the expansion scheme, has had the effect of creating a serious surplus of pilots, since the intake of the F.T.S. was based on expansion. This matter is now under consideration together with the problem of new equipment during the coming year.

6. MAINTENANCE.

Just prior to the outbreak of war with Italy, the contract had been let for the new equipment and maintenance depot. Shortage of building material and money has, however, caused the whole scheme to be shelved. In the meanwhile two Colman hangars have been erected at Almaza and are being used to implement the existing workshop facilities. Owing to lack of spares the number of aircraft awaiting overhaul and repair has been steadily growing.

7. AERODROMES.

Dikhella aerodrome, Alexandria, has been vacated by the R.E.A.F. and handed over to the Fleet Air Arm. The fighter squadron from Dikhella has taken over a landing ground at Suez and the remaining units moved to Almaza.

8. ELEMENTARY TRAINING SQUADRON.

In order to minimise congestion and permit dispersal of aircraft at Almaza, the Magisters of the Elementary Training Squadron have been moved to Khanka landing ground. This is sufficiently close for the pupils to live and do ground instruction at Almaza.

9. FLYING ACCIDENTS.

There have been seven serious flying accidents. This shows a marked increase over previous periods. The cause, in each case was an error of judgment, usually coupled with careless flying, while at least two cases were due to low flying against orders. An Anson was crashed, killing all five of the crew, through the pilot trying to land on the aerodrome in fog, although Khanka landing ground less than five miles away was perfectly clear.

The British Mission officers are doing all in their power to obtain a tightening of flying discipline, but without any executive control, this is very difficult. The Director has promised that, in future, serious cases of flying indiscipline

will..

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will be dealt with by court-martial. It remains to be seen whether such strong action will in fact be taken.

No flying accidents have been due to faulty material or maintenance.

10. CIVIL AVIATION.

There is still no coordination between civil and military aviation, but, with the change in command of the R.E.A.F. the matter is likely to come up for reconsideration. Private flying and training has practically ceased.

Misr Airwork have reorganized their air lines to meet defence requirements. Besides a daily local service extending to Palestine, they are operating a weekly service between Egypt, Cyprus and Turkey via Palestine, and to Assiut three times a week. In all those services British and Egyptian officials and diplomatic mail have priority. All Misr pilots are doing over 100 hours a month.

In addition the company undertake special charter work on behalf of the R.A.F. and Army cooperation flying for the British and Egyptian A.A. units at Alexandria, Cairo, Port Said and Haifa. They have also carried out repairs and overhauls to R.A.F. Gladiators and Hudsons, and provide facilities in their workshops for British Overseas Airways Corporation; additional contracts have been promised if space can be found.

11. BRITISH PERSONNEL.

Two British Warrant Officers have recently been commissioned and therefore returned to R.A.F. duty - W.O. Oldland and W.O. Hore. They have been with the Egyptian Air Force since its inception, the former in charge of maintenance and the latter equipment. The present standard of efficiency in these two spheres is largely due to their outstanding capability, zeal and tact.

12. No. 1 R.C. SQUADRON - LYSANDERS.

For the greater part of this period the squadron has had two widely divergent roles, since one flight has undertaken cooperation with the British Canal Brigade including dawn and dusk shipping patrols in the Gulf of Suez, while the other flight has cooperated with the Egyptian Mobile Brigado.

On the whole the squadron is efficiently trained for the type of cooperation it is likely to be called upon to provide, but its activities have been and are still being severely handicapped by an acute lack of spares. During one period serviceability had dropped to six aircraft out of 16 I.E.

The officers are rather obviously reluctant to serve in the Western Desert, in which each flight has had one period. This is undoubtedly in no small part due to the policy of the Egyptian Government of trying to avoid any clash with the Italians in the Western Desert.

The percentage efficiency of this squadron as regards training is estimated as 70 per cent.

13. No. 3 COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON - ANSONS, PERCIVAL Q.6.s, COMMODORE, MOTH.

This squadron consists of two flights, one equipped with Ansons and the other with miscellaneous civil type aircraft.

The Anson flight, until two aircraft were destroyed in crashes, carried out valuable work patrolling the Gulf of Suez and escorting British shipping convoys. The other flight has been rather disorganized through the two Percival Q.6. aircraft being allotted for the use of H.M. The King.

14. No. 4 SQUADRON - GORDON AND LUDAX

Originally this was to have been a Dornier Squadron, but owing to the aircraft not being available the function of this squadron has been changed to drouge towing for air to air and A.A. battery practice, and to provide aircraft for instruction in air fighting and air gunnery.

The number... ٧٤.

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4.

The number of Gordons available was insufficient for air to air and ground to air towing. The problem was solved by the R.A.F. lending their towing flight for about two months to provide training for the two fighter squadrons.

Nos. 2 and 5 Fighter Squadrons - Gladiators.

15. MOVEMENTS.

At the beginning of the period covered by this report, the fighter squadrons were both stationed at Dikheila, and were beginning to settle down, No.2 Squadron after a number of changes in its personnel, and No.5 after its formation as a fighter squadron. The squadrons had begun a good training syllabus, and had arranged affiliation exercises with No.60 Squadron of the R.A.F. at Amryia. Before it was possible to carry those out, the two squadrons received orders to move to their war stations, and these moves were carried out on 19th May, No.2 Squadron to Almaza, and No.5 Squadron to Suez.

✓
Chaf 5/11

Since then the two squadrons have continued with their training at their war stations, while at the same time keeping a proportion of their aircraft at "readiness" under the control of the Fighter Sector Commander at Holwan. At various times during the period the squadrons have interchanged their flights so that all pilots could make use of the superior training facilities of the Cairo Area - air firing ranges etc.

16. OPERATIONS.

Neither squadron has as yet carried out more than routine or practice patrols. There was a raid on the Suez area but there was no opportunity for the fighters to intercept. There have been no daylight raids on the Cairo area.

✓
Chaf 5/11

17. MORALE.

The pilots seem quite ready to engage the enemy if he appears. On the other hand they have no great confidence that the performance of their Gladiators is good enough to compete with the S.79 type of Italian bomber which is expected. Morale is inclined to fluctuate with good news or bad, with flying accidents, and with the trials of Ramadan etc.

✓
Chaf 11

18. DISCIPLINE.

Discipline is moderately good, better on the whole in No.5 Squadron than in No.2. It is not likely to be better while all the flight commanders are pilot officers, and the C.O.s flight lieutenants, one of them - in No.2 - very junior. One pilot of No.5 Squadron killed himself and wrote-off his aircraft through a breach of discipline.

✓
Chaf 5/11

19. TRAINING. - AIR.

Altogether, during this period, 50 fighter pilots have been brought up to a quite useful operational standard. This involved a great deal of individual training at first, although calls for operational readiness did not allow this to be as thorough as it should have been. For the first time in the R.E.A.F. it has been possible to carry out a concentrated programme of air to air firing. This was made possible by the loan from the R.A.F. of a Towed Target Flight of Gordon aircraft; the R.E.A.F. Towed Target Flight having proved itself quite unable to deal with the quantity of work required. Pilots have also carried out all the standard operational practices of a fighter squadron: Fighter versus Bomber attacks, Fighter versus Fighter attacks, Quick take-off and interception practices; oxygen climbs, etc. With the syllabus completed, all that is needed is constant practice to improve the standard of manoeuvre and gunnery. Unfortunately it is doubtful if the R.E.A.F. Towed Target Flight will be able to deal with these gunnery practices.

✓
Chaf 5/11

In assessing the value of these squadrons it must be realised that the pilots are far from experienced, most of them having carried out only 150 hours flying on all types.

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Unit 2
✓ 20. TRAINING. - GROUND.

With some exceptions the pilots have not shown themselves willing to make the effort to acquire knowledge, or even the effort to assimilate knowledge when it is imparted to them.

Unit 3
✓ 21. SERVICEABILITY.

The serviceability of No.2 Squadron is at the moment good; only one out of the original aircraft is damaged, and that is repairable. No.5 Squadron is less well off. One aircraft is completely wrecked, and three more need major replacements which are not available. The serviceability has been subject to rapid fluctuations owing to the extremely low stock of spares held by the R.A.A.F.

Unit 4
✓ 22. PERCENTAGE OF EFFICIENCY.

No. 2 Squadron 70 per cent. No.5 Squadron 70 per cent. No.2 Squadron has the more experienced pilots, but No.5 is keener.

Unit 5
✓ 23. PERSONNEL.

Both squadrons are seriously short of good armourers. In war time this will be of grave importance. Armourers are always said to be coming but never appear. Other personnel are fairly satisfactory.

Unit 6
✓ 24. BRITISH PERSONNEL.

At Dirhella, the squadrons had their own Maintenance Supervisors, but had to share the officer adviser and the armament and signals supervisors. When the squadrons moved to different war stations it was impossible for each squadron to have the advice and supervision that was needed. This was got over to a certain extent by the attachment of an R.A.A.F. officer to Suez, and by the periodical visits of Warrant Officer supervisors. This is not really satisfactory, and results, in effect, in there being no signals supervisor at Almsa for No.2 Squadron, and no armament supervisor at Suez for No.5 Squadron.

Unit 7
✓ 25. FLYING TRAINING SCHOOL.

During the period 22 officers and 10 warrant officers completed their training and 28 officers commenced flying training.

Twelve part used Harts were received in May from the Air Ministry, but unfortunately they arrived without air cleaners, tropical radiators or large type landing wheels, and were therefore unfit for flying.

The R.A.A.F. were approached, but were unable to supply the necessary parts to modify these aircraft. An attempt is now being made to obtain the necessary materials to manufacture air cleaners. Should this be successful it should be possible to fly these aircraft during the winter months from landing grounds with a reasonably hard surface.

The Harts were intended for intermediate training, releasing the Aviax for an advanced training squadron. Their non-availability has seriously upset the training scheme and has resulted in new pilots being posted to squadrons with practically no operational training.

One of the British flying instructors has been running a flying instructors' course, and has passed out seven as instructors during the period. Two officers returned to Egypt after completing a flying instructors' course at G.F.S.

Unit 8
✓ 26. THE MECHANICS, ARMAMENTS AND WIRELESS SCHOOLS.

These schools have been functioning in a satisfactory manner.

A. H. H. H. H.
Group Captain.
Senior Air Adviser.
British Military Mission.

Cairo.
31st October, 1940.

تابع ملحق (٢٠)

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APPENDIX "A"

to Half Yearly Report No.8 on the Royal Egyptian Air Force.

1. Personnel of the Air Wing, British Military Mission.

Senior Air Advisor.

Group Captain E.P.Hackay.

Instructor, Station H.Q. Almazra.

Wing Commander C.E.N.Guest, O.D.E.

Instructor, No.1 A.C.Squadron.

Squadron Leader V.A.Pope.

Instructor, Nos. 2 and 5 (F) Squadrons.

Wing Commander P.D.Cooto.

Instructor, No.4 (E) Squadron and Towed Target Flight.

Flight Lieutenant H.D.Jones. (Terminated appointment on 30th September owing to Elonheim aircraft not being available for this squadron).

Chief Flying Instructor.

Wing Commander E.A.C.Britton, D.F.C.

Flying Instructors.

Flying Officer L.F.Humphrey, A.F.M.

Total British officers.....7.
 R.A.F., N.C.O.Flying Instructors.....8.
 R.A.F., N.C.O.Technical Instructors.....21.

 Total...36.

2. Royal Egyptian Air Force Personnel strength.

Officers(4 non-flying)including officers under training...158.
 N.C.O.Pilots, including N.C.O.s under training..... 44.
 Military(technical)other ranks(including under training)..898.
 Military(non-technical)other ranks.....590.
 Civilian employees.....928.
 Total...2619.

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APPENDIX "D"

to Half Yearly Report No.8 on the Royal Egyptian Air Force.

AIRCRAFT ON STRENGTH ON 31st OCTOBER, 1940.

1.	Avro Type 626.....	16.
	(Cheetah Mk.V)	
2.	Fairey Gordons.....	4.
	(Panther Mk.II)	
3.	D.H.Moth E.III.....	1.
4.	Hawker Audax.....	21.
	(Panther Mk. VI and X)	
5.	Miles Magister.....	37.
	(Gypsy Major)	
6.	Avro Anson 652 (Civilian).....	1.
	(Two Cheetah Mk.IX)	
7.	Westland Wessox.....	1.
	(Three Conet Major)	
8.	Avro Type 642 (Commodore).....	1.
	(Lynx Mk.IV)	
9.	Westland Lysanders.....	15.
	(Mercury XII)	
10.	Gloucester Gladiators.....	35.
	(Mercury IV and VIIIA)	
11.	Avro Anson - Military Type.....	1.
	(Two A.5 Cheetah Mk.IX)	
12.	Percival Q.6.....	2.
	(Two Gipsy VI)	
13.	Hawker Hart(unmodified for local conditions and not.....	12.
	(R.R.Kostrol) in use)	

Total.....147.

✱ IX ?

ملحق (٢١)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference: AIR 2/2768 xch 54214

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British Military Mission,
Cairo, 21st April, 1940.

23 MAY 1940

SECRET.

No. H/6/4.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith Half-yearly Report No. 7 on the Royal Egyptian Air Force, drawn up by Group Captain V.H. Tait, O.B.E., R.A.F., Senior Air Advisor on the Military Mission.

It will be noticed that this Report deals only with the five months ending on the 31st March, instead of the usual period of six months ending on the 30th April. This has been done in view of the departure of Group Captain Tait from the Mission at the end of the month, and I trust that this procedure will cause no inconvenience.

Copies of this Report have also been despatched as follows:-

- British Embassy, Cairo.....4 copies.
- War Office, London.....2 copies.
- A.O.C.-in-C., R.A.F., Middle East.....1 copy.
- G.O.C.-in-C., Middle East.....1 copy.
- G.O.C.-in-C., British Troops in Egypt.....1 copy.

2. As the Air Council are no doubt aware the financial situation in Egypt has lately become difficult and as a result the previously contemplated expansion of the fighting services has been curtailed. The present Egyptian Air Force consists of five squadrons partially or completely equipped and a Target Towing Flight. According to the long range programme approved in principle about a year ago, an eventual expansion to twelve squadrons was envisaged, but the long range expansion plans both for the Air Force and the Army were cancelled on the assumption of office of the present Government, mainly owing to financial difficulties, and the Air Force was left in its present condition with no fixed plans for the future.

3. As a result of the recent visit to the Sudan of the Prime Minister and Defence Minister, who were accompanied by an escort of nine aeroplanes, orders were given for the Egyptian Air Force to be expanded during the coming financial year to seven squadrons, and the necessary provision was included in the draft financial budget. During the last two or three weeks, however, these two extra squadrons have been eliminated from the budget for financial reasons in the same way as the strength of the Army for the coming year had to be reduced by rather over 2,000 men.

4. During the last few days the Minister of Defence has informed me that the Egyptian Government are approaching the British Government on the question of financing the purchase of armament and equipment from England by some long term arrangement and I have been asked to estimate what capital expenditure is envisaged during the next three or five years. As a result of this it has been necessary again for the Egyptian Government to decide on a long term programme, and so far as the Air Force is concerned it seems likely that the two fighter squadrons will be again inserted in the programme, making a total Air Force of seven squadrons. The necessary provision for the Aircraft Depot, landing grounds, etc., will also be made.

Otherwise any further expansion of the Air Force for a considerable number of years seems unlikely.

5. As stated in paragraph 2 of the attached Report the administration of the Egyptian Air Force has benefited considerably by the appointment of the new Director, Lema Hassan Abdul Wahab Pasha, a most energetic officer and probably a better disciplinarian than any other senior officer in the Defence Services.

Whether...

تابع طحق (٢١)

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2.

Whether he will hold his present appointment long is perhaps doubtful, as he has designs on the post of Chief of Staff of the Army which will become vacant this summer.


6. Mention is made in the attached Report (paragraph 6) of the cooperation exercises carried out by No. 1 Army Cooperation Squadron with the British Army and Navy, the Egyptian Army, the Indian Army, and the Frontiers Administration, and I should like to add that at all exercises which were attended the work of this squadron was really good.

7. In conclusion, I should like to invite attention to the excellent work done by Group Captain V.H. Tait during his period of service with the Egyptian Air Force. There is no doubt that the progress made by the Egyptian Air Force is primarily due to his energy, ability and tact. I have met few officers with the ability to remain equable in face of the constant irritations met with in this country, and there is certainly no British officer who has been more liked by the Egyptians than Group Captain Tait. It was, in fact, not without some difficulty that the Defence Ministry was persuaded to agree to his release a few months before the expiry of his contract.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,



Major-General.
Chief of the British Military Mission.

The Under-Secretary of State
The Air Ministry,
London.

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1874

BRITISH MILITARY MISSION.
CAIRO, 6th December 1940

[Handwritten signature]

SECRET.
N/6/4.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith Half-yearly Report No.8 on the Royal Egyptian Air Force, drawn up by Group Captain E.P.Mackay, R.A.F., Senior Air Adviser on the Military Mission. Copies of this report have also been despatched as follows :-

[Handwritten notes in margin: "1874", "1876"]

- British Embassy, Cairo 4 copies
- War Office, London 2 "
- G.O.C.in C., R.A.F., Middle East 1 copy
- Commander-in-Chief, Middle East 1 "
- G.O.C.in C., British Troops in Egypt 1 "

2. As will be seen from this report, it is considered that at the end of the period under review the Egyptian Air Force had attained a reasonably high standard of efficiency.

This standard cannot, however, be maintained unless adequate supplies of spare parts and also new aircraft are provided in the near future.

The most urgent requirements are spare parts for the Lysanders, and additional aircraft to make up the Anson Flight to six aircraft. Modern fighters are also needed to replace the Gladiator aircraft which are not fast enough for "home defence".

3. There is no doubt that unless the above requirements are met reasonably soon the moral and efficiency of the Egyptian Air Force will seriously decline. This would be unfortunate as the R.E.A.F. is capable of carrying out certain useful duties in connection with the defence of Egypt. These include the day air defence by fighter squadrons of Cairo and Suez, for which the R.E.A.F. is at present solely responsible, escort duties in the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea in cooperation with the Royal Navy, and the provision of towing facilities for the Royal Navy and the British Army.

4. As regards the future, it is realized that, under present circumstances, aircraft cannot be made available to permit the expansion scheme (up to 12 squadrons) to go ahead normally. In 1941, however, it is recommended that modern aircraft be forthcoming for one extra fighter squadron and to re-equip with fighters one of the existing squadrons, and that six Ansons and six towing aircraft be supplied. This would enable surplus personnel to be absorbed and permit the R.E.A.F. to continue to carry out the duties referred to in paragraph 3 above.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

[Handwritten signature: P.G. Stone]
Major-General,
CHIEF OF THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION.

The under-Secretary of State,
The Air Ministry.
London.

ملحق (٢٣)

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SECRET

HALF-YEARLY REPORT No.12 ON THE ROYAL EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE
BY THE SENIOR AIR ADVISER ON THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION
PERIOD 1st JULY, 1942 TO 31st OCTOBER, 1942.

29B.

GENERALReaction to Axis Advance into Egypt

1. Since my last half-yearly report the REAF has undergone the most severe crisis of its short history. After a purge, prescribed by the British Military Mission and administered by the Egyptian Government, it is now in a much more healthy condition than at any time since the outbreak of war.
2. During the recent retreat of the British Forces towards Alexandria, the REAF maintained a most commendable calm, and the big majority of its personnel accepted our assurances that the enemy would be brought to a halt before reaching the Nile Valley. The Director, REAF, offered to place Amaza aerodrome facilities at the disposal of the RAF in the event of an emergency, and one could feel no strain in our relations with the Egyptians.

Subversive Activity in the REAF.

3. In the second week of July, by which time the battle-front had become static at El Alamein, two REAF Pilots disappeared in Gladiator aircraft, and it soon became evident from Intelligence reports that they had landed in enemy-held territory, and with the object of imparting information. The Egyptian authorities, acting on their own initiative, promptly grounded the REAF, and requested me to supervise the removal of magnetos from all aircraft. In the previous year a retired Chief of Staff of the Army had made an unsuccessful attempt to flee the country in a REAF aircraft, manned by an Egyptian crew, whilst he was under suspicion of subversive activities. These further incidents so distressed the Egyptian Government that the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence seriously considered disbanding the REAF and transferring the personnel to the Army. A senior Staff Officer in the REAF was immediately suspended for suspected implication, following reports from the Egyptian Intelligence Section. These reports were confirmed from British sources.

Policy of the British Military Mission

4. The Mission, after consultation with the AOC-in-C, decided to oppose the extinction of the REAF, since it appeared certain that the conspiracy was limited to a few persons, and the service as a whole was deeply ashamed and bitterly resented the action of these few. It was felt that, had the REAF been disbanded, the Axis Powers would have been presented with a valuable propaganda point, and would declare that the REAF had been quashed owing to British pressure, proving how the latter were anxious regarding the activities of the armed forces of the downtrodden Egyptian Nation. Furthermore, the posting of the personnel to the Army would have a most detrimental effect on that service, since not only would they be untrained in their new work, but they would also undoubtedly consider that they had a major grievance. These points were put to the Minister of Defence with the counter-proposal that certain of the more senior officers who, on the grounds of inefficiency, or for other reasons, were a bad influence, should be removed, since it was evident that, although there was no big subversive element in the REAF, the discipline of the Service as a whole needed tightening up. This was agreed to, and the Minister further arranged to convene a strong committee consisting of carefully selected senior Egyptian Army and Air Force Officers and myself, to consider any proposals for the reorganisation of the REAF which I might consider desirable.

تابع ملحق (٢٢)

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2.

Action taken by the Egyptian Government

5. This was an opportunity I had long awaited and, except that two of the officers I was anxious to get rid of were, for political reasons, merely put on six months' probation, all my proposals were accepted by the committee and confirmed by the Government.

6. As a result

- (a) Three senior officers have been transferred to the Army and two more put on probation.
- (b) Fourteen officer pilots of various ranks and seventeen airman pilots, considered to be below standard professionally, or unreliable politically, were also transferred to the Army, being found surplus to requirements owing to shortage of aircraft.
- (c) It was agreed to introduce Acting rank when necessary, since owing to the youth of the REAF there is a big shortage of officers holding ranks above that of Flying Officer. Squadrons, Flights and Sections were therefore being commanded by officers without sufficient rank to exert their authority.
- (d) It was agreed to adopt appropriate sections of the British Air Force Law and King's Regulations and Air Council Instructions suitably modified, since, in spite of repeated protests on our part, the REAF is governed by Army Law. This is most unsuitable for enforcing discipline, particularly in flying matters, and accused persons are almost invariably acquitted by Courts Martial.
- (e) Almaza is to be reorganised on a one station basis. Since units were moved from Dekaila to Almaza, over two years ago, Almaza has consisted of two separate stations, and has even had separate workshops. This has led to great inefficiency and confusion.

Change of Director

7. The Minister of Defence also considered it advisable to make a change in Directors, on the grounds that discipline in the REAF had been shown to be lax and that although Ali Houaffi Pasha had in other respects proved himself a capable director, he must be held responsible. He was therefore transferred to an important staff job in the Army, and Lewa Hosni Taher Pasha, a reputedly strong man with pro-British leanings, was appointed Director. As in the case of all his predecessors, Taher Pasha has had no air experience, but, since no REAF officer is senior enough, the choice seems to have been sound.

Discovery of Source of Leakage of Information

8. In the meanwhile, investigations arising from the affair of the two Gladiators exposed a source of leakage of information from Egypt, involving an escaped German Officer, an Egyptian Army Officer and another officer of the REAF. It was discovered that they had been using an Egyptian Army W/T Station for passing information to the enemy. These Egyptian Officers were convicted by an Egyptian Court and sentenced to imprisonment.

Reaction of the REAF

9. Nothing but good seems to have resulted from these happenings. The recommendations of the Committee have been very well received by the REAF, and the pruning off of the less desirable element has apparently resulted in a rise in morale and feeling of confidence and security. The intervention of the British Military Mission, resulting in the reprimand of the Service, and the suggestions made to the Committee have been understood and much appreciated. I would go so far as to say that our influence is now greater than it has been for the last three years. It is difficult to foresee what will be the situation if the Government changes.

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3.

EQUIPMENT AND MAINTENANCE

Procedure for obtaining equipment

10. Within the period of this report R/LF ME have undertaken to supply from stock, so far as possible, spares and equipment required by the R/LF and to demand on UK such items as are not held. This is a great improvement on the old system, which, however, worked well enough in peace time, the R/LF submitting their demands annually to their representative in London, who then arranged for purchase and delivery.

Transfer of Equipment and Spares to the R/LF.

11. On reviewing stocks of equipment and spares I found that, owing to the postponement of the expansion scheme, many items of flight and workshop equipment and a large amount of spares (mostly A.G.S.) were surplus to requirements. These have been handed over to, and gratefully received by, the R/LF. The principle is being extended to any further stocks which were ordered from the UK and which may arrive, having been delayed in transit.

Equipment Section.

12. The organisation of this section is most unsatisfactory. The R/LF will try to service the whole of their Air Force with an organisation designed for a single small station. They have, however, agreed at least to increase the number of Equipment Officers from one to seven. The new Director has lately had charge of the Army Ordnance Services and it is hoped that he will be persuaded to accept and introduce our reorganisation scheme. There is a risk that he may try to remodel the section on Army principles, which do not adapt themselves to an Air Force.

Maintenance

13. With the exception of MT, the standard of maintenance has been satisfactory. For a period of about three months, when the R/LF were short, it was impossible to get red dope. This seriously interfered with the serviceability of aircraft, especially in the case of one of the fighter squadrons. Dope is now available, but the effects are still being felt.

Workshops.

14. There has been a steady improvement in the efficiency of the workshops. This will be enhanced by a reorganisation made possible by amalgamating the two stations at Almaza into one. At long last it has been agreed to take the overhaul of MT seriously and allot adequate workshops.

FLYING ACCIDENTS

15. The crash rate has been commendably low, except as regards Hurricanes. There have been no flying accidents involving serious injury.

BRITISH PERSONNEL

16. Group Captain J.D'A Keary, on promotion to that rank, was posted for duty with the R/LF. Wing Commander A.M. MacLachlan, R/LF, VR, filled this vacancy.

17. There has been a few changes in Warrant Officer personnel, due to commissioning.

18. It is becoming increasingly difficult, as regards both Officers and Warrant Officers, to find men old enough and with sufficient R/LF experience, for attachment to the Mission. R/LF ME are most sympathetic and helpful, but, as a general rule, the right type of man is simply not available.

تابع ملحق (٢٢)

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EFFICIENCY OF SQUADRONSNo. 1 O.C. Squadron - Lysanders

19. The squadron has a monthly average of 100 hours for the last 6 months, many hours flying have been carried out on Camera Gun practices and formation flying; apart from this very little training has been done.

20. The average serviceability has been nine aircraft out of thirteen. The serviceability is considered good since the squadron has experienced a certain amount of trouble with tail wheels, owing to a shortage of bearings. Spare tail wheels have been obtained from the R/F which, though of a different type, can be adapted to suit the Lysander. Fabric deterioration has also been experienced, but is being overcome by changing some main planes and repairing others. The O.C. takes a considerable interest in the functioning of the Squadron and all officers are keen to fly as much as possible. A certain amount of disorganisation has taken place through mechanics being away till ten o'clock in the morning on sports and this is considered serious if flying hours are to be maintained and maintenance work carried out in a reasonable time.

No. 3 Communication Squadron - Q6, Anson and Moth.

21. The squadron has averaged 40 hours flying time per month. Flying has consisted mostly of local practice and test flights. The serviceability has been approximately five out of seven aircraft.

22. A certain amount of trouble has been experienced on Q6 aircraft owing to high oil temperatures but this has been overcome by fitting oil coolers. Details of this installation have been submitted to the makers at their request. Difficulty has been experienced in repairing Anson aircraft owing to a shortage of plywood; repairs, however, have been effected and now both Ansons are serviceable.

No. 4 Squadron - Audax, Hert

23. Flying in the squadron has mostly consisted of practice flights. Flying in the squadron has averaged approximately 80 hours per month. Serviceability is very low, being approximately 6 out of 12 aircraft. Reasons for this are maintenance difficulties and the time taken on major inspections. A certain amount of fabric deterioration has taken place through aircraft being dispersed and a few aircraft are awaiting fabric renewal. It is hoped to concentrate on the necessary fabric work to be done in this squadron after the requirements of the fighter squadrons have been met.

FIGHTER SQUADRONSNo. 2 Squadron - Gladiators

24. The aircraft of this squadron, after living in the open air for over two years, have been all completely unserviceable for the past two months, due to the total re-covering and re-doping needed as a result of the extremely bad state of the fabric. Red dope has been impossible to obtain from the R/F in quantity, owing to extreme shortage. This also applies to "thinners". The only flying carried out by the squadron has been of a "refresher" nature in Magister aircraft.

25. The pilots of this squadron are keen and show plenty of enthusiasm for fresh knowledge. The C.O. seems a good officer and is certainly a good disciplinarian.

No. 5 Squadron - Gladiators

26. This squadron, whose aircraft are newer than those in No. 2 squadron, has not suffered much through fabric trouble. Maintenance has been good and the personnel are keen, due in no small measure to having an efficient squadron commander.

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5.

No. 17 Squadron - Hurricanes

27. This squadron, which should really be termed the Hurricane Flight, as it has only had seven aircraft, leaves much to be desired in serviceability, keenness for training and discipline, both on the ground and in the air. The lack of serviceability is due, and due only, to the fact that the aircraft are flogged as hard as they possibly can be, whenever they are serviceable. This does not enable the ground staff to carry out their maintenance as they would like, the result being an atmosphere of uninterest in the squadron, which is quite understandable. Training memoranda have been passed to the squadron and lectures have been given, yet operational training has been virtually at a standstill for some time.

28. The pilots of the squadron are, on the whole, senior to those of the other two fighter squadrons. The resulting air of superiority adopted is extremely noticeable.

29. Several accidents have taken place, two aircraft being badly damaged, as opposed to a clean record in the two Gladiator squadrons.

30. At my suggestion, there is to be a new squadron commander. This may result in more effort being made to become operationally efficient on modern aircraft.

FLYING TRAINING SCHOOL

31. During the last few months, only a small amount of flying training has been carried out. It can be classified as follows:-

- (a) Two pupils from the Higher School of Engineering (now Engineer Officers in the REAF) have completed 10 hours solo on Magisters
- (b) Five pupils have been on a refresher course, the syllabus being based on previous refresher courses.
- (c) Five or six recently graduated pilots are kept in flying practice until some vacancies occur in the squadrons.

Magisters, Avro 626's and Panther Luda in the P.T.S. are loaned to squadron pilots who need flying practice.

W/T SCHOOL

32. The following training has been carried out, or is in progress at the present time:-

- (a) Ten 'ab initio' W/T mechanics are due to pass out Aug 1943.
- (b) A refresher course is being given to 6 W/T Warrant Officers (5 are due for up-grading).
- (c) Three officers are doing an 'ab initio' Short Signals Course.

The standard syllabus is adhered to for all these courses.

There has been a great shortage of dry batteries in the REAF, but it is hoped that supplies will be forthcoming shortly from the RAF.

CIVIL AVIATION

33. The whole of the Egyptian Civil Aviation Department's efforts are now concentrated on maintaining, or supplying, the air communication services and ground organisation required by the RAF for the prosecution of the war. The normal peace-time activity for the encouragement of private flying and civil aviation is practically at a standstill.

تابع ملحق (٢٢)

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34. With regard to such contribution as can be made by Egyptian civil aviation to the Allied war effort, two important factors are becoming increasingly apparent. Firstly, in order to make full use of local resources it is essential that there should be some agreed plan with the British Government to ensure that, under war conditions, Egyptian aviation can be supplied with the replacements, spares and materials needed to maintain aircraft, aerodromes, radio stations and similar facilities in a serviceable condition.

35. Secondly, it is abundantly clear that the military demand for the use of civil aircraft in Egypt, which includes Army Co-operation flying, special charters, additional feeder line services to adjacent countries and similar facilities, far exceeds anything that can be undertaken by the Egyptian national air operating company without British support. These requirements are further evidence of the need for co-operation between British and Egyptian aviation interests such as was envisaged in the "Egyptian Airways" scheme.

36. Misr Airwork S.A.E., which is now the only air operating company providing feeder line connections between Cairo and nearby countries in the Middle East, is flying with full loads on every service. Each aircraft in the Company's fleet, which consists of 4 D.H.89 and 4 D.H.86 aircraft, operates on an average 120 hours a month which, after allowance for the C.of A. overhaul periods, amounts to a total mileage in the region of 900,000 miles a year. The following is the present schedule of regular services:-

Internal Air Routes

Cairo/Alexandria ✓
Cairo/Minia/Lasut ✓

Three services a day
Two services a week.

External Air Routes

Cairo/Port Said/Lyddā
Cairo/Port Said/Lyddā/Beirut
Cairo/Port Said/Lyddā/Beirut/Cyprus

One service a day.
Four services a week
One service a week.

37. Owing to the difficulty of obtaining spare parts and replacements for the now obsolete D.H.86 and D.H.89 types of aircraft, coupled with the fact that it was intended to re-equip the Misr Airwork fleet in 1939, the company is pressing its claims for the purchase of new and more modern equipment. They would prefer to re-equip with aircraft of De Havilland design and construction, but, since there appears to be little prospect of obtaining aircraft from British sources, there is growing sympathy towards suggestions of endeavouring to obtain American aircraft.

Cairo,
14 December, 1942.

E. Phaskey,
Group Captain,
Senior Air Advisor,
British Military Mission.

تابع ملحق (٢٢)

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APPENDIX "A"

1. PERSONNEL OF THE AIR WING, BRITISH MILITARY MISSION.

Senior Air Advisor

Group Captain E.P. Mackay

Advisor on Operations and Staff Matters

Wing Commander L.H. MacLachlan

Fighter Advisor

Squadron Leader F.H. O'Neill

Air Training Advisor

Flight Lieutenant L.P. Humphrey, A.F.M.

Engineer Advisor

Flying Officer J.R. Mitchell

Total British Officers	5
R.A.F. NCO Flying Instructors	-
R.A.F. NCO Technical Instructors	10
TOTAL	23

	23

2. ROYAL EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL STRENGTH

Officers, including those under training	121
NCO Pilots, including those under training	17
Military - Technical Other Ranks	813
- Driver Mechanics	68
- Non-technical Other Ranks	810
Civilian Employees	136
Civilian Mechanics	789
TOTAL	2712

	2712

with

تابع ملحق (٢٢)

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APPENDIX "B"

STRENGTH OF AIRCRAFT OF R.E.A.F. ON 31 OCTOBER, 1942.

	Serviceable	Unserviceable	TOTAL
1. Avro Type 626 (Cheetah Mk V)	9	7	16
2. Fairey Gordons (Panther Mk II)	0	0	0
3. D.H. Moth E.III	1	0	1
4. Hawker Audax (Panther Mk VI and X)	6	9	15
5. Miles Magister (Gypsy Major)	16	18	34
6. Avro Anson 652 (Civilian) (Two Cheetah Mk IX)	1	0	1
7. Westland Wessex (Throc Gonot Major)	0	0	0
8. Avro Type 642 (Commodore) (Lynx Mk IV)	0	1	1
9. Westland Lysanders (Mercury XII)	7	7	14
10. Gloucester Gladiators (Mercury IV and VIIIa)	4	26	30
11. Avro Anson - Military Type (Two A.5 Cheetah Mk IX)	1	0	1
12. Percival Q.6 (Two Gypsy VI)	1	1	2
13. Hawker Hart (R.H. Kestrel)	1	11	12
14. Hurricane I	0	6	6
TOTAL	47	86	133

وَعَزَائِرَةُ الدِّفَاعِ الوَطَنِى

رئاسة هيئة أركان حرب الجيش

راج / حـ / ٢ (٦٦٦)

التاريخ ١٧ مارس سنة ١٩٤٥

طلحق (٢٤)

الموضوع - زيادة الجيوش واعادة تنظيمه وتسليحه على
أثر إعلان حالة الحرب مع دولتي المحور

مصرى

حضرة صاحب المعالي وزير الدفاع الوطنى

بالإشارة الى كتاب معاليكم رقم ١٣ / ١ / ١ / ٢٥٠ بتاريخ ١٨ مارس الحالى
أنشرف بأن أرفع لعاليتكم مع هذا مشروعا يتضمن اقتراحانى بحدود زيادة الجيوش
واعادة تنظيمه وتسليحه ١٠٠٠ سوف تلاحظون معاليكم من الاطلاع على المشروع
أننى اقترحت تنفيذ في مدى خمس سنوات مراعى في ذلك عدم ارهاق مالية الحكومة
ومقدرة الدولة الحليفة على امدادنا بما يلزم لهذا المشروع من المهمات والأسلحة
وخلانسه . فاذا ماتراعى لعاليتكم أن الحكومة المصرية على استعداد لـ
مبالغ أكثر مما قدر وأن الدولة الحليفة على استعداد لامدادنا بالمهمات والأسلحة
اللازمة في مدى أقصر فيمكننى حينئذ أن أقصر مدى المشروع تبعاً لذلك .

وعلى كل حال فالأمر يتطلب وضع برنامج ثابت لزيادة الجيوش وتنظيمه وتسليحه
سواء على مدى خمس سنوات أو أقل من تلك المدة . وأنا طبعاً أرجو أن تنفضلوا برفع
هذا المشروع لمجلس الدفاع الأعلى حتى اذا ما أتموا بوضع التفصيلات اللازمة
له نوطنة لعرضه على مجلس الوزراء .

وتفضلوا معاليكم بقبول وانسبر الاحترام،،

الخبر
وزير الدفاع
الجنرال محمد مصطفى

مكتب وزير الدفاع الوطنى

وارجو ان يرد ١٤٠٠ د.

تاريخ ١٧ / ٣ / ١٩٤٥ ساعة ١٠.٤٠

المقدمة

تطورات زيادة الجيش

• عندما بدأت الحكومة المصرية في تنفيذ معاهدة الصداقة مع الحكومة البريطانية بادرت بطلب بعثة عسكرية بريطانية لاعداد وتنظيم الجيش على أساس الجب وشرا لخدمة ولهكون مطابقا للنظم الموجودة في الجيش البريطاني وللمحل محل القوات البريطانية للدفاع عن البلاد ورجال السويس.

تقدمت البعثة بمشروع لتوسيع وزيادة الجيش واقترحت تنفيذ في مدة خمس سنوات ونظرا للالتزامات الدولة العالمة رأأت الحكومة وقتذاك جعل هذا المشروع على سبع سنوات بدلا من خمس.

وعندما بدى في تنفيذ هذا المشروع نشبت الحرب العالمية الحالية فرأت الهيئات العسكرية ضرورة التعجيل بأشياء قوات لمقاومة التهديد الجوى والدفاع عن مرفق البلاد الحيوية ومن ضمنها " قناة السويس " • وسعى مشروع (سنة ١٩٤٠ ح.ا.) وكان المفروض وقتئذ أن يستمر العمل في تنفيذ مشروع السبع سنوات ولكن نظرا لانقطاع المواصلات وكثرة التزامات الحكومة البريطانية لم تتمكن من امداد الجيش المصرى بالمعدات والأدوات التي كانت مقررة • ويقس الحال على مشروع سنة ١٩٤٠ الى وقتنا هذا •

ويؤسفنى أن أقرر أن حالة الجيش لم تتغير كثيرا عما كانت عليه قبل سنة ١٩٣٧ فحجمه وتنظيمه وتسليحه وكفائه لازالت في مستوى أقل بكثير فيما اذا قورن بالجهد — وشر الأخرى المدرية.

وقبل أن أبدأ بتقديم مشروى هذا أورد أن أرجه النظر الى الحقائق الآتية • —

١ — قد دلت التجارب في هذه الحرب أنه مامن دولة (صغيرة أو كبيرة) يمكنها أن تعتمد على قواتها العسكرية بمفردها أو مواردها الانشاعية أو الطبيعية عند مهاجمتها ولتة أخرى مماثلة لها بدون أن يكون لها حليف أو حلفاء • فمثلا انجلترا لم يمكنها مقارومة القوات الألمانية بدون مساعدة أمريكا وروسيا لها وكذلك أمريكا فقد طلبت معارضة انكلترا للهجوم على اليابان •

٢ — لذا فقد لجأت الدول الصغيرة الى اعداد قوة عسكرية صغيرة للدفاع عن نفسها الى أن يمكن لحليفها أو حلفائها أن تتدخل وتمد يد المساعدة لها •

٣ — وقد ثبت أيضا أنه في الامكان تقديم القوة اللازمة للمحافظة على أمن دولة ما في الوقت الحاضر أو المستقبل القريب ولكن في الوقت نفسه لا يمكن القول أى القوات تلزم لحماية نفريهه الدولة في المستقبل البعيد لأن عدد هذه القوات يتوقف على قوة خصوصها وحلفائها ومدى التزامات وتوزيع قواتها في ذاك الوقت كما يتوقف على مدى تطوور الأسلحة والاختراعات •

(٢)

تابع ملحق (٢٤)

تقديم الموقف

١ - الفيرين

هو دراسة العوامل التي تؤثر على الدفاع عن القطر ومدى زيادة الجبهتين
نمما لذلك *

٢ - العوامل السياسية الخارجية*

أ - ما من شك أنه لمصر أرى روح عدائية لأي بلد ما كما أنها لاتطعم نفس
زيادة ممتلكاتها وكل ما ينبغي هو حماية استقلالها وسلامة أراضيها *

ب - ومصر كدولة من دول البحر الأبيض المتوسط لا يسمها إلا أن تنظر بعين
الاطمئنان في وقتنا هذا إلى الدول المجاورة لها نتيجة لانتصار الحلفاء
فالأخطار التي ستعرض لها مصر بعد الحرب من البر والبحر أقل بكثير
ما كانت عليه سنة ١٩٣٩ حيث كانت إبطالها عدوا قويا خطيرا ولكنها لن
تكون في حالة تسمح لها بالتهديد *

وقد نتج من هذه الحرب أيضا تقدم كبير في القوات الجوية وفي السدي
الذي يمكن استخدامها فيه ونتيجة لذلك أن الدول البعيدة جدا عن
مصر أصبح في مقدورها سهاجتها جوبا * ومن هذه الناحية يكون الخطر
على مصر أكبر مما كان عليه سنة ١٩٣٩ وبجانب أن تكون هذه المسألة محل
اعتبار وتقدير عند تقرير القوات اللازمة للدفاع عن القطر *

ج - وعلاوة على ما ذكر في الفقرة " ب " فقد تبين أنه لا يمكن الجزم بأن حالة
الاستقرار العالمي تدوم * وقد أصبح قريبا إحدى دول البحر الأبيض
من القوة بحيث تهدد سلامة مصر واستقلالها *

د - ونتيجة للمؤتمرات الدولية القائمة الآن سوف تطالب مصر باشتراك
جبهتها في المحافظة على الأمن الدولي كما أنه قد يتبع
الاختيار على هذا القطر بالنسبة لموقفه الاستراتيجي أن يقوم بالالتزام
الدولية القريبة له في الشرق الأوسط *

ولكل ما ذكر بعاليه أرى أنه من الضروري أن يكون لمصر جيش
يقوم بالدفاع عن استقلالها وبالأعباء التي تطالب بها *

تابع ملحق (٢٤)

٣ - فيروض واجبسية - ٣ -

ولكى يكون نقديرى نى احتجاجات مصر الى القوات العسكرية على أساس سليم رأيت
أن أعتبر أن الفروض المبنية بعد مسلم بصحتها ولاخلاق نى شأنها *

أ - أن التحالف بين مصر وبريطانيا قائم

ب - أن القوات المصرية هى المسئولة بمفردها عن سلامة الدولة ومن ضمنها قناة السويس

ج - حسن التفاهم بين الدول العربية

د - أن الحرب الحالية ستنتهى بانتصار الدول المتحالفة

هـ - أنه نى قدرة الميزانية المصرية مضاعفة مصروفاتها لاستكمال تسليح قواتها العسكرية

٤ - طريق الهجوم التى تهدد القطر المصري

أ - الهجوم الجوى

تبين من هذه الحرب أن مثل هذا الهجوم يكون الفرضية التأثير على الروح
المعنوية للمدنيين وتدمير المنشآت التى لها أهمية عسكرية وحيوية *
ففى مصر أكر الاغراض عرضة لهذا الهجوم حسب ترتيب أهميتها هى كالاتى *

١ - الموانى وأحواض السفن

٢ - مرافق القاهرة والاسكندرية

٣ - المطارات والمنشآت العسكرية

٤ - معمل تكرير البترول بالسويس

٥ - الكبارى الرئيسية بالدلتا

٦ - قناطر محمد على *

ولكى يمكن لقواتنا المدافعة عن هذه الاغراض يجب أن يكون لنا قوة كافية
من الطائرات المقاتلة وقوة من الاسلحة المضادة للطائرات والأنوار الكاشفة
وقد ثبت من هذه الحرب أن ذلك يحتل وجود القوات الآتية *

عدد من الاصراب المقاتلة

٣ لواء ثقيل مضاد للطائرات

٣ لواء خفيف مضاد للطائرات

٣ لواء أنوار كاشفة

ب- الهجوم البحري على الموانئ المصرية

يستلزم الأمر للدفاع عن اسكندرية ومرسى مطروح والسويس وبورسعيد انكشاف الجنرال بارون وجود الآتى بعد :-

٦ بطاريات للدفاع الساحلى	باسكندرية
بطارية	بمرسى مطروح
"	ببورسعيد
"	بالسويس
"	ببورسعيد

ج - انزال قوات على الشواطئ المصرية

لبحر من المستبعد أن يكون غزو القطر المصري عن طريق انزال قوات كبيرة على الشواطئ المصرية وللمقابلة هذا الاحتمال (فضلا عن المساعدة البحرية المنتظرة من انكلترا) يستلزم الأمر وقت السلم تنظيم وتسليح وتدريب قوات مصالحة خفر السواحل والحدود على أسس وأنظمة الجيش وأن تكون هاتين المصالحتين على اتصال دائم برئاسة الجيوش لتوحيد التعليم والتدريب بهما كي يمكنها اعطاء انذارا مبكرا ومقاومة الغزو الى أن تصل قوات الجيوش. وفي الوقت نفسه يجب استكشاف الشواطئ الصالحة لمثل هذا الهجوم لكي تجهز بالواجب المسلحة.

د - هجوم بقوات كبيرة محملة بالطائرات

نتيجة لتحسين الطيران أمكن نقل قوات كاملة بمعدات ثقيلة الى مدى بعيد بواسطة الطائرات كما حصل في غزو أوروبا وفي هجوم الحلفاء على هولندا لتحريرها وللمقابلة هذا الاحتمال يستلزم الأمر وجود فرقة مدرعة.

هـ - الهجوم البرى

سبق أن بينت احتمال هجوم برى من احدى الدول المجاورة ولو أنه ليس في مقدورى الآن تحديد الجهة التى سبق منها وعلاوة على ذلك فان التزامات مصر المنتظرة للمحافظة على الأمن الدولى تستلزم وجود القوات الآتية :-

فرقة مدرعة

فرقة مشاة

و - تخريب المرافق الجوية بالقذير

مصر بحكم موقعها في حوض البحر الأبيض المتوسط وثرونها بها جبالها الأجنبية متعددة وفي حالة نشوب الحرب بين مصر وبين احدى هذه الدول تصيب رعايا هذه الدولة خطرا يهدد سلامة الأمن الداخلى والمرافق الجوية في هذا القطر.

(٦)

تابع ملحق (٢٤)

ب- التوسع في استخدام الاسلحة الميكانيكية

ان استخدام الاسلحة الميكانيكية في هذه الحرب بالمدى الواسع الذي لاحظناه قد ساعد على زيادة كمية النيران مع استخدام عدد قليل من الأفراد وهذا بطبيعته الحال يؤثر على تنظيم المشاة.

ج- التحسين في وسائل الاتصال

كما أن كثرة استخدام الاسلحة والراديو قد يسر للقائد ادارة قواته وهي مؤثرة على مسافات بعيدة وهذا أمكن له أن يزيد في مناورة قواته بدون أن تتعرض القوات من الانفصال.

د - تأثير الطيران على العمليات الأرضية

ان التحسن الذي طرأ على سرعة الطائرات ومدى عملاتها وحمولتها قد زاد من تيمية أهمية الدور المطلوب منها بالنسبة للعمليات الأرضية والدور الذي لعبه الطيران في هذه الحرب لاجتياح الى بمان.

وما سبق يمكننا أن نستنتج الآتسى -

١- أن العبرة في الحروب القادمة هي بالأسلحة التي في أيدي الجنود وأن الشجاعة لا تكفي وحدها لمقاومة عدو متفوق في أسلحته.

ولذا فيلزم أن تعمل على تسليح الجيش بأحدث أسلحة ممكنة.

٢- سوف يحتاج الجيش الى عدد وافر من الرجال الأكفاء المدربين لاستخدام وصيانة هذه الأسلحة والمهمات الثمينة وأن الرجال الذين يجندون الآن لا تتوافر فيهم هذه الكفاءة ولذا نبتطلب الأمر إعادة النظر في قانون التجنيد الحالي.

كما يجب إعادة النظر في نظام ترقى الضباط الى رتب القيادة.

٧ - المقدرة المالية للدولية

ان قوة الجيش في أي مملكة يتوقف على المبالغ التي يمكن لهذه المملكة أن تخصصها له . وما من فرد في القطر الا يرغب ان يكون لبلاده جيش قوى ولطالما سمعنا من مختلف الحكومات المتعاقبة هذه الرغبة ولكن للأسف لم يظهر للآن ذلك عملها ونظرة واحدة الى ميزانية الجيش لسنة ١٩٤٥ تزيد قليلا . فقد كانت ميزانية الجيش سنة ٣٨-٣٩ تقدر بنسبة ١٤% من ميزانية الدولة وفي سنة ٤٢/١٩٤٣ أصبحت ١١% وفي سنة ٤٤/١٩٤٥ تناقصت الى ٨% وهذا أقل بكثير من النسبة التي تخصصها الدول الأخرى حتى الفقيرة منها ذات الموارد المحدودة التي لا تنافس ميزانيتها ولا أهمية بلادها بمصر.

فلو عملت الحكومة على زيادة هذه النسبة وليكن الى ٢٠% فإن ذلك لن يترجم الى فائدة الى الأمة من الرجعية العسكرية فقط بل يتعداه الى تحسين مستوى صحة الشعب ومحو الأمية منه وتحسين حالته الاجتماعية أيضا علاوة على ما يوفر من ميزانيات الخزانات المختصة الأخرى تبعاً لذلك .

وأما ذلك ترى اتباع الآتسى -

أ - وضع برنامج ثابت لزيادة الجبر - شترتقره ، جميع الهيئات حتى لا يتأثر بتفسيير
رجال الحكم .

ب - تنفيذ هذا البرنامج على مراحل حسب قدرة الميزانية وليكن على خمس سنوات .

٨ - ميل الأمة الى الروح العسكرية .

لاجدال في أن ميل الأمة الى الروح العسكرية ضعيف ولا شك أن ذلك يرجع سبه
الى الطرق التي بها تحصل على جنود الجيشرى الوقت الحالى .
ان قانون التجنيد الحالى لا يمكننا من الحصول الا على أفقر وأجهل طبقة في الشعب
وطول مدة الخدمة والقائمى الخدمة العسكرية على هذه الطبقة دون غيرها مما يجعل
أفراد الجيشر لا ينظرون الى هذه الخدمة الوطنية بعين الرضى . كما أن الأندراد
الذى أمكنهم التخلص من التجنيد لا يشمرون بواجبهم نحو الدفاع عن وطنهم .
ولكى يمكن انشا' جه شر قوى كف* يستلزم الحال اثاره الروح العسكرية في الشعب
وجعلهم يتقون أن خدمة الجندية ما هى الا شرف وواجب يود به أفراد الأمة جميعها
الأغنيا' والفقرا' على حد سسوا'
ولذا فأرى انبعا' الآتى :-
أ - تعديل قانون التجنيد الحالى لجعله الزاميا ولتخفيض مدة الخدمة
وبذا يمكن الحصول على مستورى أعلى من الجنود .

ب - القيام بدعاية قوية لتحبيب الشعب في الجندية باستخدام كــــل
الوسائل الممكنة كالتقا' المحاضرات وعمل أفلام سينمائية والتي تظهر
محاسن حياة الجندية . الخ

٩ - المساعدات المحتمل الحصول عليها من الحكومة البريطانية

ان مهاددة الصداقة وحسن التفاهم التي بيننا وبين بريطانيا
العظمى مما يسهل لنا الانتفاع بخيرة رجالها العسكريين وما يسهل لنا
الحصول على الأسلحة والأدوات اللازمة بنك اليسف نفقاتها فقط .
كذلك يمكننا من ارسال بعثات تعليمية من مختلف الرتب والأسلحة
الى مدارس الجيشر الانجليزية للوقوف على أحدث المعلومات والأنظمة .

تابع ملحق (٢٤)

- ٨ -

وأود أن ألفت النظر الى الفوائد التي نجنبها من هذه الحرب القائمة فيما اذا علمنا على ارسال بعثات من ضباط أركان حرب الى مختلف مبادئ القتال الحالية كما فعلت الدول الأخرى فهي فرصة ثمينة قد لاتتاح لضباطنا مستقبلا - ففى ذلك تدريب على قيادة الجيوش وعلى التفهيمات التي نتجت من تطور الأسلحة فى هذه الحرب

كما أن إيفاد ملحقين عسكريين فى هذا الوقت الى البلاد المحاربة يجعلنا على اتصال دائم بالتطورات والأفكار العسكرية فى هذه البلاد

١٠ - خطة التنفيذ

- أ - عمل مشروع ثابت لزيادة الجيش لمدى خمس سنوات
- ب - تعطى السلطة التامة لعالي وزير الدفاع الوطنى وحضرة صاحب السعادة رئيس هيئة أركان حرب الجيش لتنفيذ هذا المشروع على أن يقدم كل سنة شهر تقريراً عن ذلك لمجلس الدفاع الأعلى .
- ج - تعديل قانون التجنيد الحالي وأن تكون الخدمة لمدة اقصاها سنتين ونصف
- د - يكون ترقى الضباط الى رتبة البكباشى بالأقدمية ومعددها يكون الترقى بالكفاة .
- هـ - يعدل نظام القبول فى الكلية الحربية ليلام روح الجيش الجديد
- و - التوسع فى ارسال بعثات تعليمية الى مدارس الجيش الانجليزية
- ز - ارسال بعثات من ضباط الأركان حرب الى مبادئ القتال الحالية
- ح - إيفاد ملحقين عسكريين الى الممالك المتحالفة
- ط - يقوم الجيش بتدريب رجال مصلحتى خفر السواحل والحدود

.....

رقم ٤٤١ / ١٠٠

حضرة صاحب المقام الرفيع رئيس دهبوان جلالة الملك •

اتشرف بان ارسل مع هذا صورة المذكرة التي قدمها لي منذ اسبوعين الجنرال كلتر بك
رئيس البعثة العسكرية البريطانية وهي تحوى مقترحات الحكومة الانجليزية (هكذا اخبرني)
بشان تنظيم الجيش المصرى حاضرا ومستقبلا ومرفق معها ترجمة لهذه المذكرة مع ملاحظة
ان الاصل الانجليزي بدون توقيع •

بعد الاطلاع على المذكرة استدعت جناب رئيس البعثة واخبرته ان المعاهدة المصرية
الانجليزية لا تجيز تدخل الحكومة الانجليزية في شئون الجيش المصرى بحال من الاحوال
لان الحكومة المصرية وحدها هي صاحبة الحق في هذا وتلوت عليه نصوص المعاهدة
ثم المهمته مدى اختصاصه كرئيس للبعثة وتلوت عليه ما ورد في المعاهدة وملاحظتها
وكلمها نصوص لا تجيز له عرض مثل هذه المقترحات وطلبت من جنابه سحب المذكرة
واعتبارها كأن لم تكن ولعلا سحبها • وفي اليوم التالي حضر الى جنابه وابدى اعتذاره
عما حصل وانه يرجو اعتبار المسألة منتهية عند هذا الحد وكأنها لم تكن •

وعليه ارجو رفع الأمر لحضرة صاحب الجلالة الملك لاحاطة جلالتة علما بهذا الموضوع
الذى اردت عرضه على صاحب جلالتة لولا ان المقابلة الملكية لم تتم •

مع ملاحظة ان هذه المذكرة تروى الى جعل الجيش المصرى اشبه بهيئة البوليس
يضاف الى هذا انها تحصل الدفاع عن القتال من حق الانجليز وحدهم وهذا مخالف
تماما للمعاهدة المصرية الانجليزية •

وتفضلوا رضىكم بقبول فائق الاحترام •

وزير الدفاع الوطنى

(السيد سليم)

القاهرة في ١٤ مايو سنة ١٩٤٥ •

س/ك

استجيب تبعات وتنظيم الجيوش وسلاح الطيران المصري

الفرش

=====

(١) الفرش من هذا البحث هو تقرير المسؤوليات والتنظيم للجيوش المصرية، ليط بعد الحرب مباشرة ليكون قاعدة للمباحث مع الملاحظات المصرية .

التفاصيل

(٢) من أجل هذا وضعتنا الاختراعات الآتية :-

أ - من سر المتأثر وتبين منهم مفاجئ . برنا أو من البحر على الدامر المصري،

برأسية عدو قسوى . ولكن سيختي من الجوائز ولحق هجوم جوي .

ب - برنا أيضا العظمى (كحليفة لصر) ستون في ونيم لتتدبير المساعدة برنا وحسرا

وحررا بعد انظارها بوقت قصير .

ج - لن يتجاوز أقصى مدى للمرونة المصرية لهوانة الدفاع سنة طالبين من الجليحات ملو يا

الدور الثاني يفتتح به الجيوش وسلاح الطيران المصري

(٣) من الواضح ان القوات المصرية المسلحة لا يمكنها بفردها ان تدافع من مصر ضد هجوم

دولة من الدول العظمى .

نحن - لذلك - نعتبر ان الدور الذي سيتم به الجيوش وسلاح الطيران المصري فيما

بعد الحرب مباشرة سيكون :-

أ - ايجاد - في الحدود الشمالية - جيوش وسلاح طيران تادرين على حافة الأمن الداخلي

ب - المساعدة - بواسطة دفاع ساحلي ودفاع منفذ للثائرات - على حماية للمصفا

ضد أي هجوم خانق قد يحدث .

العوامل الأخرى على تنظيم القوات المصرية

(٤) نحن نعلم ان مدة الخدمة الإجبارية قد تخفص من خمس سنوات الى ثلاث سنوات .

ولما كان معظم المجندين يجلبون القراءة والكتابة . ليس من الممكن تدريب ضباط الصف

العظام وكذا الفنيين في ثلاث سنوات . سوترتب على ذلك بل سيكون من الصعب الحصول

على هذه الفئة من طين المتطوعين . بزيادة ذات اعتبار في الحاضر . وللحكومة

المرسسة أن تقرر تسمية هذه الزيادة في الحارث في الحارث اما بتخفيض عدد القوات المسلحة او بزيادة الجيرانية المستوية لعناية الدفاع .
 وأما تخفيض في عدد القوات المسلحة المصرية سينتج - عليها - القروض التي، سيطلب تمويلها من بريطانيا المعنى التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية المصرية .

(٥) ولما كان على مصر ان تصاوتنا في حالة الحجم الخارجي فانه يجب أن تكون قواتها ضاربة وديرة ومسلحة على مثل القوات البريطانية .

(٦) ولما انهم - يخرج من المرفوض فيه وجود وحدات في كادر الجيش الا اذا كان من الممكن اعطاءها صلا في وقت السلم كأن تكون جزءا من ليل او منبأة . ولكن من المرفوض فيه ان تكون جميع الوحدات المشكلة كاملة القوة وأن تنظم هيئات التدريب بحيث يمتنع تشكيل وحدات اافية عند ابراد التوسع .

محافظة الأمن الداخلي

(٧) لمحافظة الأمن الداخلي وحفظ القانون والنظام في مصر سيؤمن للجيش المصري واجبان أساسيان -

أ - مساعدة السلطة المدنية على حماية القانون والنظام في الدلتا وبادي النيل .

يجب ان يكون سلاح العنابة في الجيش المصري ذا قوة كافية حتى لا تتلصب المساعدة من القوات البريطانية لاعادة النظام في حالة الطوارئ .
 وتليه نتقي أن ندين اننا نلزمه لاقامة للقائم بهذا الواجب في أربع كتابت

متساة متتلة .

ب - مراعاة الحدود

تعالف الصحراء وظائق الحدود بواسطة قوات سريعة هتيرة تعمل من المراكز الصاعدة ونظ ارتكار .

لقيام بهذا الواجب يجب وجود لواء حدود يكون من هجانة (١١ صف) ومن الآيبين سيارات خفيفة .

تساعد هذه القوات للقيام بواجباتها حسب الضرورة ه جطة لسوء سيرج العسكرية .

(٨) هناك دوران أساسيان مطلوب من سلاح الطيران المصري القيام بمهمة .

أ - المساعدة على مراقبة الحدود وخصوصا في مناطق الصحراء .

ب - مساعدة القوات الأرضية في المحافظة على القانون والنظام والأمن العام الداخلي .

تتكون الواجهات الأمامية - النقل - الاستكشاف - المساعدة الجانبة .
 بين التحيز إلى أسرارها النقل تزيد كثرة قوة الحركة والتبعية تزيد كثيرا لسي
 تامة الجوية المصرية المشير للقيام بواجباته بالنسبة للأمن الداخلي .
 والمفهوم بهذه التيمات، لن أن سأل الطيران المصري يجب أن يتكون من -

- ١ - ٢ أسراب نقل
- ٢ - ١ استكشاف قتال
- ٣ - ٢ قتال - طائرة تفصيل

الدفاع ضد الهجوم من الخبايا

(٩) واجبات الجيش المصري في الدفاع ضد أي تهديد من الخبايا -

١ - الدفاع من الساحل

نظرا للحدود المائية المحددة التي يجمعها هذا بعد عمل المخابر اللاتج استقرت
 المناقشة على الأمن الداخلي لن يكون مستطابا إيجاد الدفاع الساحلي اللاتج
 لجميع المناطق الرئيسية . وتضمن تعتبر أن أمن المناطق للرحلات
 البحرية في الإسكندرية - تاركن مشطوبة الدفاع عن بيروت وفريد والموس
 نيرستانيا .

٢ - الحماية ضد العناصر - المناطق الشمالية المصرية .

يجب أن تدرج الوحدات وتجهز في أحد مشطوي يمكن . ويمكن للجيش المصري
 بواسطة اربعة آليات تليق وشارة آليات شقيقة والآيين انوار كاشفة . أن يفسر
 بالنسبة انقصر في الدفاع ضد العناصر عن المناطق الشمالية المصرية
 في مصر خارج منطقة القتال - اما تفصيرات تخرج المواجه والمعلومات
 فتحدد فيها بعد . ونظرا لقلة المورد المائية ، سوف لا يمكن صيانة
 كل هذه الآليات كاطلة القوة ولذا سيكون الآيين منها (واحد تقبل والآخر
 شقيقتي) في دولة الكادر ولحقان بوحدة تامة .

(١٠) سيكون على سلاح الطيران المصري إيجاد تهيئة الفاضلة اللازمة لرحلات
 سلاح الطيران الملكي البريطاني وكذا ساعدته ضد التهديد من الدفاع . ويحتمل
 أن يمكن يجب أن تتجج الاسراب البحرية وافراد المصريين على التشريب مع سلاح
 الطيران البريطاني ليكونوا في حالة الحرب قادرين على القيام بواجبات خاصة
 تحت ادارة عمليات سلاح الطيران الملكي البريطاني كما حدث في هذه الحرب .

جماعة اللواء السريع الحركة

- (١١) ونعتبر أن جماعة لواء واحد سريع الحركة منظمة كما هو وارد في الملحق "د" -
 ضرورة كاحتياط واجبها كالتالي -
 أ - للعمل كاحتياطي سريع لتقوية - حسب الضرورة - قوات البوليس وقوات الجيش العاملة
 على المحافظة على القانون والنظام في الدلتا وواى النيل .
 ب - لتلبية - حسب الضرورة - لواء الحدود في مراقبة الصحراء وناطق الحدود .
 ج - للتعاون مع الجيش البريطاني في حالة هجر خطىر .
- (١٢) الكوادر المختلفة للمحافظة على الأمن الداخلي والقانون والنظام يجب أن تدرب لتأخذ
 حلقا في التدرج سريعا الحركة او لتكون لواء نانيا في حالة التعميل . وفي هذه
 الحالة يتم بإجسادات الأمن الداخلي وحدات احتياطية يستدعى أفرادها للخدمة
 لهذا الغرض . ويجب أن يحصل هؤلاء الأئتمزاد على انصاف التدريب في
 زمن السلم .

طلاب التدريب والمثبون الادارية

- (١٣) المدارس وراكز التدريب ضرورية لكل سلاح ويجب أن تكون قادرة على تهيئة
 (كادرات) للتوسيع .
- (١٤) لضمان أن يكون الجيش المصري قوة متزنة تادرة على القيام بواجباتها بأقل مساعدة
 خارجية سيئون من الضروري وجود رياضات الأشعة المساعدة والخدمات .
 من حيث القواعد تطلب التثبون الادارية مشابهة لتثبونها في الجيش البريطاني
 ولكن نظرا لخصر حجم الجيش المصري وطبيعة نبات القاعدة لا ضرورة لوجود بعض تخصص
 من تخطيطات الخدمات للجيش او يمكن ان يتم بأعمالها مدنيون تحت ترتيبات عسكرية .
 من المنتج ان تكون الوحدات الادارية لجاعة اللواء سريع الحركة دائما في اكل قوة
 وينضاف الي ذلك بعض مخصص من الوحدات الادارية في هيئة الكادر حيثما أمكن
 اعطاؤها عملا في وقت السلم كجزء من نزل او متسأة .
- (١٥) ويصلح سلاح الطيران المصري ترتيبات مشابهة . اذا أخذ سلاح الطيران المصري
 على عاتقه القيام بأعمال الصيانة الكبيرة فستحتاج من ناحية التثبون الادارية الى مخزئين
 طائرات ورحلات صيانة واصلاح . ونشرا للتأثير الذي تد يحدث من تنفيذ مدة الخدمة
 الاجبارية من خصر الى ثلاث سنوات ولضرورة المحافظة على كفاءة سلاح الطيران المصري
 قدر الامكان فاننا نقتنر أن تجرى الصيانة الفنية (ما عدا ما تقم به الاحباب من
 اصلاحات) في أقرب تشكيل لسلاح الطيران البريطاني الذي يحصل ان يكون

تابع طلق (٢٥)

- ٥ -

به مستلزمات سلاح الطيران المصري في هيئة آادر .

التابع بالمحسبات

(١٦) نحن نعتبر ان سياسة تعلق رتبتهيز وحدات الجيش المصري بجبان تكون

كالتالي ف

١ - يجب ان تكون الوحدات المعاملة على الأبن الداخلي وكذا الوحدات المعينة

لتنفيذ يدور عليها في الصحراء وهذه تشمل القوة البرية المركبة - تعلق

الوحدات التابعة كالملا حسب ترتيبات الحرب ويتطلب ذلك عيسى فـ

London Munitions Assignment Board of Issue of Equipment.

ب - الوحدات المتور مشرطة في نطاق (١) تعلق فقد لمستوى التدريب - ولكن

يتطلب في النزلات بحجم التجهيز - كما أمكن استيرادها - اللازمة لاستكمال

تأمينها في وقت الحرب .

التنظيم للحركة

(١٧) من تنظيم التناسيم النابل للحركة يتناول منصوص للمعركة باللحسب

لنفس الطيران ولقاء الحسود والتحرك مرسية الحركة والدمشق الساحلي

بالدمشق عند الطائرات مينة في المناطق من " ا " الى " و " .

الملحق " ب "

سفن الطيران
=====

٢	امراب نقل
١	* استكشافات اتصال
٣	* لاطافات قنابل

الملحق " ج "

لواء الهندسة
=====

تتدوم الحركة (مختصر)

١	رئاسة لواء الهندسة
٥	محافظة مكونة من ١١ صف
٣	آلات سيارات خفيفة

الملحق " د "

القوة سرية الحركة
=====

تتدوم الحركة (مختصر)

١	سرية لواء سفن خدمة الجيش	١	رئاسة لواء
١	مقتضى ميدان خفيف	١	آلات استكشاف
١	مقتضى ميدان مهمات	١	آلات هندسة ميدان
١	مقتضى بمساعدة اللواء	١	مقتضى اطل خفيفة (٤٠)
		١	آلات م . د
		١	سرية مهندسين ميدان
		١	مقتضى اشارة جبهة لواء
		٢	كيفية منقاد
		١	سرية م . م . م . متعلقة

الملحق " ه "

مقتضى الساحل
=====

٦	مقتضى ١٢ بوصة الدخيلة والبرل (الدخيلة كادر)
٢	* زاوية ارتفاع ٤٥ درجة العجبي

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

H.O.S. ROYAL AIR FORCE

وزارة الدفاع الوطني

رئاسة سلاح الطيران الملكي

سرى وماجل جدا

رقم الفيد ١٦ / ٢ / ٣٣ / ١٠ / ٢٨ / ١٩٤٨

Cairo 194

القاهرة ١٠ / ٢٨ - سنة ١٩٤٨

حضرة صاحب المعالي وزير الدفاع الوطني

اشرف باخطار معاليكم انه بناء على خطابكم السرى رقم ١ - ٢١ / سج / ١٧ بتاريخ ٢٢ اكتوبر سنة ١٩٤٥ الخاص بحالة السلاح الحاليه زيادته ليكون وانما بحاجة البلاد قد شكلت لجنة فنية من السرج لدراسة هذا الموضوع وقد قررت هذه اللجنة عمل مشروع مستوف للدفاع الجوي سائقه به تفصليا لمعاليكم فيما بعد ويمكن اجماله حاليا في الآتي :-

(١) قد برهنت الحرب الحالية على قيمة اسلحة الطيران الفعالة سواء في اطار الهجوم او الدفاع ، وانه لا يرجى لاية قوة حربية النجاح في عملياتها بدون مساعدة الطيران لها ولهذا وجب عند تقديرى موقف حرسى للمستقبل ان تعطى القوة الجوية الاهتمام الاول .

(٢) اتضح من حقائق الحرب الاخيره ان النليه في النهايه تكون لمن يتفوق في انتاج الاسلحة المختلفة ويحتم الاحتفاظ بهذا التفوق لوفرة موارده من المواد الاولية المختلفة .

ونظرة عاجلة الى انتاج الدول الثيرة تلقى لان يتضح منها ان الدول الصغيرة ذات الموارد المحدودة ومن بينها مصر يصعب عليها ان تكون قوة حربية حد يشه تلقى لتفرد امام هجوم احدى الدول الكبرى لمدة طويلة .

اراء هذا اصح كل ما يمكن التفكير فيه للدفاع عن مصر هو ان تنشأ قوة من مختلف الاسلحة على ضوء تجارب الحرب الاخيره كافية لان تفادى هجومها كبرى مسدة محدودة من الزمن الى ان تصل القوات الساعده المرجوه من حلفائنا اسوة بما حدث مع الطيران البريطاني نفسه في مصر .

(٣) يتضح من موقعة العليين وهي التي تعتبر الموقده الفاصله لرد الغزاه عن ارض مصر ان سلاح الطيران البريطاني في مصر كان يملك وقتئذ حوالي ١٦٠٠ طائرة من مختلف الانواع والاحجام ، ولما كان الجزء الاخير من هذه الممره مع هجوما فلو تشيئا مع القاعده التقريبه الغائله بان قوة الدفاع تكون فعاله لوعادلت ربح القوة المهاجمه لاتضح لنا ان العدد التقريبى الذى يمكنه البقاء في سد حاجه الدفاع الضرورى عن مصر هو حوالي ٤٠٠ طائرة حد يشه من مختلف الاحجام والانواع كما هو مبين بالملحق (١) المرئق طيه وتبلغ هذه القوة حوالي عشرون سريا خلال طائرات المدارس المختلفه .

(٤) وبمراجعة حاله السرج الحاضر يتضح ان الموجود به حاليا هو ستة اسراب فقط منها اربعة اسراب جميع طائراتها وتسليحها من الانواع القديمه والتي لا تصلح بناتنا للحروب الحد يشه . هذا علاوة على ان شركاتها قد توقفت عن انتاج قطع غيارها .

ولذا اصبح من الضرورى تجد يد هذه الاسراب . اما السربين الباقين فرغم انها

- القيام بأعمال الدفاع كما يجب ولذا وجب استكمال عدتها .
- (٥) أما مدرسة الطيران فتتكون حاليا من ثلاثة اسراب من الانواع القديمة التي توقفت انتاج شركاتها لقطع غيارها . وقد اصبح الصالح منها للاستعمال حاليا سربين فقط وسيصبحان قريبا غير صالحين للاستعمال ايضا . ولذا يجب تجديد هذه الاسراب الثلاثة حتى يمكن لهذه المدرسة ان تسد حاجة السرح من الطيارين العازمين لهذا التوسع .
- (٦) ولقى يمكن البدء في هذا التوسع يجب افتتاح مدارس الطيران الفنية من ميكانيكا ولاسلكي وتسلح وخلافها فوراً حتى يمكنها ان تكمّل النقص الموجود حاليا في الفنيين اللازمين لهذا السرح وحتى يمكنها امداد الفنيين اللازمين لهذا التوسع .
- (٧) كما يجب البدء فوراً في انشاء ورش اساسية تقوم بالاصلاحات الكبيرة ومخازن اساسية يمكنها امداد هذه القوات التي ستوزع على مطارات مختلفة في جميع انحاء القطر .
- (٨) يتكلف هذا المشروع حوالي ١٢ مليون جنيه تقريباً لمشترى وانشاء الاسراب والورش والمخازن اللازمه لهذا السرح ، وعندما تصل قوته الى القوه السابق بيانها فيلزمه ٨ مليون جنيه سنوياً منها ثلاثة ملايين لامداد وصيانة الطائرات ومليون جنيه لتجديد التالف والقديم منها واربعه ملايين جنيه وهى قيمه ما تتكلفه قوه هذا السرح من مرتبات ومهمات وتعيينات ومليونات وخلافه .
- هذا علاوة على ما يلزم لهذا السرح من مطارات مختلفه لم تتعرض لها هذه اللجنه لوجود مطارات كامله الاستعداد بمصر في الوقت الحالى وموضوع تسليمها لسلاح الطيران الملكى المصرى قيد البحث الآن .
- والبيان التفصيلى لبلغ العشرين مليون جنيهه الوارده في هذا البند مبين في الملحق ب"ب" المرفق طيه .
- (٩) وارجو العلم انه لا يمكن باى حال من الاحوال وضع خط ناصل ليحدد قوه سلاح الطيران اللازمه للدفاع من البلاد ان مقدار هذه القوه يرتبط ارتباطاً كلياً بموامل كثيره مختلفه منها مقدار القوه الجويه للدوله المهاجمه . ولذا فان عدد الطائرات الذى سبق ذكره هو اقل عدد يمكن الاعتماد عليه في بدء اعمال الدفاع امام قوه لا تزيد عن القوه التى هاجمت مصر في هذه الحرب .

وتفضلوا بما اليكم بقبول فائق احترامى ،،،

شكراً
لسوا

مدير سلاح الطيران الملكى المصرى

تابع ملحق (٢٢)

(٢)

ملحق ١٠

تقدر القوة الجوية التفريبيه اللازمة لبدء الدفاع من مصر لحين وصول امدادات الحلفاء
بالآتسى :-

عدد	بيان
١٠ ✓	اسراب قتال توزع بحيث يمكنها الدفاع من جميع المراتق الجوية للبلاد
٢	اسراب استكشاف متوسطة الحجم
٢	اسراب فاذفات قنابل متوسطة
١	سرب فاذفات طوربيد
٢ ✓	اسراب مواصلات منها واحد متوسط الحجم والآخر كبير الحجم
٢	اسراب تسامان
<u>٢٠</u>	مجموعا

ملحوظة • متوسط عدد الدلائرات هروباق ٢٠ طائرة للسرب الواحد •

بالتفصيل
لواء

مدير سلاح الطيران الملكي المصري
تحريرا نى ٢٨ اكتوبر سنة ١٩٤٥

ملحق (٢٨)
(نموذج رقم ٦ - استنماء طيران)

المران القرائن : " براق "
تلفون رقم ٦٢٢١١٤

وزارة الدفاع الوطني

رئاسة سلاح الطيران الملكي المصري
الادارة العامة - مصرية
الملاحق رقم ٦ - استنماء طيران سنة ١٩٤٥

الموضوع : تفريغ سلاح الجو الملكي المصري

(٥ -)

حضرة صاحب المعالي، وزير الدفاع الوطني.
أشرفنا بأن أنتموه، الى محالكم باننا سبق أن أتمرنا في كتابنا بنفس الرقم بتاريخ
٢٨ أكتوبر سنة ١٩٤٥ الى أننا سنستخدم بمشروع تفصيلي عن موضوع زيادة السلاح ليكون واقفا
بحاجة البلاد ، وحيث أننا لا نستطيع الآن التقدم بهذا البيان الا بعد معرفة ما استقر
عليه رأي السلطات العليا في هذا الشأن وعن المبالغ التي سوف تعتمد لهذا الغرض
أتمرنا اننا انتموا لتم محالكم بالتنبيه بافادتتنا عما استقر عليه الرأي في هذا الصدد .

وتفضلوا محالكم بقبول فائق الاحترام

سوا

المرشد برسلان الطيران الملكيس
١١/٤٩

١/٤٦/٢/٣ / عمومي

عدد الرقعات

مكتب وزير الدفاع الوطني
ولود رقم ٤٩٩١
تاريخ ١٥/١٠/٤٥ سنة ١٤١٥

- أسراب، في الاحتمال لمواجهة الخسائر الى أن ترد المساعدة المنشودة - وذلك تسهيلاً
 اسوة العمليّة لهذا السلاح ثلاثة وثلاثون سرباً .
- ٢- ورغم ذلك فإنه لا يمكن تعليق هذا المشرع نورا دفعة واحدة بل يجب تقسيمه الى قسمين
 أساسيين اذ أن السلاح بحالته الراهنة لا يمكنه أن يتخضع مع الزيادة السريعة المطلوبة
 الا بعد ثلاث سنوات يتبعها في الاستعداد لتقبل هذه الزيادة وبما ذلك كالاتي .
- ١) عدد الميكانيكيين في هذا السلاح في الوقت الحالي لا يمكن قوته الحالية وذلك نظرا
 لتعطّل مدارس هذا السلاح من العمل مدة طويلة ولكن يمكن للسلاح تقبل هذه الزيادة
 يجب اعداد الميكانيكيين اللازمين لهذه الزيادة أولا وتنظيم الدفعة الواحدة منهم
 بستة رة، سنتين ، ولذا فإنه يجب العمل أولا على توسيع مدارس السلاح بحيث يمدتها
 أن تقبل ١٠٠٠ ميكانيكي في السنة لمدة الثلاث سنوات الأولى ، ولذلك لايجاد النواة
 المنشودة للزيادة ثم التوسع بعد ذلك في هذه المدارس بعد أن يمكن تمويلها
 السان من الخصائص ما يمكنهم التدريس بهذه المدارس على نطاق أوسع .
- ٢) يجب انشاء كلية للطيران عتج على الأقل مائتين طيار في العام حتى يمكن هذا
 السلاح مقابلة هذه الزيادة - ولا يخفى على معاليكم أنه يربح انشاء محطة منفردة
 لهذه الكلية اذ لا يمكن لها العمل لتفريغ هذا العدد من الطيارين مشتركة
 في مطار واحد مع أية قوة أخرى رقتن لذلك أخذ مطار بلهين وانشاء هذه الكلية به
 وذلك لكثرة أرائسي التبول، حوله وهو أول عامل أسس لاختيار موقع المدرسة على أن
 يوزع نظام لهذه الكلية يقضى بالاستنادنا عن أخذ خريجي الكلية الحربية الملكية
 لهذا السلاح .
- ٣) يجب انشاء مخازن الأساس فورا واعداد هذه المخازن بجميع مستلزماتها حتى يمكنها
 مقابلة الزيادة المنتظرة ، ولا يخفى على معاليكم أن هذا التوسع يقضى زيادة مهدة
 السلاح أضعافا مضاعفة له ولذا يجب اتيان نظام المخازن المتعمق من
 سلاح المساعدة والمهمات من اسناد عهد الى عسكريين بدلا من مدنيين ، ولذا يجب
 انشاء مخزن أرائسي لهذا السلاح لشؤون المخازن وذلك حتى يتسنى إمكان ضمان سير العمل
 بهذه المخازن .
- ٤) يجب الهد فورا انشاء ريش الأساس حتى يمكنها مواجهة الاصلاحات والتصديقات
 اللازمة لهذا العدد المتزايد من الدلائل كما أنه لا يخفى على معاليكم ضرورة ارسال
 البعثات من الضباط الطيارين خريجي كلية الهندسة الى جامعة الامبراطورية لبريطانيا
 حتى يمكنهم الحصول على أعلى الدرايات الفنية الخاصة بالاعيان ، ولذا يمكنهم
 تولي شؤون هذه الريش الأساسية الحربية للسلاح .
- ٥) كما أنه يجب الهد فورا ربط أجزاء القطر بشبكة لاسلكية محكمة - من انشاء
 محطات لاسلكي ومحطات للرادار تطوّر جميع الأرائسي المصرية حتى يمكنها معرفة
 اقتراب الطائرات النربية وكذا توجيه الطائرات النربية .
- ٦) ولا يخفى على معاليكم أنه ليمكن هذا السلاح من مواجهة هذا التوسع ليجاد المطارات
 والمحطات اللازمة لمقابلة هذه الزيادة ولذا يجب الهد فورا في انشاء محطتين جويتين

- ٣ -

تابع ملحق (٢٩)

خلاف الدخلة المخصصة للمدارس بخلاف مطار ملاصق للورش الأساس حيث يجري اختيار
البناء راتبه .

٧) يتقرر السلاح اذ ما بدء فوراً في اثناء ما سبق ذكره أن تستقر، هذه العملية الثلاث
سنوات الأولى من مشروع الزيادة وبعد ذلك يمكن هذا السلاح متابلة التوسع تدريجياً
البر أن يصل العدد المذكور سابقاً في مدى عشر سنوات ولا يخفى على معاليكم أن بعد
منه الثلاث سنوات الأولى في التجهيزات يكون هذا السلاح قد استهلك جميع طائراته
الموجودة الحالية، وبذا يجب تجديدها أولاً وادخال الزيادة عليه بواقع ثلاثة أشراب
للسنة الأولى التالية لسنتين التجهيزات الثلاث ثم تتدرج الزيادة في السنوات
حسب قوة اخراج السلاح للفنيين والطيارين الى أن تصل في نهاية المشروعات التي
القوة اللازمة، وبهذا نحو الجزء الثاني من المشروع فاذا وانقضى معاليكم على هذه
السياسة يمكن للسلاح التقدم بمشروع تفصيلي عن الثلاث سنوات التجهيزية الأولى
وفي نهايتها يتقد أيضاً بمشروع آخر مجملاً عن السبع سنوات الهاتمة إذ أنه لا
يمكن وضع مشروع تفصيلي لزيادة السلاح عن مدة سبع سنوات وذلك نظراً
للتقدم السريع في هذا الفن وما يتبع ذلك من تطورات ويمكن السلاح التقدم تفصيلياً
باحتياجاته عن كل سنة من هذه السنوات السبع في مشروع الميزانية .
بفضلوا بقولنا فائق الاحترام !!!

لشؤون
مجمع مديري سلاح الطيران الملكي المصري .

مكة نشور الدفاع الوطني
وارت. رقم ٤٦٦٤ ملف ١-١٩٠/م
تاريخ ١٤/٥٥ ساعة

(٣٠) طلع

Reference -	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Air 20/6706	11/2/1941					
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G.R.

PIECES SUBJECT OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCEORDER OF BATTLE

1. The R.E.A.F. is composed of six operational squadrons, a Flying Training School and certain detached flights. These are as follows:-
- | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| No. 1 Fighter Reconnaissance Squadron | - Spitfire LF IX's
U.E. 16 |
| No. 2 Fighter Squadron | - Spitfire LF IX's
U.E. 11 |
| No. 3 Communication Squadron | - Anson, Dakota, Percival,
Magister, Lycoming U.E. 15 |
| Hq. Royal Flight | - Lancaster, Anson, Dakota,
Magister - U.E. 9. |
| No. 4 G.R. Squadron | - Anson - U.E. 6 (+ 6 on order) |
| No. 5 Fighter Squadron | - Spitfire - U.E. 100 |
| No. 6 Fighter Squadron | - Spitfire Vb - U.E.
16 + 3 |
| Det. Flight | - Hurricanes - U.E. 4 |
| E.P.T.S. | - Magister - U.E. 25 + 3 |
| I.C.S. & A.C.S. | - Harvard - U.E. 16 |
| Navigation Flight | - Anson - U.E. 100 |
| A.A. & Target Towing Flight | - Defiant - U.E. 4
(U/S) |

PERSONNEL

2. The total number of personnel in the R.E.A.F. is 2,600 comprising 150 officers, 1500 other ranks and 950 civilians.

MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR

3. The R.E.A.F. Repair workshop is located at Alamein and comprises an A.R.S. and an E.R.S. The former has a capacity for the complete overhaul and repair of approximately 30 aircraft annually. At the moment, this output is insufficient to cover the demands of the squadrons.

The E.R.S. is capable of dealing with 60 engine top overhauls annually and is sufficient to meet demands.

The standard of technical maintenance throughout the R.E.A.F. is poor and the fact that there is any serviceability at all is almost due to the efforts of British ex-R.A.F. technicians.

TRAINING

4. The R.E.A.F. training organisation comprises the following training schools:-
- (i) Flying Training School - consists of Nos. 7 & 8 Training Squadrons and deals with elementary, intermediate and advanced flying training. The output is, approximately, 50 pilots per annum.

تابع ملحق (٣٠)

Reference:-	ZVALLC. KLEPHD. 9111.CE	1	2	3	4	5	6
AUG 20 / 6906	113,6111	1	2	3	4	5	6
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G.R.

- 2 -

- (11) Technical Training School - comprising a school for training fitters & riggers, Amusement School, Signals and Electrical School and a Photographic School. An input of 400 pupils have commenced training and a further 200 are undergoing a preliminary disciplinary course. The course at the School is planned to cover two years with a theoretical annual output of 100 pupils per year.

D.A.F.L.
1st April 1947

طحق (٢٤)

Reference: Air 20/6706 113,6771

1	2	3	4	5	6

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MINUTE SHEET.

Acas(P) 9308
Air Ministry File No. G. 36416/AM25

SECRET

A.C.A.S. (Dy. W.C.)
A.C.A.S. (I)
D. of Pol. (A.D.)

I think I should draw your attention to the present Foreign Office attitude to the supply of aircraft to Egypt. The Egyptian Air Attache has recently approached us for the supply of 25 Harvards with two years' spares backing, to be paid for in sterling. We can produce the Harvards, but not the spares, for which we would require payment in dollars.

2. The Foreign Office have advised us by telegram that in view of the Palestine troubles, we should delay the sale to Egypt. This has not yet been confirmed in writing.

3. I understand that the Foreign Office is taking the same attitude about the 6 (possibly to be increased to 10) Vampire III's which the Egyptians have ordered from Glosters.

[Handwritten Signature]
D.D.A.F.L.

3rd February 1948.

ملحق (٢٢)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE									
Reference:-									
113,111									
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COPY

1299A

V.C.A.S. 594. *Accepted* 17/3/48

COLONIAL OFFICE,
The Church House,
Great Smith Street.

27th March, 1948.

SECRET

Dear Roberts,

May I refer to your Secretary of State's secret letter of the 13th March to the Minister of Defence about the question of supplying jet aircraft to the Egyptians.

My Secretary of State has considered this question and is in agreement with Mr. Devin's view that it would be wiser to hold up delivery of these aircraft for the present, and to reconsider the matter in, say, three months' time. It would presumably then be necessary to consider whether any stipulation could be imposed regarding their employment in Palestine.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries at the Ministry of Supply, Ministry of Defence and Air Ministry. I must apologise for the delay in dealing with this matter.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) H.D. Watson.

F.K. Roberts, Esq., C.I.O.

Copies to: P.S. to U.S. of S.
P.S. to A.M.S.O.
P.S. to C.A.S.
P.S. to V.C.A.S.
P.S. to P.U.S.
A.U.S.(S)
S. G.
W.G.A. (17)

ملحق (٢٢)

reference:	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Air 20/6706.						
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COPY

Acas (P) 9791
VCAS 594.

12/7/48

Copies to: U.S. of S. M.U.S.
 C.A.S. A.U.S.(S)
 A.H.S.O. S. 6.
 V.C.A.S. *12/7/48*

Mr
 Foreign Office,
 S.W.1.

SECRET

30th March, 1948.

Dear Arthur,

Your letter of the 16th March about the supply of various aircraft to Egypt.

I enclose copies of a letter from the Minister of Defence and of my reply, from which you will see that we have no objection to the supply of the trainers but think, like you, that the jet aircraft should not be supplied for the present, and that the question of supplying them should be reconsidered after a few months.

Your point about first re-equipping Royal Air Force units in the Middle East is, of course, a further argument in favour of this line of action.

I am sending copies of this letter to Alexander, Creech Jones and Strauss.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd) ERNEST BEVIN.

The Right Honourable
A. Henderson, K.C., M.P.

ملحق (٣٤)

Reference:-	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Air 20/6906			113177			
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M.A.P. Form 2554

(1973) WT. 0020 3100 (Rev. 11-16) 1215 G.S.N. P. 11.

CYPHER MESSAGE

WARNING.—This cypher message must first be paraphrased if it is necessary to publish its text or so communicate it to persons outside British or United States Government Services and Departments. Messages marked One-Time Pad: "O.T.P." are excepted from this rule.

IMPORTANT

Received: 081627

From: H. Q. M.D.M.E.
To: A.M. HARBEGATE,

NO. 7293

QX.707 8 JUNE TOP SECRET.
VARIOUS CONSIGNMENTS UNDER PACKUPS DART ELAM/UK GART
REF WAR ALEXANDRIA AND LATE DESPATCHED FROM UNITED
KINGDOM IN SATISFACTION OF DEMANDS PRESENTED TO AIR MINISTRY
BY ROYAL EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE ARE LOCATED AT 107 M.U.
PARA. 2. DELIVERY TO REF HAS BEEN WITHHELD IN CONSEQUENCE
OF AIR MINISTRY MSX.305 1 JUNE AND AIR ATTACHE ADVISED.
PARA. 3. REQUEST YOU CONFIRM THAT DELIVERY IS TO BE SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY OR ALTERNATIVELY GIVE DISPOSAL INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE CONSIGNMENTS.

T.O.O. :- 081121Z

D.D.E.14 (ACTION)	D.D. POL (AS)
S. OF S.	D.D.O. (A)
U.S. OF S.	D.C.E.
C.A.S.	S.9.S.
V.C.A.S.	F.1.
A.M.S.O.	S.6
P.U.S.	D.D.A.F.L.
A.C.A.S. (P)	S.9.L.
A.C.A.S. (1)	

طحق (٢٥)

Reference:-	PUBLIC MESSAGE OFFICE	1	2	3	4	5	6
Ave 20 / 6706		113,1171		1		2	
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M.A.P. Form 2554A

(4822) W. 48228 2448 2150-(44-67) 1143 G.S. 2-11 51.

11.9.48 **CYPHER MESSAGE** 14716

WARNING.—This cypher message must first be paraphrased if it is necessary to publish its text or to communicate it to persons outside British or United States Government Services and Departments. Messages marked One-Time Pad: "O.T.P." are excepted from this rule.

From: AIR MINISTRY, HARROGATE,

To: H.Q. MED.M.E.

HS.83 JUNE 9 TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: - ISSUES TO ROYAL EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE.

YOUR QX.707 JUNE 8.

PARA. 1. CONFIRMED THAT DELIVERY IS TO BE SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH A.M. SIGNAL MSX.305 JUNE 1.

T.U.O. :- - 0901230A

D.D.E.14 (ORIG.)	D.D.A.F.L.	A.M.S.O:	D.D.O.(A)
B.9.E	S. OF S.	P.U.S.	D.G.F.
F.1	U.S. OF S.	A.C.A.S.(P)	
F.6	C.A.S.	A.C.A.S.(1)	
S.9.S	V.C.A.S.	D. OF POL (AG)	

HS/8/394

ملحق (٣٦)

602 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1949, VOLUME VI

It is clear from your two reftels as well as your Weeka No. 1* that Israeli forces had in fact advanced into Egypt in considerable force and to considerable distance.

US has great strategic and other interests at stake in NE and PGI therefore has no just grounds on which to resent fact that US should react strongly to any action either by Israelis or Arabs containing threat of enlargement of conflict.

You should in fact state that we are making strong representations Egyptians re Egyptian acts complained of in your unnumbered Jan 1, 11 a. m. and 6 Jan 3.* I have also requested Brit make similar representations.

Israelis therefore should only draw simple conclusion that US representations are directed toward composing situation promptly.

Ref last sentence your Jan 1, 11 a. m. re "serious responsibility" US may have incurred through your representations Dept considers that full responsibility rests with parties who are engaging in military operations contrary to SC resolutions.*

LOVETT

* Sent as telegram 5, January 2, not printed.

* Latter not printed; It reported information from Foreign Minister Shertok that on the evening of January 2, an enemy plane, presumably Egyptian, dropped three bombs over Jewish Jerusalem. The message also stated that the Provisional Government of Israel expected the United States to make "very urgent and stern representations to Egypt" concerning this first bombing of Jerusalem (807N.01/1-3-49).

* A marginal notation indicates that this telegram was cleared at the White House with Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel to President Truman. It was reported to London as 12. On the night of January 4, Mr. McDonald handed a paraphrase to Mr. Shertok who "expressed pleasure Dept's explanation. He volunteered information that Israel troop withdrawal was ordered afternoon December 31, that officer in charge asked 24 hour leeway, that withdrawal began January 1 and by morning January 2 'not an Israeli hoof remained in Egypt.'" (telegram 10, January 6, noon, from Tel Aviv, 601.BB Palestine/1-549)

601.DU Palestine/1-340: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, January 3, 1949—5 p. m.
NIACT

2. Please seek immediate audience with King¹ and make following oral representation, leaving memorandum in same sense:

1. Amer Govt has been deeply disturbed at recent renewed outbreak hostilities bet forces of Israel and Egypt in Negev, despite SC's resolutions Nov 4² and Nov 10 and Council's basic resolutions calling for cease-fire and truce in Palestine May 29 and July 15, 1948.³

¹ Farouk, King of Egypt.

² *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1646.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 1070 and 1221.

2. Because serious nature recent fighting and continued neglect countries concerned to heed SC's resolutions, Amer Govt has recently indicated to Provisional Govt of Israel its concern at course events and its belief that Israeli forces should under no circumstances invade territory of Egypt.

3. In same spirit Amer Govt because its long friendship with Egypt feels it must point out similar concern which it has lest attitude of Egypt should be stumbling block to prompt conclusion peace in Middle East. In particular we feel there should be compliance with SC resolution Nov 16, 1948 which called upon parties to Palestine conflict to negotiate armistice either directly or through good offices UN Mediator.

4. It would be most encouraging if Govt Egypt would promptly undertake negotiations looking toward armistice foreseen by SC in its resolution Nov. 16. Any word which King can give this Govt as to his intentions this respect will be appreciated.

5. In light friendly representations made to PGI which have in fact resulted in assurances of withdrawal Israeli forces from Egyptian territory, Amer Govt can expect no less than policy of wise restraint on part Egyptian Govt with respect to further hostilities against Israel. Such incidents as that Jan. 1, when two Egyptian vessels are reported to have approached Israeli coast to attack capital city of Tel Aviv, or recently reported bombing of Jerusalem, can only bring reprisal on part of Israel and will make it difficult for this or any other Govt to counsel PGI against extensive mil operations. Any assurances which King may be able to give as to Egypt's peaceful intent will be awaited with great interest by this Govt.

6. Finally, it should be urged upon King in most serious terms that Amer Govt and people feel time has come to make peace in Palestine. It is essential that hostilities should cease and that statesmanship should be employed to establish lasting peace. We trust that King Farouk as a leader of Arab world will seize this opportunity.

Repeated to London as 11, Tel Aviv as 2.

LOVETT

801N.01/12-2848 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Wells Stabler*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1949—5 p. m.

2. Dept has given careful consideration to Jerusalem tel No. 1550 Dec 23² rptd Amman 15 and to ur 173 Dec 28,³ 172 Dec 28⁴ and 176 Dec 29.⁵ Dept's comment on points raised as follows.

¹ Vice consul at Jerusalem; detailed to Amman.

² *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1687.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1694.

⁴ Not printed, but see footnote 1, *Ibid.*, p. 1700.

⁵ Not printed.

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gone well beyond this limit into field peace settlement. Burrows opined limiting talks to Arab Legion area "might be sinister," since there is school of Arab thought (including Samir Pasha) which believes that as soon as some progress is made with Transjordan, Israeli forces will drive south from Baisan along Jordan valley thus cutting off Iraqis who at present show no signs of either negotiating or going home. Arab Legion is already spread thin and could not take over Iraqi front unless assured it would not have to meet Israeli attacks.

8. Asked regarding British ideas for road ahead, Burrows said Foreign Office still believes, and apparently Ambassador Griffiths agrees, next move should be US and UK reaching understanding regarding territorial objectives (Embassy's top secret despatch 2497 December 21⁶ and A-2377⁷ December 22). He said British Embassy Washington was instructed January 3 to suggest to Dept. that these talks should begin at once. Foreign Office was encouraged by British Embassy report December 28 that Department willing to discuss with UK policy regarding Conciliation Commission which according Foreign Office logically should embrace territorial thinking.

9. Please keep Embassy fully informed.

HOLMES

⁶ Not printed (SGTN.01/12-2148); it transmitted a memorandum of December 17, 1948, prepared by the British War Office, which dealt "with the strategic significance of Palestine and in particular with the importance which the British War Office attaches to the location of Israel's southern frontier." This memorandum was a followup to the Douglas-Berlin meeting of December 14, as described in telegram 5244 from London of the same day, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1670.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1680.

601.BB Palestine/1-449: Telegram

*Mr. John C. Ross*² to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, January 4, 1949—11:25 p. m.

3. For Rusk³ and Satterthwaite.⁴ Bunche informs that Azcarate⁵ phoned from Cairo this evening that Egyptians have confidentially notified him that they are ready to enter into talks with Israel on all outstanding questions under UN auspices provided Israelis will obey SC cease-fire order by 1400 GMT January 5.

¹ Deputy to Senator Warren R. Austin, U.S. Representative at the United Nations.

² Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs.

³ Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

⁴ Pablo Azcarate, Acting Mediator Bunche's Representative at Cairo.

(٣٢) تابع ملحق

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FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1940, VOLUME VI

Bunche describes this development as most encouraging in long time for there apparently are no strings attached. He has instructed Vigier⁶ to take up matter urgently in Tel Aviv pressing strongly in Bunche's name for acceptance. Bunche has received no word from Tel Aviv regarding observance of SC cease-fire order to date. He has instructed Vigier to sound out Israelis on holding a high level conference on Rhodes with civil and military authorities of both Israel and Egypt under UN chairmanship. He thinks Transjordan could relatively easily be persuaded to join such a conference.

Bunche feels strongly that Israel should grab this opportunity at once if they want a peaceful settlement. He feels certain that it is a bona fide offer.

Bunche requests us to find opportunities tomorrow to impress on Israelis urgent importance of accepting this offer by deadline. He feels that advice from appropriate US officials would tip the scales at this critical juncture. However, he emphasized that matter should be treated with the utmost secrecy during next twenty-four hours.⁶

Bunche commented in same conversation this evening that until above development he was seriously contemplating requesting withdrawal of UN observers on Israeli side of lines at SC Negev committee⁷ meeting Friday, January 7, since observers are bottled up in Haifa and Tel Aviv. He feels that unless the SC can make its cease-fire order stick with the Israelis he will have no course but to pull out the military observers which now give only a false sense of security.

Ross

⁶ Henri Vigier, Mr. Bunche's representative at Tel Aviv.

⁷ After consulting with Messrs. Rusk and Satterthwaite, Robert M. McClintock, Special Assistant to Mr. Rusk, telephoned Mr. Ross at 10 a. m., January 5 regarding telegram 3. He observed to Mr. Ross that "the Egyptian deadline for entering into talks with Israel on all outstanding questions, provided the Israelis would obey the Security Council cease fire order by 1400 GMT today, had already passed, since this hour was 9 a. m., EST. Since the suggested representations which Dr. Bunche thought would be useful if made by the United States to the Provisional Government of Israel would have to be cleared with the President and the deadline was already expired, it seemed impossible for us to act on Dr. Bunche's suggestion. I said, however, that I thought it would be entirely appropriate for the Acting Mediator to telephone Mr. Shertok in Tel Aviv and give him the information which Mr. Azcarate had telephoned from Cairo, together with Dr. Bunche's own estimate of the situation." (memorandum of conversation by Mr. McClintock, 501.BB Palestine/1-549)

⁸ A loose usage for the Committee on the Palestinian Question of the Security Council. Messrs. Rusk and Satterthwaite, in a joint memorandum of January 5 to Mr. Lovett, began preparation of instructions to the United States representative on the Committee. The memorandum noted that the Committee "was appointed pursuant to the Security Council's resolution of November 4, which required Israel and Egypt to stop fighting in the Negev and to withdraw their forces to the positions occupied as of October 14. The purpose of the Committee was to study the situation in the light of this resolution and to determine whether it should recommend to the Security Council possible action under Chapter VII in the event that the resolution had not been complied with." (501.BB Palestine/1-549)

leaders be informed of this statement on his part, as he had not informed any of them that he was going to take such action. In speaking thus to the British Minister the King said that he was motivated by the fear that the present conflict would facilitate the spread of Communism in the Near East.

Mr. Bevin's comment on this was that it pointed out the necessity of a firm US-UK agreement on boundaries in Palestine and the use of the influence of the US and UK to persuade both parties to reach a final agreement.

The British Embassy officer also stated that a RAF reconnaissance on January 4 showed a party of thirty Israeli troops still occupying a strong point within Egyptian territory six miles west of El Auja. Photographs taken on this reconnaissance revealed that an anti-tank ditch had been bulldozed across the road one mile west of the strong point and five miles inside Egypt. Three anti-tank guns were observed in position at the strong point.

Editorial Note

Acting Mediator Bunche, at Lake Success on January 6, made a report to the President of the Security Council, which advised that "the Government of Egypt and the Provisional Government of Israel have notified my representatives in Cairo and Tel Aviv, respectively, of their unconditional acceptance of a proposal providing for a cease-fire to be immediately followed by direct negotiations between representatives of the two Governments under United Nations chairmanship on the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of 4 and 16 November 1948." The proposal provided that the cease-fire would be effective on January 5, but the date was postponed until the following day, "owing to unavoidable delays in cable communication with Haifa and Tel Aviv." The effective date was finally fixed at 1200 hours GMT, January 7, "Owing to further communication delays." The Security Council, on January 6, released the text of Mr. Bunche's report as S/1187.

The Acting Mediator informed the Committee on the Palestinian Question of the Security Council on January 7 that he had "transmitted a formal proposal to the parties that since it was desirable for the negotiations to be held in the best possible atmosphere, they be conducted at Rhodes. He had also suggested they get under way Jan. 11 or 12." (telegram 11, January 7, 8:22 p. m., from New York, 501.AJ Treaties/1-749)

Editorial Note

Cairo advised, on January 6 that Ibrahim Abdel Hady, the Egyptian Prime Minister, had telephoned the text of an *aide-memoire* to Ambassador Rahim at Washington. The *aide-memoire* was said to have expressed "appreciation for the friendly sentiments of US designed to reestablish peace in Palestine"; to have "insisted that Egypt had observed the Security Council's resolutions in regards to Palestine while Zionist adversaries had not done so and had moreover bombarded refugee camps and hospitals. Accordingly Egypt had been obliged to exercise legitimate defense against attacks"; and to have expressed astonishment at the accusation of bombarding Jerusalem, for "ever since May 15 [1948]," Egypt had "endeavored to spare Jerusalem and other holy places from the consequences of military action." (telegram 15, 501.BB Palestine/1-649)

The *aide-memoire*, an undated message from the Egyptian Embassy to the Department of State, was handed to Mr. Satterthwaite by Ambassador Rahim on January 7. (867N.01/1-749)

501.BB Palestine/1-649: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT WASHINGTON, January 6, 1949—3 p. m.
NIACT

3. Confirming Rusk-Ross telephone conversation today, following is attitude to be adopted by USRep in SC Committee on Palestine scheduled for Fri., Jan. 7.

Principal objective is to get SC and its Committee to deal with Palestine in such way as not to impair possibility of success of Conciliation Commission. Inactivity Lebanese, Syrians, Iraqi, Saudi Arabians and negotiations now in process between Israel and Trans-jordan would make it unfortunate for an exaggeration of present Israeli-Egyptian difficulty to throw entire Palestine situation into fresh turmoil. US is exercising maximum influence on both Israel and Egypt to cease present hostilities.

SC Committee should give careful study to the reports of the Acting Mediator and his Chief of Staff on the actual fighting in the Negev and to the statements of PGI and Egypt before making Committee recommendations to SC as whole. If Bunche-Riley reports and statements of parties do not sufficiently clarify the picture, the Committee should, through its Chairman, request additional info from those having access to the facts.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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A.M. Form 1700

125/99

CYPHER MESSAGE

WARNING.—This cypher message must first be paraphrased if it is necessary to publish its text or to communicate it to persons outside British or United States Government Services and Departments. Messages marked "One-Time Pad" or "O.T.P." are excepted from this rule.

This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorized recipient and not passed on.

AC. Cypher /OTP GC.20930

Received Registry Telegrams 6th December, 1948.

FROM— CAIRO: Sir R. Campbell.

TO— FOREIGN OFFICE.

HE:166B December 5th.

URGENT SECRET

Radar sets for Egyptian Air Force.

Position has not finally obtained since by telegram No.1007 [grp. unrec.] letter 04/9/48 of July 19th and Egyptian Department's reply J4730/204/16 of July 29th.

2. Jewish Air Force has greatly expanded and air activity both East and West of the Canal has increased according to reports of the Egyptian Observer posts, and plots revealed on the new early warning radar set screen which has already been made available to the Egyptians, on loan from the RAF.

3. Although the accuracy of these reports may be doubtful, it does not alter the fact that the effect has been seriously to interrupt the R.A.F. night flying training in the Canal Zone, and particularly, the night bombing exercises at El Shatt range which is the only range at present available to the R.A.F. and is located East of the Canal, opposite Suez, and within the Egyptian gun defended area around Suez.

4. I am advised that Bomber Command Squadrons now operating double "Sunny" exercises have in consequence had to return to the United Kingdom without completing their night bombing programme, and that the constant interruptions are being viewed with grave concern by the Air Commander-in-Chief MED/SC1.

5. Despite close co-operation between the R.A.F. and the Egyptians, it has proved impossible to avoid continual interruption of R.A.F. use of the El Shatt range, owing to its position on the Eastern air approach to Suez and within the gun defended area.

6. Use of an alternative range at Shal [grp. unrec. ? 10] which is to the North of Suez, outside the gun defended area around Suez and West of the Canal has been proposed by the R.A.F. To this the Egyptian administrator objected on grounds that without further radar, their observer personnel would be unable to state whether an aircraft flying high by night West of the Canal was friendly RAF aircraft on bombing exercise or a hostile Jewish aircraft on route to bombing exercise or a hostile Jewish aircraft on route to Cairo or other Egyptian town or target for attack, particularly in the Canal area such as the oil refineries at Suez.

7. In order to make use of the proposed Shal [grp. unrec. ? 10] range which should obviate interruptions in R.A.F. night flying training, Air Commander-in-Chief MED/H.E. is prepared to make available to the Egyptians a further two type 6j early warning radar sets on loan subject to the following conditions.

/ (2)

Note.—In the interests of economy, both sides of this sheet should be used.

(٤٠) ملحق

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

reference -

> 371/69289

XC/B/1004

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC DISTRIBUTION.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

J 8282

Sir R. Campbell,
No. 1795

D. 10.56 a.m. 29th December, 1948.

29th December, 1948. R. 10.15 a.m. 29th December, 1948.

Repeated to Washington, U.K. Del. Security Council, Paris, Amman,
Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jerusalem and Jeddah.HOT IMMEDIATE.CONFIDENTIAL.Addressed to Foreign Office telegram 1795, repeated
for information to Washington, U.K. Del. Security Council Paris,
Amman, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jerusalem and Jeddah.

Haidar Pasha Egyptian Minister of War has just sent a senior Air Force officer to inform Air Attaché for my information and that of His Majesty's Government that main battery is now in the region of El Auja (repeat El Auja) which is about 1 mile on the Palestine side of the Egyptian frontier on the road to Beerseba. Some Jewish armoury is believed to have crossed the Egyptian frontier and possibly to be making for El Arish which is the Egyptian forward air base and frontier garrison town. Egyptian Minister for war asks urgently for 20 long range petrol tanks to enable Egyptian Spitfire aircraft to operate from airfields in the Canal area. He also asks for facilities at air fields in the Canal Zone at present occupied by British forces.

2. I should be grateful for most immediate instructions, I have informed Commanders in Chief Canal Zone.

Foreign Office please pass Hot Immediate to Washington and U.K. Del. Paris as my telegrams 185 and 55 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and Paris (for U.K. Del.)].

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference:-

FO 371/69289

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CYPHER/OTP

DIPLOMATIC DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R. Campbell.
No. 1,799.

D: 11.01 a.m. 29th December, 1948. f.

29th December, 1948.

R: 11.10 a.m. 29th December, 1948.

Repeated to: Washington,
U.K. Delegation Paris (Security Council),
Amman,
Bagdad,
Beirut,
Damascus,
Jedda,
Jerusalem.

INDEXED

MOST IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1799 of 29th December repeated for information to Washington, U.K. Delegation to Security Council Paris, Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda and Jerusalem.

My telegram No. 1799.

Ministry of War have just informed my Air Attache that Jewish forces are now within 10 kilometres of El Arish i.e. well within Egyptian territory.

Foreign Office please pass Most Immediate to Washington and U.K. Delegation Paris as my telegrams Nos. 184 and 38 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington and Paris (for U.K. Del.)]



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CYPHER

29/12/48
Despatched 2.25 PM.

Draft.

Secret.
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MOST IMMEDIATE

~~MOST IMMEDIATE~~

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 13611 of 29th December, 1948 repeated for

To Washington

Telegram

No. 13611

information ~~most immediate~~ to Cairo and Paris (for UK Delegation to Security Council) ~~UN Security Council, Paris and immediate~~

(Date) - December 1948

Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda and Jerusalem.

Repeat to:-

Most immediate to Cairo (UKDEL, Security Council) Paris

You should inform State Department

Immediate to
Amman, 1180
Bagdad, 1124
Beirut, 1135
Damascus, 875
Jedda, 1023
Jerusalem, 1210

Immediately of substance of Cairo telegrams 1793 and 1799. You should say that I have so far no (repeat no) confirmation from any other source of statements of Egyptian Ministry of War but that instructions are being sent to the R.A.F. in Egypt to verify the position by immediate reconnaissance.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

~~in Class.~~
~~over~~
Cypher.

2. You should add that if Jewish forces are in fact attacking Egyptian territory our obligations under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty would of course come into play.

Distribution:-

Diplomatic.

Mills

29/12

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1698

FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1948, VOLUME V

While it would be inadvisable to discuss these questions with Arab officials at the present time, in your discretion you may wish to discuss them with your British colleagues and possibly with certain American nationals concerned with refugee matters. Such discussion, however, should be on an informal and personal basis and no reference to this instruction should be made.

LOVETT

501.EB Palestine/12-2945: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris*SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, December 29, 1945—11 a. m.
NIACT

4937. For Jessup. Brit Emb has just informed Dept as follows. Brit FouOff has recd two cables from Brit Emb Cairo dated Dec 29. First quoted Haidar Pasha Egyptian Min War as stating Israeli forces were in vicinity El Auja and some had perhaps crossed Egyptian frontier. Message stated Egyptians were requesting UK permission for Egyptian Spitfires to operate out of Suez Canal zone.

Second and subsequent message quoted Haidar Pasha as stating Israelis were then within 10 miles of El Arish and well over Egyptian frontier.

Brit FouOff desired substance these two messages be given Dept. FouOff stated no confirmation from other sources but RAF had been instructed to verify by reconnaissance. If Israelis had in fact crossed Egyptian frontier UK obligations under terms Anglo-Egyptian treaty would of course come into play.¹

LOVETT

¹ This telegram was repeated to Cairo.

501.DB Palestine/12-2945: Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT TEL AVIV, December 29, 1948—4 p. m.

349. Acceptance by S.C. of Beeley resolution¹ would, we believe, postpone peace in Negev by encouraging Egypt's continued refusal negotiate armistice. Moreover, PGI cannot surrender military gains in Negev especially since Egypt shows no willingness recognize Israel's existence, MG [sic] state or to deal with PGI.

McDONALD

¹ See resolution of December 29, *infra*.

501.BB Palestine/T2-2048

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 30, 1948.

Participants: The Acting Secretary, Mr. Lovett
 The British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks
 The British Minister, Mr. Hoyer Millar
 Mr. Satterthwaite—NEA
 Mr. McClintock—UNA

The British Ambassador called, under instructions to leave a *Note Verbale* with the Acting Secretary of State with reference to the existing hostilities in Palestine. A copy of this document is attached. Sir Oliver Franks read, from a telegram just received by his Embassy, reports from the British Ambassador in Cairo to the effect that an Israeli column had bifurcated in the vicinity of Beersheba and that attacks were being made by Israeli forces across the Egyptian frontier from the south and southeast on a line from Rafah extending fifteen kilometers in the direction of El Arish. One Egyptian airstrip on Egyptian territory had been taken by the Israeli forces. Egyptian Spitfires had landed out of gas on British airfields in the Canal zones, thus implying that advanced Egyptian airfields were no longer operable.

When asked whether, if the treaty of 1936 were invoked, it would be invoked by the British Government or by the Egyptian Government, particularly in light of the fact that the latter government had recently shown its dissatisfaction with that treaty, the British Ambassador said that he could give no straight answer. He emphasized that his information on the military situation was preliminary but that, according to the evidence now at hand, it seemed highly probable that Israeli forces had crossed the Egyptian frontier and that in consequence a most serious situation had arisen. He spoke of the strategic interests of the United States and the United Kingdom in this area and, from the broader political point of view, the troubles which could ensue to both governments if the present threatening situation were allowed to continue.

I said that we agreed that the situation, if the facts were as represented, was a serious one and that we were ready to do our best to compose it. I said the President had been informed yesterday of the most recent information and that I would discuss the Ambassador's *Note Verbale* with the President at 12:30 today.* I thought, offhand, that it might be useful for the President to instruct our Representative at Tel Aviv to make immediate representations to the Provisional Government of Israel.

¹ Drafted by Mr. McClintock.² President Truman read this note at 12:45 p. m., December 30.

As for the final paragraph of the *Note Verbale*, I could not but say frankly that if the British Government decided to resume the shipment of arms to the Arab countries this would be regarded as a clear violation of the Security Council's arms embargo. It would inevitably result in a demand in this country for the lifting of our own arms embargo which, as the Ambassador knew, had been imposed by us unilaterally even before the Security Council took action. Such a development would, of course, be highly unfortunate.

Mr. McClintock suggested to the Ambassador that there was a seeming inconsistency between the first and final paragraphs of the *Note Verbale*. The concluding sentence of the first paragraph reads "If the Security Council is thus flouted the United Nations will cease to be an effective force", yet the final sentence of the fourth paragraph clearly indicates that the British Government intends to resume shipping arms to the Arab countries, thus itself flouting the United Nations.

Sir Oliver Franks at this point said that he had been given permission, but only in terms of "utmost discretion", to inform the Acting Secretary that a telegram had been received from the British Representative in Amman, stating that King Abdullah had received a message from the Jews (presumably the Provisional Government of Israel) that the time for negotiations for an armistice had passed. The Jews were interested now only in negotiating peace. If it was not to be peace, it would be war. Sir Oliver inferred that it was on the basis of this threatening information that his government had drafted the final paragraph of the *Note Verbale*. The British Ambassador was asked his opinion whether his Government would carry out the intended action described in Paragraph 4, if through the cooperation of the United States it proved possible to meet the suggestions made in Paragraph 3, with the result that the forces of Israel would withdraw from Egyptian territory immediately. Sir Oliver said that he was speaking only for himself but he thought it possible that his government would not proceed to arm the other Arab countries if indeed it was possible to restrain the Israelis from their present attack on Egypt and to get their forces back across the border.

Sir Oliver reverted to his telephone conversation with me¹ in which he had requested an interview with the President. I said that the President was giving no outside appointments this week as he was engaged on the State of the Union Message. Sir Oliver asked if I would present his case to the President and I said I would at once give him the British *Note Verbale* and report our interview. At the Ambassador's request I promised to ask the President to accord him an interview at the earliest possible moment.

¹The editors have found no record of

Note Verbale by the British Embassy

All the evidence in possession of the British Government points to the fact that, notwithstanding the truce and the resolutions passed by the United Nations, Israeli forces are fighting on Egyptian territory, where they are in possession of airfields. They have declined the use of United Nations observers and officials and it seems that United Nations, upon which the United States and Britain had both pledged their action, are being deliberately and totally ignored. If the Security Council is thus flouted the United Nations will cease to be an effective force.

2. The British Government regard the situation with grave concern. Unless the Jews withdraw from Egyptian territory the British Government will be bound to take steps to fulfil their obligations under their treaty of 1936 with Egypt. There may arise out of this situation the gravest possible consequences, not only to Anglo-American strategic interests in the Near East, but also to American relations with Britain and Western Europe.

3. The British Government have no desire to get into conflict with the Jews provided the latter accept the decisions of the Security Council of the United Nations and act upon them. They still trust that wiser counsels among the Jews will prevail. They trust that it will be possible for the United States Government so to act upon the Jews as to make any military action by British forces on Egyptian territory unnecessary under our treaty with Egypt. This can only be ensured if the Jews immediately withdraw from Egyptian territory.

4. Meanwhile, the British Government feel bound to take the necessary steps to protect their own troops and installations in Transjordan. The British Government agreed not to supply any arms to the Arab countries provided the truce was observed, and they understood that the United States Government were agreeable that Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter should be applied to either party which did not observe the truce. On that basis, the British Government have carried out their obligations to the absolute letter. They have refrained from moving arms and equipment even to their own installations, thereby endangering their own troops in order to assist a settlement. In view of the very serious danger the British Government must now proceed to move equipment into Transjordan. Moreover, in view of the aggressive use to which the Jews have put arms obtained from Russian satellite countries, the British Government will find themselves in a position in which they are no longer able to refuse to carry out British contracts to the Arab countries

(ملحق (٤٦)

1704 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1948, VOLUME V

301.BB Palestine/12-3048: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)*TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, December 30, 1948—5 p. m.
KLAFT

251. President directs that you make following immediate representation to Shertok and Ben Gurion. You are authorized in your discretion to make same representation to President Weizmann. Please telegraph immediate report of your interviews.

1. This Govt is most deeply disturbed on receipt of apparently authentic reports confirming that Egyptian territory has been invaded by armed forces of Israel. Reports indicate that this is not an accidental maneuver but a deliberately planned military operation.

2. British Govt has officially notified this Govt that it regards situation with grave concern and that unless Israeli forces withdraw from Egyptian territory British Govt will be bound to take steps to fulfill their obligations under Treaty of 1936 with Egypt. However, British Govt states it has no desire to get into conflict with Govt of Israel provided latter accept decisions of Security Council of UN and act upon them.

3. As first gov't to recognize PGI and as a sponsor of Israel's application for admission to UN as a "peace-loving state" this Govt, with deep concern and as evidence of its consistent friendship for Israel, desires to draw attention of Israeli Govt to grave possibility that by ill-advised action PGI may not only jeopardize peace of Middle East but would also cause reconsideration of its application for membership in UN and of necessity a reconsideration by this Govt of its relations with Israel. As PGI knows, their assurances of peaceful intent have been basis upon which our policy toward Israel has rested.

4. Immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory appears to be minimum requirement giving proof of peaceful intent of PGI, if enlarged conflict is to be avoided.

5. This Govt has received reports from its representative in Transjordan indicating that PGI has informed Govt of Transjordan that time for negotiations for an armistice has passed. PGI is represented as stating that it is interested now only in negotiating peace, but indicated that it must be either peace or war. If this threatening attitude should be confirmed, again this Govt would have no other course than to undertake a substantial review of its attitude toward Israel.

6. You may conclude by stating that temporarily your Govt is withholding press comment pending a complete statement from PGI in answer to the foregoing representation.

Repeated to Amembassy, London as 4819.

LOVETT

Forrestal Papers

Diary Entry for December 31, 1948, by the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)

Cabinet—China—Palestine

Subject this morning at Cabinet was China.

[Here follow two paragraphs concerning China.]

Palestine:

Lovett said the Israeli troops had apparently invaded Egypt. Specifically, they were reported to have attacked an air field within the Egyptian border; that it was reported the British would notify us that the failure of the Israelis to withdraw promptly would automatically bring into operation the Anglo-Egyptian mutual defense pact.

601.BB Palestine/12-3145: Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
XIACT

URGENT

TEL AVIV, December 31, 1948—1 p. m.

350. Redeptel 281, December 30, 5 p. m., received at 1 p. m. December 31. True copy typed at 1:45. At 2 p. m. called Shertok who came my house and I read him careful paraphrase. Knox present. Shertok informed me Ben-Gurion left Tel Aviv for Tiberias at 12 noon but would immediately attempt get in touch with him. I urged necessity my seeing BG here or Tiberias today. Owing distance Tel Aviv to Tiberias and gravity of question 10 or 12 hours may elapse before I am able send full reply.

Shertok's tentative and informal preliminary reply was as follows:

1. As for Israel incursion into Egypt he admitted such operations but stated uninformed as to details (Shertok returned Israel only last 24 hours). Shertok observed that his opinion such operations based on military logic of total operations and not any intentions seize Egyptian territory.

2. As regards Trans-Jordan Shertok was positive. He stated that our government's advices inaccurate. Israel has informed Trans-Jordan that negotiations must proceed further than present cease-fire arrangements toward an effective armistice looking toward peace. Last secret meeting of negotiators took place night December 30 in Arab part Jerusalem with Shiloah, Colonel Dayan and secretary on one side and Abdullah el-Tel on other. Next secret meeting is for January 5 in Jewish Jerusalem. Shertok stated that if any statement re-

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guarding "war or peace" was made at earlier meeting it was in course conversational exchange, was not an ultimatum, and used in an effort persuade Trans-Jordan proceed to definite armistice.¹

McDONALD

¹ Mr. McDonald, later the same day, reported that he and Mr. Knox were leaving immediately for Tiberias to see the Israeli Prime Minister, who was ill. He also advised of information from Mr. Shiloah that orders had already been issued for the immediate withdrawal of small Israeli units from the Egyptian side of the frontier (telegram 351 from Tel Aviv, 501.DB Palestine/12-3148).

867X.01/12-2548: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Wells Stabler, at Amman

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1949—5 p. m.

2. Dept has given careful consideration Jerusalem tel No. 1550 Dec 23 rptd Amman 15 and to ur 173 Dec 28, 172 Dec 28¹ and 176 Dec. 29.² Dept's comment on points raised as follows:

Dept anxious see peace restored to Palestine and believes should be accomplished by negotiations, either directly between parties or through Conciliation Commission. Dept would naturally welcome any concrete steps by Israelis or Arabs to bring about such negotiations. In this connection Dept has found reasonable attitude shown by TJ re negotiations with Jews extremely hopeful sign.

US, however, naturally desires avoid becoming involved in inter-Arab jealousies and intrigues and Dept regards question TJ relations with Arab League as essentially one for determination by TJ. As you point out ur 176 Dec 29, determining factor seems to be mil one. Dept believes final attitude TJ re Israelis will be decided by mil situation, particularly position of Arab Legion, and by stand taken by UK. Not essential, therefore, and certainly undesirable that US become involved in question TJ attitude re Arab League and other Arab States.

Dept believes that most satisfactory solution disposition greater part Arab Palestine would be incorporation in Transjordan. Therefore Dept approves principle underlying Jericho resolutions.

To sum up, US would like to see TJ negotiate armistice and final peace with Israelis, and believes most Arab Palestine could be incorporated in Transjordan as outcome such negotiations. However, US can not become involved in inter-Arab politics. If King and TJ officials

¹ No. 172 not printed; but see footnotes 1 and 3, p. 1700.

² Not printed; it advised that British Minister Kirkbride had cabled the Foreign Office for instructions concerning an approach to King Abdullah. The Minister commented that the policy of the Foreign Office to "hold back until Conciliation Commission arrives" no longer corresponded with the facts and that the King was fearful that the Israelis would "continue war against him or Iraqis or both unless he agrees in immediate future to peace negotiations." The King was said to be aware that the Arab Legion and the Israel Army would be defeated

ISRAEL

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONTROVERSY OVER THE FUTURE STATUS OF PALESTINE;¹ ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS; UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO ATTAIN A FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE AREA

601.DD Palestine/1-149: Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonold)
to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET US URGENT TEL AVIV, January 1, 1949—9 a. m.
NIACT

1. For attention President and Acting Secretary.² ReDeptel 281, December 30 and Miste's 350, 351, December 31.³ Returned from Tiberias 3: 15 a. m. Had two hours with Ben Gurion.⁴ Knox⁵ present. I read Ben Gurion the same paraphrase I read Shortok.⁶ After considerable deliberation he replied as follows: (paragraph references are to Department's 281).

1. "We have not invaded Egyptian territory nor do we have any intention of doing so. It is true some Israel Forces had to cross frontier into Egypt in course of tactical operations but they have already received orders to return to the Negev frontier."

2. As regards British notification to US Government he said, "in note Great Britain threatens to take action against us under 1936 Treaty with Egypt and unless we obey the decisions of the SC. In this latter connection I am confused and surprised. Great Britain is a member of the SC with which we are dealing directly and cordially. Does Great Britain plan to take independent action to enforce decisions of SC?"

3. "We are very grateful for the friendship of the US and value it. I note the italics on the phrase 'peace-loving' and am distressed. We are indeed peace-loving and have consistently shown it. We are last people in the world to want to break the peace in Middle East or else-

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, pp. 633 ff.

² Robert A. Lovett.

³ For Nos. 281 and 350, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1704 and 1705; No. 351 is not printed, but see footnote 1, *ibid.*, p. 1700.

⁴ David Ben-Gurion, Israeli Prime Minister.

⁵ Charles F. Knox, Jr., Counselor of Mission at Tel Aviv.

⁶ Moshe Shortok, Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs.

where. We are a very small people and we can survive only in peace. What we are doing is in self-defense. We have been attacked. We must reserve our right to defend ourselves even if we go down fighting. I believe the American Government and people will recognize this right. We accepted the UN request for an armistice and peace. Egypt rejected it."

4. Orders for the withdrawal of the Israel units have already been given.

5. "The reports communicated to your government about our negotiations with Transjordan are untrue and astonishing. Israel is now in the act of negotiating an armistice with Transjordan and is on the best terms with that government. There have been no threats on either side. We have met on very friendly terms and our next meeting is set for January 6."

Prime Minister then commented "I am pained by the severe tone of this communication which might have been written by Bevin¹ himself". He then stated that a formal written reply would be prepared immediately after Cabinet meeting on Sunday.

He concluded by speaking of peace negotiations with Lebanon which he said were also progressing encouragingly.

McDONALD

¹ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

501.DB Palestine/1-140 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

IMMEDIATE

TEL AVIV, January 1, 1949—11 a. m.

NIACF

2. Attention President and Acting Secretary. At approximately 2:30 a. m. January 1, two Egyptian vessels approached off coast to attack Tel Aviv. Air alert sounded and Israel coastal batteries replied to attack fire. No hits, no casualties. Israel military spokesmen issued following warning: "up to now the various arms of the defense army of Israel have refrained from taking any action outside the immediate battle areas in the south. If the Egyptians should repeat their last night's attempt and direct attacks in whatever form against the civilian population of Israel, we shall take whatever action we deem appropriate against Egypt, and, in particular, against the Egyptian capital, Cairo."

At New Year's Day reception in our residence, President Weizmann² stated to mission staff that the representations I made yester-

² This telegram was originally received as an unnumbered message.

³ Chaim Weizmann, President of the Provisional Government of Israel.

It is clear from your two reflets as well as your Weeka No. 1² that Israeli forces had in fact advanced into Egypt in considerable force and to considerable distance.

US has great strategic and other interests at stake in NE and PGI therefore has no just grounds on which to resent fact that US should react strongly to any action either by Israelis or Arabs containing threat of enlargement of conflict.

You should in fact state that we are making strong representations Egyptians re Egyptian acts complained of in your unnumbered Jan 1, 11 a. m. and 6 Jan 3.⁴ I have also requested Brit make similar representations.

Israelis therefore should only draw simple conclusion that US representations are directed toward composing situation promptly.

Ref last sentence your Jan 1, 11 a. m. re "serious responsibility" US may have incurred through your representations Dept considers that full responsibility rests with parties who are engaging in military operations contrary to SC resolutions.⁵

LOVETT

² Sent as telegram 5, January 2, not printed.

³ Latter not printed; it reported information from Foreign Minister Shertok that on the evening of January 2, an enemy plane, presumably Egyptian, dropped three bombs over Jewish Jerusalem. The message also stated that the Provisional Government of Israel expected the United States to make "very urgent and stern representations to Egypt" concerning this first bombing of Jerusalem (807N.01/1-310).

⁴ A marginal notation indicates that this telegram was cleared at the White House with Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel to President Truman. It was reported to London as 12. On the night of January 4, Mr. McDonald handed a paraphrase to Mr. Shertok who "expressed pleasure Dept's explanation. He volunteered information that Israel troop withdrawal was ordered afternoon December 31, that officer in charge asked 24 hour leeway, that withdrawal began January 1 and by morning January 2 'not an Israeli hoof remained in Egypt.'" (telegram 10, January 5, noon, from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/1-549)

501.BB Palestine/1-340: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, January 3, 1949—5 p. m.
NIACT

2. Please seek immediate audience with King¹ and make following oral representation, leaving memorandum in same sense:

1. Amer Govt has been deeply disturbed at recent renewed outbreak hostilities bet forces of Israel and Egypt in Negev, despite SC's resolutions Nov 4² and Nov 10 and Council's basic resolutions calling for cease-fire and truce in Palestine May 29 and July 15, 1948.³

¹ Farouk, King of Egypt.

² *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1510.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 1070 and 1221.

refusal to follow British calculations and ill-advised policies. But I am unable to square the United States' warning that they would review their support of Israel's application for membership to the United Nations if our forces remained on Egyptian territory, with United States' sponsorship of Egyptian election to the Security Council while Egyptian forces were actually invading and attacking Israel. As a result of such sponsorship, Egypt, which defied the authority of the United Nations and broke the peace in the Middle East, is now a member of the very Council whose function it is to suppress aggression and maintain international peace.

Finally, I should point out that Egypt, in addition to defying the resolution of November, 1947, also failed to comply with the Security Council's resolution of November 16³ and the Assembly's resolution of December 11, 1948,⁴ which ordered both parties to enter into negotiations for armistice and peaceful settlement. I trust that the above submissions may assist you in determining where the initiative, responsibility, and guilt for the present unhappy situation properly lie.

I should reiterate that the Provisional Government of Israel is ready at any time to enter into negotiations toward the speediest possible attainment of peace.

CHAIM WEIZMANN

³ See telegram Delga 740, November 14, 1948, from Paris; footnote 2 to Delga 740; and editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1582, 1583, and 1587.

⁴ See editorial note, *ibid.*, p. 1601.

WM.DB Palestine/1-140: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative in Israel (McDonald), at Tel Aviv

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, JANUARY 3, 1949—5 p. m.

3. Re our 1 Jan 1 and unnumbered Jan 1, 11 a. m.¹ Dept surprised at comments made by Ben Gurion, Weizmann and others on your representations based on Deptel 281 Dec 30.² Please make it clear to them and others directly concerned that there should be no misconception in minds of Israelis as to purpose these representations. It was as indicated Deptel 281 to stop a move with most serious implications which Brit were contemplating. Another purpose was to avoid if possible Brit rearming of Arabs which Brit apparently determined carry out if all Israeli forces not promptly withdrawn from Egypt.

¹ Regarding the latter, see telegram 2 and footnote 1, p. 506.

² *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1704.

501.BB Palestine/1-549

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 5, 1949.

Participants: The Acting Secretary, Mr. Lovett
 The British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks
 Mr. Bronley, First Secretary of the British Embassy
 Mr. Satterthwaite—NEA
 Mr. Wilkins—NE
 Mr. McClintock—UNA

Sir Oliver Franks said that he had been instructed personally to thank the Acting Secretary of State for the prompt and effective intervention which this Government had made with the Provisional Government of Israel and which had resulted in instructions being given by the Israeli Government for the withdrawal of its forces from Egypt.

The British Ambassador said that Mr. Bevin, in view of the very great strategic interests of both the United States and Great Britain in the Near East and in the light of the necessity for an adequate defense in depth of the Suez Canal, very much hoped that the American Government might find its way clear to exert pressure on the Israeli Government to withdraw to the lines in the Negev established by the Acting Mediator after the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution of November 4, 1948.

I told the British Ambassador that for a variety of reasons I did not feel that we could accede to Mr. Bevin's request. While, in an exceptional case such as that when the incursion by Israeli forces into Egypt threatened a much more grave conflict outside the boundaries of Palestine, we had been willing to make strong representations, our general line of policy was to operate through the United Nations. It did not seem proper for the United States to take on itself the responsibilities of the Security Council and apply them unilaterally. Furthermore, we had found in practice that strong representations, to be effective, should be used sparingly, otherwise notes often were merely interesting documents for the archives but useful for no other purpose. Finally, we had our position on the Conciliation Commission to consider. The Israeli authorities already believed that two of the Members of the Commission were prejudiced in favor of the Arabs, since Turkey was a Moslem country and France not only had 25 million Mohammedans living under its jurisdiction but also had not voted for Israel in last month's sessions of the Security Council. If we were

¹ Drafted by Mr. McClintock.

to achieve anything as an impartial member of the Commission we could not jeopardize that position by taking a line which would cause the Israelis to feel that even the third Member was against them. Meanwhile, of course, we continued to share the British anxiety over the situation in Palestine and were not stinting our efforts to do the utmost to bring about a cessation of hostilities. In fact we were this afternoon addressing new representations to the Governments of Israel and Egypt, based on a report received last night from the Acting Mediator, to the effect that Egypt had said it was willing to undertake negotiations all across the board with Israel under United Nations auspices, provided Israel accepted a cease-fire by 1400 hours GMT today. The deadline was so short that we were inclined to be suspicious whether the offer was bonafide but we thought that a representation was warranted by our desire to do everything possible to facilitate a cessation of hostilities.

Sir Oliver said that the second main point which Mr. Bevin wished to make was that with the continued stress of warfare in the Near East conditions in the Arab countries would become, as he put it, deliquescent, or, to use the more graphic aphorism of the Foreign Secretary, "We should have another China on our hands". Accordingly, it was of the utmost importance that the United States and Great Britain, whose strategic interests were so involved in that area, do their utmost to compose this dangerous situation. Mr. Bevin wondered if the American Member of the Conciliation Commission might not be instructed by his Government to keep in mind the strategic interests of the United States and the United Kingdom and to use his good influence to further those interests. I said that, while naturally we would give background information to Mr. Keenan, our Representative on the Commission, we had no choice but to do our utmost to play the role of a true conciliator. Mr. Keenan and his colleagues had the task of trying to find some common ground for agreement which would be acceptable to all the parties concerned. If they could get agreement between the parties we would be bound to accept such an arrangement. However, Mr. Keenan of course would comport his action to the main lines of policy which had already been made public to the world by Dr. Jessup in his speech before Committee 1 on November 20.² I briefly recapitulated our main points, including the fact that if the Israeli Government desired to benefit by the territorial provisions of the resolution of November 29, 1947, it should be expected to relinquish such areas as were awarded to the Arabs

² See editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1617. Philip C. Jessup was the spokesman of the United States on questions involving Palestine at the Third Session of the General Assembly at Paris.

by that resolution but were now occupied by Israel, as Jaffa and western Galilee. In other words, they could not have it both ways. As for the strategic implications of the situation, I said that Mr. Keenan would be briefed before he went. The British Ambassador seemed to be satisfied with this answer.

Sir Oliver then said that he had received permission to tell us that shortly British reinforcements would be sent to the Gulf of Aqaba.³ He did not, however, wish to inform us officially of this fact if we had no desire for such intelligence from his Government. In response to questioning the Ambassador intimated that the British reinforcements would be sent from outside by sea and that they numbered three companies in strength. (Mr. Bromley, however, murmured that he thought something like a battalion was being sent to Aqaba.)

I said that we had already received similar reports from other sources, including the press. I did not think that this Government wished to be officially apprised of the Ambassador's information. As a matter of friendly comment, however, we wished to raise a little red flag and point out that if the troops indeed came to Transjordan from outside the Near Eastern area their arrival would be construed in many quarters as a violation of the Security Council truce resolution of May 29, which explicitly forbade the movement of military personnel into Palestine or the neighboring countries.

The interview concluded with Sir Oliver handing me a written statement of his Government's views on the situation in China and a memorandum of its views with respect to the IRO.⁴

³The British Foreign Office communiqué on this matter, issued on January 8, read as follows: "His Majesty's Government have received a request from the Transjordan Government under the terms of the Anglo-Transjordan treaty of March 1948, to send a British force to Aqaba. His Majesty's Government have acceded to this request." (telegram 91, January 8, from London, 841.23901/1-849).
⁴Chargé Holmes, on January 5, cabled the Department concerning the instructions sent to Ambassador Franks on January 3 for his conversation with Acting Secretary Lovett. He noted that Mr. Bering had personally drafted the instructions, which in part called for the Ambassador "to refer to identical lines of policy regarding Middle East worked out between US and UK in fall 1947, and to say that all British actions Middle East are based on this policy and nothing else. British Government understood US views general Middle East problems have not altered since 1947. . . . Franks told to urge USG to participate in resolute effort with UK to arrive at firm conclusions which US and UK can support as Palestine solution. Instruction stated three things necessary to accomplish this:

- "(a) Fix frontiers Israel which US and UK could support;
- "(b) UK recognition PGI;
- "(c) Strong advice to Arabs if not to accept at least to acquiesce in agreed frontiers and to cease fighting."

The Ambassador was instructed "to urge that US and UK come to 'very firm conclusions' and fix definite boundaries and thus arrive at final settlement 'which will save Middle East'." (Telegram 47, 867N.01/1-549)

Regarding the "identical lines of policy" agreed upon at the "Pentagon Talks of 1947," see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 485 ff.

(٥١) ملحق

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action agreed to by the Government of Transjordan could remove the threat to Israel security so long as Iraqi troops remain on Israeli territory a few miles distant from the coast and from the most densely populated centres of Jewish population.

7. There are contradictory reports of Iraq's intention to abide by any agreement signed by Transjordan. Reports of Iraq's willingness to this effect were published, later denied by General Riley, given renewed currency and later denied by the Iraqi Premier. The Transjordan delegation has now informed Dr. Bunche that they are now empowered to represent Iraq. It is obviously necessary, however, to have this undertaking from the Iraqi Government itself. Dr. Bunche has now invited the Iraqi Government to confirm officially that it will consider itself bound by any agreement signed by the Transjordan delegation. In the meantime, a discussion is proceeding on the armistice lines on other fronts.

8. The conclusion here is that unless Iraq, as well as Syria, complies directly, or through an accredited intermediary with the November 16th resolution, the prospects of an armistice with the Lebanon and Transjordan will be gravely impaired. Should it become necessary, Israel may have to ask the SC whether Syria or Iraq are justified in refusing to comply with the November 16th resolution."

AUSTIN

FGTN.01/3-1049

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 10, 1949.

We received two rather alarming telegrams from our Legation in Amman, the capital of Transjordan, yesterday afternoon. The first¹ indicated that Israeli forces in rather large strength had started moving into the southern Negev area which, according to the telegram, is under Arab Legion occupation. The second telegram² reported that King Abdullah had informed our Chargé d'Affaires that Israeli forces had been attacking an Arab Legion post at Ein Gharandal, four miles inside the Transjordan frontier.³

¹ No. 88, March 9, not printed.

² No. 90, March 9, not printed.

³ A third telegram of March 9, No. 89, gave Mr. Stabler's view that the Israeli advance, when negotiations for an armistice by Transjordan and Israel were proceeding, "seems ultimate in breach of good faith" and a flouting of the United Nations by Israel. The Israeli action was said to be "further evidence to Arabs that Israeli intentions, far from being peaceful, are perfidious and aggressive. . . . Cause of peace, which Israel claims earnestly to desire, is not being served through this later maneuver." Mr. Stabler then recommended urgently that the United States "make immediate representations in strongest possible terms to Israel demanding that Israeli forces return at once to and remain in positions occupied at time commencement Rhodes talks and that Israel finally accept principle that any questions relating to territorial disposition must await final peace settlement." (501.333 Palestine/3-949)

The Department called in Ambassador-designate Elath⁴ and gave him the substance of the reports we had received. Elath brought with him a telegram which Dr. Bunche had sent the Israeli Government from Rhodes quoting a note which Bunche had received from the Chief of the Transjordan armistice delegation at Rhodes informing him under the instructions of the Transjordan Government that Israeli forces had crossed the Transjordan military lines in the Negev on the morning of March 7 and describing the situation as extremely delicate. The Transjordan Government requested in this note to Bunche that Israeli forces cease such operations during their armistice negotiations and withdraw to their original positions.

Elath also had with him the text of Tel Aviv's reply to Bunche which asserted that nowhere in the Negev were Israeli land or air forces operating outside the Israeli borders, and that these forces had not crossed and did not intend to cross the Transjordan frontier. The Israeli reply referred to the fact that the Transjordan note revealed the presence of Transjordan forces in the Negev and stated that this constituted a serious embarrassment to the armistice negotiations. The Israeli Government then registered a strong protest against this "invasion" and requested Bunche to transmit to the Transjordan Government the Israeli demand for the immediate withdrawal of the Transjordan forces to their own side of the frontier.

The Department expressed to Elath the gravest concern as regards the situation and strongly impressed upon him the serious consequences that would ensue should the report of the Israeli incursion into Transjordan be verified. Elath stated that his government was fully aware of and had no desire to provoke such consequences.⁵

This morning Elath has telephoned the Department to say that he has had a further telegram from Foreign Minister Sharett (Shertok) again stating categorically that no Israeli forces had crossed into Transjordan or had any intention of doing so.⁶

⁴ Eliahu Elath, who had recently changed his surname from Epstein.

⁵ The information covered in Secretary Acheson's memorandum up to this point was sent to Tel Aviv in telegram 145, March 6, 7 p. m. The Department instructed Mr. McDonald to convey to the Israeli Foreign Office its expression of "gravest concern" and of "serious consequences" should the reported Israeli incursion into Transjordan be verified (SG7N.01/2-2849). Telegram 145 was repeated to London, Anunan, New York and to Jerusalem as No. 146, identified also as Unpal 55, for Mr. Ethridge. It was sent also to Beirut, Baghdad, Panamas, Jidda, and Cairo the following day in a circular telegram of March 10 (SG7N.01/3-1049).

⁶ Mr. Satterthwaite's memorandum of conversation states that he "thanked Mr. Elath for the prompt response to our inquiries, and took occasion to point out that our representations had not been based on press reports but on information which we had received from our representatives. I expressed the hope that there would be no further developments which might adversely affect the present delicate negotiations." (SG7N.01/3-1049)

تابع ملحق (٥١)

S12

FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1949, VOLUME VI

Ambassador Franks has also telephoned me to inform me of telegrams about this situation which he has received. He had been instructed to see me, but thought he would not trouble me by coming down in person. He added that the information he was giving me was for you as well as for me. He said that the movement of a considerable Israeli force south into the Negev toward the Gulf of Akaba was not in line with the Security Council resolution and that the recent armistice could not override the Security Council. The British also have reports, not yet confirmed, that the Israelis have moved into Transjordan territory. He confirmed our information that Bunche is sending observers into the area to report on the situation, and said that his government hoped to hear from these observers soon.

The Ambassador further said that his government had sent instructions to the British forces in Akaba to the effect that if the Israeli forces fire on British forces, the fire is to be returned, and that if Israeli aircraft fly over British forces they will be engaged. The British Consul at Haifa has also been instructed to give the Israeli Government the exact text of the instructions.

The Ambassador then said that the only bit of more encouraging information he had is a report from Amman indicating that the Israeli forces which had made contact with the Arab Legion inside Transjordan had broken off contact at dusk yesterday and retreated westward. This later information is confirmed in a telegram which the Department received from the Legation at Amman this morning that Israeli forces have left Transjordan territory and are proceeding southward toward the Gulf of Akaba.

Sir Oliver Franks then said that he wished to express to me the anxiety of his government and to explain what they had done in the situation. The Ambassador later phoned to say that the Ambassador had forgotten to make the following statement: "We were reluctant to believe that Israeli forces had taken this action, but if the news of an aggression into Transjordan territory is confirmed, British obligations under the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty will, of course, immediately come into question."

I thanked the Ambassador for this information and said that I felt sure the British at Akaba would behave with restraint and not allow any minor incident to set off the balloon. I also told him of the reports we had received from the Israelis denying the truth of the report that they had crossed into Transjordan. I pointed out that the frontier is not marked, and that if someone should wander across it without evil intent it would be too bad to set off the whole show. The ambassador said he would use what I had told him in a message to his government. The important point was he said as I would know that "this does touch his people on a very raw nerve".

Reference -		PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE		1	2	3	4	5	6
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No. 4/b/499

1410

8 April, 1949

IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

✓ Draft LETTER

H. E.

Thank you for your two letters J 1166/1194/16G and J 2065/1224/16G of 22nd February and 29th March about supply of arms for the Egyptian armed forces. I am grateful for the efforts which had been made to clear the decks.

The question is, as you will realise, coming into even sharper focus now that the first steps towards technical talks have been taken.

The Commanders in Chief, with my concurrence and advice, give prominence in their paper for the Egyptian Prime Minister to the importance which they attach to the development of strong well-trained and well-equipped Egyptian armed forces. That proposition naturally stands on its own legs. But it is of course also true that we have no chance of getting this or any other Egyptian Government to agree to our present requirements in Egypt unless we are prepared at the same time to help them to build up their own strength. However successful we may be in getting them to admit that the presence in Egypt of British forces is essential now, they all look to the eventual day when their own strength will make this unnecessary - and no-one can blame them. The point came out very clearly in the course of Air Marshal Dickson's conversation with the Egyptian Prime Minister on April 1st, when the latter asked for an assurance that

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Michael Wright Esq
African Dept.
Foreign Office

Handwritten notes:
H. E. see first
7/4

H. E. see first

7 copies to Mr. Well "Personnel" together with copies of the correspondence in 409/3/450 and 409/3/450 and copy of present letter only to go to Mr. A. and A.A.

تابع طلع (٥٢)

Reference:-		PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE					
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- 2 -

we really were genuine in our desire to see the Egyptian Army and Air-Force made strong and effective. Abdel Hrdi said that he hoped that this aspect of our proposals would not be pushed on one side in the discussions. He did not want the Egyptian force to be relegated to a minor role; Egypt must feel that she had the means to contribute to her own defence. This did not mean only internal security. He wanted Egypt to fight to keep the enemy outside the frontiers of Egypt and he had rather expected that our paper would have stated more precisely what size the Egyptian forces should be and what would be the requirements to make them effective. Dickson of course gave him the assurance for which he asked and was able to satisfy him that the Commanders in Chief had dealt with the composition and role of the Egyptian armed forces in general terms only because ^{in decision in principle} they would depend so much on the wishes of the Egyptians themselves (which would no doubt be made known when the discussions started).

Moreover, The Ministry of War and Marine have also recently returned to the charge with my Air Attaché. Group-Captain Gezerine, the Minister's Principal Air Adviser, told Hayes on April 2nd that the Egyptian authorities urgently needed to know when the arms embargo was likely to be lifted. They had spent about three million pounds Egyptian on the purchase of various types of aircraft, including Fiat and Macchi fighters from Italy, in the course of the fighting in Palestine. They had not liked to buy ^{any} aircraft which ^{was} not British, but while the arms embargo remained in force

they/

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ملحق (٥٢)

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MH

4/13/49

CYPRUS TELEGRAM C.T.P.

FROM: FOREIGN OFFICE (14) Copy No.
 TO: CAIRO
 NO: 962
 DESP. 1727 hrs. 17.5.49
 DECYD. 1922 hrs. 19.5.49
 DATED. 16th May, 1949.



TOP SECRET

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 5240 of May 16th repeated for information to Bagdad, Cairo, B.M.E.O. and Amman and Saving to U.K. Delegation New York.

[4/11/49]

Your telegram No. 2438.
 Palestine Arms Embargo.

Please speak again to Mr. Acheson and tell him that I should be very glad to have his further and early views.

2. You should say that I have now heard that the King of Egypt has told the Egyptian Prime Minister to go ahead with military talks with us and that three Egyptian officers have been nominated for the purpose. [G.D.] Prime Minister has again pressed us about the resumption of the supply of arms to Egypt. It is clear that very little progress can be made with the former without the latter.

3. I also understand that the United States Government, following the signature of the armistices between Israel and neighbouring countries, are informing both Israel and the Arab Governments that they are prepared to accept trainees from the Middle East for training in American National Defence Establishments. This might perhaps be regarded as a step in the same direction.

4. With reference to paragraph 11 of your telegram under reference I appreciate Mr. Acheson's thought. I have however verified that military equipment which we might supply to the Arab States has long been earmarked and consists of purely British-type equipment. This equipment in no way corresponds with equipment being requested as a result of the Atlantic Pact. The supply of the latter would not (repeat not) enable us to release any corresponding or equivalent types for use by Arab States who would in fact be incapable of using it.

[4/7/49]

5. In the circumstances I am most anxious not to delay any longer action either under paragraph 3 or paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 4632.

Cairo pass to B.M.E.O. as 905.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Copies to: Mr. Wall (6)
 Military Attaché
 Air Attaché.

Handwritten signature

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ملحق (٥٤)

Reference:-	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE					
Aug 20/1949	1	2	3	4	5	6
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MINUTE SHEET 315

1/8/49 9092(P) 4095
Air Ministry File No.
L.N. C.32527/AFL5./5366

SECRET

L.C.A.S. (P)

Copy to: D.O. (F.F.)
S.9. (a)
S.6
M.O.S. (Air 3(b))
Person

Aircraft for Egypt

Group Captain MAHMOUD, the Egyptian Air Attache, has told me that the R.E.A.F. are most anxious to obtain delivery from the makers of the following aircraft before the end of their financial year in February 1950. The reason is that unless the money is used this year it will revert to the Egyptian Treasury. Incidentally, MAHMOUD has authority to place a firm order for these aircraft and make the required monetary deposits.

(a) 20 Sea Fury, Mk.10
(b) 14 Vampire, Mk.5
(c) 7 Meteor, Mk.8
(d) 1 Meteor, Mk.7

These aircraft are in addition to those already ordered by the R.E.A.F. (Vis. 6 METEOR IV, 1 METEOR VII, 6 VAMPIRE V).

2. I told him that the METEOR Mk.8s are out of the question because of production delays, but that we are prepared to see if METEOR Mk.4s could be made available instead.

3. With regard to the VAMPIRES, I said that we hope to be able to let him know within the next two weeks whether we can meet his request.

4. I should be grateful if you could tell me to what extent we can help the Egyptians in obtaining these aircraft before the end of their financial year, on the assumption that the embargo is lifted.

J.P. Pearson
D.D.A.F.L.

9th August 1949.
MC.

المصادر

obeyikandi.com

المصادر العربية

أولاً: المصادر الأصلية:

١- الوثائق الرسمية

الوثائق غير المنشورة:

(١) وثائق محفوظة بدار الوثائق القومية:

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
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بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم


﴿ الحمد لله الذي هدانا لهذا وما كنا لنهتدي لولا أن هدانا الله ﴾

[صدق الله العظيم]


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
بعض نصور مصر الأوائل يتوسطهم الملازم طيار/ محمد عبد المنعم الميقاتي.



أولى طائرات سلاح الطيران من طراز «موث» في مطار هايتيلد قبل إقلاعها إلى مصر.



طائرات الـ «موث» في مطار «بيزا» بإيطاليا خلال رحلتها التاريخية إلى مصر في مايو ١٩٣٢.



الملازم طيار/ محمد عبد المنعم الميقاتي يحيى بعض مودعيه في مطار بيزا بإيطاليا خلال الرحلة التاريخية الأولى لنسور مصر الأوائل عام ١٩٣٢.



ثاني طرازات الطائرات التي دخلت خدمة سلاح الطيران من طراز «أفرو» ٦٢٦ قبل إقلاع نسور مصر من إنجلترا في نوفمبر ١٩٢٢.




نصور مصر الأوائل قبل إقلاعهم بطائرات «الافرو» من إنجلترا في نوفمبر عام ١٩٢٢.



طائرات الـ «أفرو ٦٢٦» بعد وصولها إلى مصر خلال أحد طلعات التدريب.



رئيس الوزراء المصرى محمد توفيق نسيم مع نسور مصر الأوائل عام ١٩٣٥.



«سينكس» باشا مفتش عام الجيش المصرى أثناء رحلة جوية إلى منقباد بواسطة إحدى طائرات النقل من طراز «ويسكس».



بعض طيارى مصر الأوائل يتوسطهم الملازم أول طيار/ محمد عبد الحميد الدغيدى وعلى يمينه الملازم أول طيار/ عبد المنعم أحمد وعلى يساره الملازمين أوائل طيارين/ أحمد ناجى وعبد المنعم الميقاتى وعبد الحليم خليفة.




رئيس الوزراء محمد محمود وعلى يساره الدكتور أحمد ماهر وزير المالية أثناء مشاهدة أحد العروض الجوية أثناء حفل التخرج من مدرسة الطيران عام ١٩٣٨.



اللواء على اسلام (أول قائد لسلاح الطيران مصر) أثناء زيارته للسرب الأول المجهز بطائرات لايسندر عام ١٩٣٩.




بعض طياري «الأوداكس» أثناء التلقين قبل الطيران أثناء الحرب العالمية الثانية.



بعض الفنيين أثناء عملهم في صيانة طائرات الـ «لايستندر» خلال الحرب العالمية الثانية.



بعض طياري السرب الأول المجهز بطائرات «لايسندر» في أرض هبوط القصابة عام ١٩٤٠.



بعض الفنيين يقومون بتسليح طائرة لايسندر بالقتال خلال الحرب العالمية الثانية.



رئيس الوزراء اسماعيل صدقى فى حفل افتتاح نادى الطيران عام ٤٦ وسط نخبة من طيارى السلاح
الجوى الملكى يتوسطهم قائد الفرقة الجوية عبد المنعم الميقاتى.



مجموعة من الطيارين والفنيين بالسرب الثانى قتال مع إحدى طائرات «سبيفير ٥» المجهز بها ذلك
السرب عام ١٩٤٧.



الملازم طيار طاهر زكى على طائرته من طراز «سبيفير ٥» عام ١٩٤٧.



اللواء المرؤى قائد القوات المصرية بفلسطين عام ٤٨ يتحدث إلى قائد الجناح محمود صدقى المليجى قائد القوة الجوية التكتيكية بالميدان.



بعض طيارى القوة الجوية التكتيكية وضباط الجيش المصرى فى أحد المستعمرات الاسرائيلية بعد سقوطها فى أيدي القوات المصرية عام ١٩٤٨.



قائد الجناح محمد نبيه حشاد (أحد ضباط هيئة المستشارين المصريين) مع الملك عبد الله فى قاعدة المفرق فى ٢٢ يونيو عام ١٩٤٨.



قائد السرب عبد الحميد أبو زيد (أحد أبطال حرب ١٩٤٨) يتوسط بعض زملائه فى مطار العريش عام ١٩٤٨، ويظهر خلفه من اليمين الملازم أول طيار جلال زيد ثم قائد السرب حسين رشدى وطبيب المطار فقائد السرب صلاح العطيفى وأحد الأصدقاء.



الفنيين المصريين يقومون بجر القنابل لتسليح إحدى طائرات النقل التى جهزت لقذف القنابل عام

١٩٤٨.



الفريق محمد حيدر وسط لفيف من ضباط الجيش أسفل إحدى القاذفات من طراز «هاليفاكس» في حفل تخرج دفعة من الطيارين المصريين عام ١٩٤٩.




تشكيل من قاذفات «لانسكتر» أثناء طيرانها فوق نيل القاهرة عام ١٩٥٠.



تشكيل أولى طائرات السلاح الجوي الملكي النفاثة من طراز «فامبير» أثناء طيرانها فوق القلعة عام

١٩٥١.



تشكيل من طائرات والميتور، ثاني الطرازات النفاثة في سلاح الطيران الملكي المصري أثناء طيارتها فوق القناطر الخيرية عام ١٩٥١.

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بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ

**الحمد لله الذي هدانا لهذا وما كنا
لننتدي لولا أن هدانا الله**

صدق الله العظيم